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The Achievement Gap, Revisited: 
An empirical assessment of what we can learn from East Asian education 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 International mathematics assessments have established students in East Asia as among 
the best in the world and their U.S. counterparts as mediocre. What is not clear is why this 
“achievement gap” exists. The last major study to address this question, Stevenson and Stigler’s 
(1992) The Learning Gap, was published prior to empirical and methodological advances in 
international comparative research on education. Prevailing wisdom points to unverified 
differences in cultural beliefs, which often leads to defeatist conclusions. This dissertation offers 
a fresh perspective by applying sociological theory and methods to the issue. Specifically, I rely 
on underutilized data from the 2003 and 2007 Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS) of fourth graders to compare educational systems across three major factors that 
influence math achievement: curriculum, teachers and parents.  
 My main empirical findings are that there is greater uniformity of math instruction across 
classrooms in the participating East Asian nations of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan 
than in the U.S. and that, among all participating educational systems, average achievement 
tends to be higher in those with greater uniformity of instruction. The implication is that the 
institutional arrangements that allow for less uniformity of instruction across classrooms in the 
U.S. might be partially responsible for the gap. Cross-regional differences in teacher 
effectiveness might also account for part of the gap, as three-level, hierarchical linear models of 
achievement in each nation indicate that U.S. math teachers are less effective than their East 
Asian counterparts—even after the quantity of instruction provided is taken into account. The 
main theoretical contribution is an alternative explanation for the apparent cross-regional 
Professor Mary C. Brinton, Advisor  Katherine J.D. Czehut 
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disparity in the proportion of involved parents, which highlights how schools can make a 
difference in whether or not parents become involved. Such an approach promises a way out of 
the dead-end reached by previous theorists. 
 However, this dissertation also draws attention to the limitations of the existing data. At 
present, there is not enough information available to substantiate the policy recommendations 
made in previous studies. As such, a central aim of this dissertation is to put research onto 
sounder methodological footing.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
N DECEMBER 2010,  the 2009 round of the Program for International Student Assessment, 
or PISA, became the latest international assessment in mathematics to publish its results. 
PISA 2009 is the 10
th
 international assessment in math that the U.S. has participated in since the 
1960s, and because most studies assess student achievement at several different grade levels, it 
represents the 19
th
 opportunity the U.S. has had to crack the list of top five nations in math. It 
also represents the 19
th
 time that the U.S. has failed to do so, even though President George H. 
W. Bush made it a national priority to reach the No. 1 spot in both math and science back in 
1990 (Vinovskis 1999). The average math score of 15-year-old U.S. students on the 2009 PISA 
is below the average for the 32 OECD member nations that participated and ranks 31
st
 out of 65 
educational systems. Facing reporters regarding the 2009 PISA results, Secretary of Education 
Arne Duncan was blunt in his response: “We have to see this as a wake-up call,” he said, adding: 
“We can quibble, or we can face the brutal truth that we’re being out-educated.”1 
 International assessments such as PISA and the Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study, or TIMSS, are designed to tell us how educational systems perform compared to 
                                                     
1
 Quote excerpted from Dillon (2010). 
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one another. At this point, the pattern of mediocrity in U.S. education is well-established. What 
is also clear is that East Asian nations are the best in the world at providing their youth with a 
superior math education. Since the 1980s, East Asian nations consistently have topped the list of 
high-achieving nations in math, as the summary of international math achievement scores from 
the U.S. and East Asian nations provided in Table 1.1 indicates. This is no small feat, especially 
considering that the number of nations participating in each of these studies has ballooned from 
18 to almost 70. These results suggest that East Asian educational systems—in particular those 
of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan—are more effective than ours at 
imparting math knowledge. 
 Although the existence of this “achievement gap” is obvious, the reasons for it are far less 
clear. Scholars and laypeople alike tend to focus on East Asian culture as the explanation, and in 
the process rarely consider what educational systems in East Asian nations are doing to promote 
greater achievement. In this dissertation, I will argue that the role of educational inputs is far 
more important than the role that cultural legacies might play. The difference in approach is 
significant: to change our national culture would be a task far beyond the capacity of any 
department of education, teacher-training program or textbook publisher, whereas modifying 
instructional materials, teacher-certification requirements or school calendars is a reasonably 
attainable goal. 
  
 
Table 1.1 Summary of U.S. and East Asian Performance on International Assessments in Math  
  Year Survey Name 
Target 
Population 
N Edu. 
Systems 
Participating 
East Asian 
Nations 
Rank of the 
U.S. 
Rank of East Asian 
Nations 
1 1964 
First International 
Mathematics Study (FIMS)
a
 13-year-olds 12 Japan 10-11 Japan: 1-2 
2 1964 FIMS 
Students in final 
year of secondary 
school 12 Japan 12 Japan: 5-6 
3 1980-2 
Second International 
Mathematics Study (SIMS) 13-year-olds 20 
Hong Kong and 
Japan 
Arithmetic- 10, 
Algebra- 8-14, 
Geometry- 13-17, 
Measurement- 18, 
Descriptive 
Statistics- 7-13 
Arithmetic- Japan: 1-4, 
Hong Kong: 3-7, 
Algebra- Japan: 1, Hong 
Kong: 8-13, Geometry- 
Japan: 1, Hong Kong: 7-
11, Measurement- Japan: 
1, Hong Kong: 7-10, 
Descriptive Statistics- 
Japan: 1, Hong Kong: 7-
14 
4 1980-2 SIMS 
Students in final 
year of secondary 
school 15 
Hong Kong and 
Japan 
Numbers- 11-13, 
Algebra- 13-14, 
Geometry- 12-14, 
Functions and 
Calculus- 12 
Numbers- Hong Kong: 1, 
Japan: 2 Algebra- Hong 
Kong: 1-2, Japan: 1-2, 
Geometry- Hong Kong: 
1, Japan: 2, Functions 
and Calculus- Hong 
Kong: 1, Japan: 2 
5 1988 
First International Assessment 
of Educational Progress 
(FIAEP) 13-year-olds 12 Korea 12 Korea: 1 
6 1995 
Third International 
Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS) Third graders 24 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea and 
Singapore 10 
Korea: 1, Singapore: 2, 
Japan: 3, Hong Kong: 4 
3
 
  
 
Table 1.1 Continued 
  Year Survey Name 
Target 
Population 
N Edu. 
Systems 
Participating 
East Asian 
Nations 
Rank of the 
U.S. 
Rank of East Asian 
Nations 
7 1995 TIMSS Fourth graders 26 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea and 
Singapore 12 
Singapore: 1, Korea: 2, 
Japan: 3, Hong Kong: 4 
8 1995 TIMSS Seventh graders 39 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea and 
Singapore 24 
Singapore: 1, Korea: 2, 
Japan: 3, Hong Kong: 4 
9 1995 TIMSS Eighth graders 41 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea and 
Singapore 28 
Singapore: 1, Korea: 2, 
Japan: 3, Hong Kong: 4 
10 1995 TIMSS 
Students in final 
year of secondary 
school 21 None 19   
11 1999 TIMSS Eighth graders 38 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and 
Taiwan 19 
Singapore: 1, Korea: 2, 
Taiwan: 3, Hong Kong: 
4, Japan: 5 
12 2000 
Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) 
and PISA+
b
 15-year-olds 41 
Hong Kong, 
Japan and Korea 20 
Hong Kong: 1, Japan: 2, 
Korea: 3 
13 2003 PISAc 15-year-olds 41 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea and 
Macau-China 25-28 
Hong Kong: 1-3, Korea: 
1-5, Japan: 3-10, Macau: 
6-12 
14 2003 TIMSS Fourth graders 28 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Singapore 
and Taiwan 13 
Singapore: 1, Hong 
Kong: 2, Japan: 3, 
Taiwan: 4 
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Table 1.1 Continued 
  Year Survey Name 
Target 
Population 
N Edu. 
Systems 
Participating 
East Asian 
Nations 
Rank of the 
U.S. 
Rank of East Asian 
Nations 
15 2003 TIMSS Eighth graders 50 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and 
Taiwan 18 
Singapore: 1, Korea: 2, 
Hong Kong: 3, Taiwan: 
4, Japan: 5 
16 2006 PISA 15-year-olds 57 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, 
Macao-China 
and Taiwan 32-36 
Taiwan: 1-4, Hong Kong: 
1-4, Korea: 1-4, Macao: 
7-11, Japan: 6-13 
17 2007 TIMSS Fourth graders 43 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Singapore 
and Taiwan 13 
Hong Kong: 1, 
Singapore: 2, Taiwan: 3, 
Japan: 4 
18 2007 TIMSS Eighth graders 56 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and 
Taiwan 13 
Taiwan: 1, Korea: 2, 
Singapore: 3, Hong 
Kong: 4, Japan: 5 
19 2009 PISA 15-year-olds 65 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, 
Macao-China, 
Shanghai-China, 
Singapore and 
Taiwan 24-36 
Shanghai: 1, Singapore: 
2, Hong Kong: 3-4, 
Korea: 4-8, Taiwan: 4-8, 
Japan: 7-12, Macao: 9-12 
a 
 Mean achievement scores for the FIMS, SIMS and FIAEP comes from Medrick and Griffith 1992. Following PISA convention, I report the 
range of possible ranks for each educational system based on the 95% confidence interval of mean scores. 
b PISA+, or the PISA 2000 study, was administered in 10 additional countries in 2002.  
c Starting in 2003, PISA began assigning an upper and lower rank to each participating country. I have followed their convention here. 
 
 
 
 
5
 
 6 
 
WHY THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP MATTERS 
While success on the global stage might be linked to heightened national pride and unity, there 
are other reasons why we should be concerned about the mediocre performance of U.S. students 
on international assessments. Today’s youth are competing with their counterparts in nations 
around the world for employment opportunities, and many jobs now require more math 
knowledge than the majority of U.S. students typically receive from a K-12 public school 
education (Dayal 2012; Duhigg and Bradshaw 2012; Flamm 2012). The New York Times reports 
that China proved a more advantageous setting for the manufacturing of Apple’s iPhone in part 
because analysts at Apple had projected that it would take up to nine months to fill the 8,700 or 
so mid-level engineering positions the plant required in the U.S., compared to the 15 days it took 
to fill the same number of positions in China (Duhigg and Bradshaw 2012). The fact that U.S. 
students tend to possess weaker math skills than their counterparts around the world does not 
bode well for their future life chances in the global economy.    
 Additionally, research shows that international assessments serve as barometers of 
economic vitality. Using 40 years worth of achievement data from 50 nations to predict the 
average annual growth rate in GDP per capita while taking into account the security of property 
rights and openness to international trade in each nation over the same period, Hanushek and 
colleagues (2008) show that an increase of 50 points in achievement boosts a nation’s annual 
economic growth rate by 0.63 percentage points.
2
  To put that figure in context: if by 2000 the 
U.S. had reached the 1990 goal set by President Bush to become No. 1 in math and science 
achievement and effectively close the gap between the U.S. and East Asia, then the GDP in 2015 
would be 4.5 percent greater than it would be without any achievement gains (Hanushek et al. 
                                                     
2
 Hanushek et al. explain that GDP growth in the U.S. has persisted despite our lackluster scores due to the strength 
of our tertiary education and our free market trading policies. 
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2008). That increase in GDP growth is not insignificant. According to Hanushek et al.’s 
calculations, the 4.5 percent boost is equivalent to what the nation spends yearly on K-12 
education. In other words, if we figured out how to close the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap, 
then the investment would pay for itself. 
 
THE COST OF FAILURE 
International assessments might be the one place on the global stage where the U.S. does not 
excel. Some—including many East Asian-U.S. comparative education scholars—might argue 
that this is because, compared to sports and warfare, the U.S. cares relatively little about 
academics. But the amount of effort and money the nation has put into education over the last 
thirty years suggests otherwise. Educational reform has been a centerpiece of both Republican 
and Democratic Presidential Administrations since the 1980s. Per pupil spending for primary and 
secondary public education in the U.S. ballooned by 91.5 percent from 1980 to 2009 (the latest 
year with available data).
3
 The U.S. now spends more per pupil on primary education than any 
East Asian nation under investigation. In 2008, the latest year for which data from all nations is 
available, the U.S. outspent Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan by at least 29 percent and 
as much as 263 percent per student.
4
 Both the reform efforts as well as the increased funding 
suggest that the U.S. recognizes the importance of education and wants to improve the quality of 
education youth here receive. 
                                                     
3
 Data obtained from Table 191 of the 2011 Digest of Education Statistics published by the National Center for 
Education Statistics. Calculations based on the total expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance, in constant 
2009-10 dollars, from 1980-01 ($6,861) and 2008-09 ($13,141). 
4
 Data on per pupil spending on primary education in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and the U.S. 
come from the World Development Indicators database. Data from Taiwan were retrieved online from the Republic 
of China’s Ministry of Education website. According to my calculations, the U.S. spent $10,531 per student on 
primary school education in 2008 compared to $8,157 in Japan, $3,908 in Hong Kong, $3,393 in Taiwan and $2,903 
in Singapore. 
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 However, neither reforms nor bigger budgets for education appear to have done much to 
boost student achievement in math and science. As Table 1.1 indicates, the nation’s standing on 
international assessments has not changed much in the last few decades. On the TIMSS, U.S. 
eighth graders’ scores increased by just 1.2 percent in math and 1 percent in science from 1999 
to 2007. Among fourth graders, gains in math achievement were not much better, with the 
national average math score increasing 2.1 percent from 2003 to 2007 while the average science 
score was nearly stagnant, increasing just 0.6 percent over the same time period. The situation is 
similar if we use domestic assessments to measure gains in student achievement. Over roughly 
the same time period when per pupil spending on primary school education increased by 91.5 
percent in the U.S., average 9-year-old test scores in math and reading on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) only rose by 11 percent and 2.3 percent, 
respectively.
5
  
 The fact that the U.S. has tried to increase student achievement, and has spared no 
expense in the process, suggests that the problem stems not from a lack of concern but from a 
lack of understanding of what to fix.  
 
THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 
To design educational reforms that work, educators and policymakers need to know why the 
U.S. is unable to provide all students with high quality learning opportunities. International 
comparative research can help educators and policymakers accomplish this task. By comparing 
the educational inputs provided in the U.S. to those of high-achieving nations, we can begin to 
                                                     
5
 Data on achievement scores come from the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) 2011 Digest of 
Education Statistics Table 125 (for reading) and Table 141 (for math). Scores on the NAEP tests in reading and 
math range from 0-500; in 1980 the average reading score of 9-year-olds was 215, by 2008 the score had risen by 5 
points to 220. In 1982 the average math score of 9-year-olds was 219; by 2008 that score had risen by 24 points to 
243 in 2008. 
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pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses in our educational system. Given the track record of Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan on international assessments, there are no better educational 
systems to use to measure the relative merits of the educational inputs U.S. students receive.  
   
INFLUENTIAL RESEARCH IS OUTDATED AND INADEQUATE 
East Asian-U.S. comparative research has informed and influenced U.S. educational policy in the 
past. Yet the last major study to provide an in-depth examination of the reasons for the disparity 
in achievement between multiple East Asian nations and the U.S., The Learning Gap: Why Our 
Schools Are Failing and What We Can Learn from Japanese and Chinese Education, was 
published two decades ago. Advances in both data collection and methodology have rendered 
this work outdated and inadequate. However, its continuing influence on the field necessitates a 
brief summary. The Learning Gap, which was written by psychologists Harold Stevenson and 
James Stigler, represents the culmination of studies published by Stevenson and colleagues 
between 1982 and 1991 based on nonrepresentative data they collected during the 1980s, prior to 
the founding of PISA and TIMSS.
6
  
 The data for The Learning Gap were collected from five large, cross-cultural studies 
involving elementary school students, parents and teachers in Chicago, IL; Minneapolis, MN; 
Beijing, China; Sendai, Japan and Taipei, Taiwan that Stevenson undertook with support from 
the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Science Foundation and the William T. 
Grant Foundation. In collaboration with researchers in Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. Stevenson 
                                                     
6
 Stevenson and Stigler (1992) provide a full list of the studies on which The Learning Gap is based in the book’s 
final section.   
 10 
 
and his team devised achievement tests in reading and math that were free of cultural biases and 
contained grade-appropriate topics and concepts in math and reading.
7
 
 The results of Stevenson’s math tests act as a precursor to the internationally comparable 
assessments: the math scores of American students at every grade level fall well below those of 
their East Asian counterparts. The primary focus of The Learning Gap is to search out the 
grounds for this disparity. Stevenson and Stigler split their attention between cross-regional 
differences in cultural beliefs regarding child-rearing and the importance of hard work to 
academic achievement, and cross-regional discrepancies in educational practices and institutional 
arrangements, such as teaching methods and the way the school day is organized. They identify a 
number of cross-regional differences in these two areas from their observations of classrooms 
and from their interviews with teachers and parents, and provide some reasonable explanations 
why these differences might attribute to the achievement gap.  
 The main thrust of the book, and the dozens of articles published by Stevenson and 
colleagues before and since, appears to be that East Asians excel in math due to the cultural 
values of Confucianism, which emphasize education and success through hard work. The poor 
performance of U.S. students, on the other hand, reflects a pattern of cultural values and beliefs 
in the U.S. that does not support math achievement. In this theory, cultural values account not 
only for cross-regional differences in student achievement but also for cross-regional variation in 
school practices and educational policies. In other words, the cultural values embodied in 
                                                     
7
 The first study was administered in 1980 to roughly 240 students in each of three grades—kindergarten, first and 
fifth—from 10 elementary schools in Minneapolis, Sendai and Taipei (Stevenson et al. 1986). The team conducted a 
follow-up study in 1984 of the first-grade students who had participated in the 1980 study and were now in the fifth 
grade. The next two studies took place in 1986. One includes first and fifth graders and their parents in Sendai, 
Taipei and Chicago. The other targeted first, third and fifth graders, their parents and teachers in Beijing and 
Chicago. The final study took place in 1990 and targeted fifth graders in Minneapolis, Sendai and Taipei. 
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Confucianism gives rise to more effective and efficient educational systems as well as to citizens 
who invest more time and effort into scholastic achievements. 
 The studies on which The Learning Gap is based garnered significant media attention 
when they were first published; Stevenson and Stigler embarked on a national speaking tour soon 
after the book’s release. Despite its age, The Learning Gap remains in print in the 1994 
paperback edition. It represents the touchstone for research on East Asian academic success and 
math achievement. A cited reference search on the ISI Web of Science shows that it has been 
referenced in over 400 published works. The authors’ opinions continue to shape understanding 
of East Asian education; the book has been included in the syllabi for dozens of college courses 
throughout the past decade. While both Stevenson and Stigler separately have tinkered with the 
conclusions around the edges, and some attempts have been made to clarify the gap between 
Japan and the U.S. (LeTendre 1999) or between Chinese and U.S. teachers (e.g. Ma 1999), The 
Learning Gap represents the last comprehensive study that integrated data from more than one 
East Asian nation to assess the root causes of the East Asian-U.S. math achievement gap.   
 Despite its popularity and influence, the message of The Learning Gap is not entirely 
clear. This is reflected in the book’s reviews. One reviewer suggests that the focus is on what 
students, teachers and parents do at home and at school that differs fundamentally between East 
Asia and the U.S. (Yano 1993), while another reviewer claims that the emphasis is on attitudinal, 
philosophical and behavioral differences between two cultures (Pierce 1993). Despite Stevenson 
and Stigler’s dual focus on cultural beliefs and formal educational arrangements, their 
understanding of the relationship between the two is unresolved. It seems to be that cultural 
values influence the institutional arrangements of the educational system and continue to shape 
the day-to-day activities of students, parents and teachers. However, the remedies the authors 
 12 
 
provide to increase student achievement in the U.S. include not only changes to cultural values 
(example: “believe in effort”) but also specific policy recommendations (such as national 
curriculum standards and more time for teachers to lesson plan).Yet it is unclear why they 
believe the educational reforms they recommend would be successful without a concurrent shift 
in cultural values. 
 Another issue is that Stevenson and Stigler do not distinguish between assumptions and 
facts in their conclusions and policy recommendations. For example, Stevenson and Stigler 
assume that teachers in East Asia are more effective than their counterparts in the U.S. (the topic 
I empirically examine in Chapter 3), and focus their attention on the belief system, teaching 
methods and teacher training requirements in Japan and Taiwan for explanations and policy 
recommendations. Similarly, as I discuss in Chapter 2, they assume that the uniformity of 
instruction they witnessed across classrooms in Japan and Taiwan is the result of central control 
of the curriculum by the Ministries of Education in those nations and prescribe national 
curriculum standards as a possible solution for the U.S. However, as I explain in Chapter 2, the 
information compiled by TIMSS casts doubt on this claim. Despite the lack of analytic rigor, 
many of their arguments concerning East Asian education and beliefs have become taken-for-
granted facts in the literature on East Asian education. Until we can separate assumptions from 
facts, policy recommendations seem premature. 
   The field of East Asian-U.S. comparative educational research by and large continues to 
be mired in empirical and methodological weaknesses. Nationally representative data are still 
relatively underutilized. While conducting background research for the chapter on parents, for 
example, I found that the most well-cited works tends to rely on data from East Asian 
immigrants to the U.S. (for example: Kao 1995; Okagaki and Frensch 1998; Schneider and Lee 
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1990; Sun 1998). Given that immigrant Asian parents are raising their children in the same 
environment as their U.S.-born, white counterparts, it is no surprise that scholars attribute the 
greater educational investments of immigrant Asian parents (compared to U.S.-born white 
parents) to cultural values as opposed to contextual factors. Some immigrant scholars have 
moved beyond an emphasis on East Asian culture to suggest that macro sociocultural factors also 
motivate immigrant Asian parents’ involvement. For example, Sue and Okazaki (1990) contend 
that discrimination against Asians in many sectors of the U.S. economy prompts immigrant 
Asians to view education as their primary vehicle to occupational attainment. Yet a reliance on 
data from immigrant Asians to the U.S. precludes many scholars from asking how features of 
schools in East Asia might also contribute to what appear to be greater investments in education 
among East Asian parents.  
 Schools in East Asia would influence how immigrant Asian parents support their 
children’s education if immigrant Asian parents factor into their decisions their past experiences 
as students in East Asian educational systems. If this happens, then we would expect to find 
some differences in parental involvement between Asian parents who were born in the U.S. and 
their counterparts who were born and raised in Asia. Indeed, both Kao (2004), who analyzed data 
from the National Education Longitudinal Study 1988 (NELS), and Pong, Hao and Gardner 
(2005), who relied on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, have 
shown statistically significant differences in the parenting practices of Asian-born Asian parents 
and U.S.-born Asian parents. More evidence that immigrant Asian parents’ decisions regarding 
parental involvement are influenced by their past experiences in East Asian schools comes from 
Louie’s (2001) ethnographic study of immigrant Taiwanese parents and their college-aged 
children in the New York City area. Louie (2001) notes that one of her respondents, a Taiwanese 
 14 
 
mother whose son was unorganized and acting out when he was in elementary school, used a 
notebook to communicate with her son’s teacher so that she could help her son stay on track. 
While Louie does not expressly mention this fact, Taiwanese elementary schools employ the 
same technique to keep parents in the loop concerning their children’s homework and to provide 
parents with updates on their children’s progress (Stevenson and Stigler 1992). It seems highly 
likely that Louie’s respondent got the idea for the communication notebook from her own 
experiences in a Taiwanese elementary school. 
 Problems arise when scholars equate immigrant Asian parents or students with parents or 
students in East Asia. This is mainly for two reasons. First, the context in which immigrant 
Asians parents raise their children is different from the context in which parents in East Asia 
raise their children. Similarly, the context in which immigrant Asian students find themselves is 
very different from the context in which students in East Asia find themselves. The social 
context almost certainly influences what parents decide to do to support their children’s 
education (a point I elaborate on in Chapter 4)—and how students navigate their way through the 
school system. Second, and most important, immigrant Asians to the U.S. are a select group (e.g. 
a limited few who chose to leave their native country to live and work in the U.S.), and tend to 
be more educated than their native countrymen (Feliciano 2005). For these reasons, immigrant 
Asians simply are not representative of their native populations. Unfortunately, it is not 
uncommon for researchers to generalize their findings from immigrant Asians to the Asian 
population in Asia, with the result being that research rarely considers the influence of school 
and community factors on parenting styles or student performance and, in turn, on the East 
Asian-U.S. achievement gap. 
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 Beyond these empirical and methodological flaws, the guiding theory is also weak. 
Prevailing wisdom suggests that cultural values propel East Asian nations to the top of the charts 
in math achievement. First, the theory implies that U.S. culture is inferior to East Asian culture. 
It is a transparently defeatist argument: without a seismic cultural shift, math achievement will 
always be higher in East Asia than in the U.S. This kind of cultural depravity model has been 
replaced in sociology by theories that explore both structural and cultural factors to understand 
achievement gaps between groups of students within the U.S. 
 The guiding theory to explain the East Asian-U.S. math achievement gap is also flawed 
because it neglects the diversity of cultural legacies within East Asia. Hong Kong, for example, 
while part of East Asia, was ruled by the British for more than 100 years. All spheres of life in 
Hong Kong were thoroughly influenced by this concession, including economic, educational, 
political and cultural. Singaporean culture, too, is influenced by more than Confucianism. The 
nation-state also underwent a period of British rule during the 19
th
 century. While the majority of 
its citizens today are of Chinese descent, sizeable portions of the population are also Malay and 
Indian and almost 30 percent of the population is foreign-born. Thus, Singapore includes a 
number of different ethnic and religious groups, which contribute to the plurality of the nation-
state’s cultural legacies. Given the paramount importance of cultural legacies to the prevailing 
theory on the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap in math, it is particularly troubling that the 
cultural diversity within East Asia is so often overlooked. 
 Lastly, the prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap in math might be 
faulted for failing to acknowledge the disconnect between values and actions, or between what 
individuals believe and what they do. While cultural legacies, or macro-level value systems, can 
shape micro-level actions and behaviors, the two are not always in sync. The theoretical one-to-
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one correspondence between values and actions more often than not leads to the conclusion that 
nothing can be done to eradicate the gap. 
 
IMPROVING RESEARCH ON THE EAST ASIAN-U.S.  MATH ACHIEVEMENT GAP  
A sociological perspective would bring much needed clarity to this research. Sociologists of 
education who follow James Coleman tend to view individual schools as mostly closed social 
systems, which means that students’ actions and behaviors are only guided by the norms and 
expectations of the adult community to the extent that school staff, parents and community 
members work to instill these values in students.
8
 Explaining the chief reason why he chose to 
study high schools (for The Adolescent Society), Coleman (1994: 31) wrote:  
... high schools seemed to be one of the few social contexts in modern society that constituted 
largely self-contained social systems. Most adolescents directed their attention inward. Status 
among the adolescents in the school was more important than status outside. The youth could not 
easily leave the system and choose a different one. This meant that the processes which generate 
norms, systems of status, cleavage and conflict, in short the community’s functioning, were first 
of all internally generated (though with influences from school staff, parents, and community), 
and second, they were effective in shaping the behavior of the members of the system. 
 
 In this way, the higher average math achievement of students in East Asia compared to U.S. 
students can be seen as the product of educational systems with high achievement norms and 
with school staff, parents and community members who work to effectively instill those norms in 
youth. The implication is that a cultural legacy that values education on its own is not enough to 
propel a nation to the top of international assessments in math. Educational systems must endow 
educators with the resources and skills they need to foster high achievement norms among 
students. Given that parents also play an outsized role in their children’s early educational 
                                                     
8
 Whether schools are viewed as primarily open or closed social systems is a matter of debate within the sociology 
of education. While Coleman clearly viewed schools as closed systems, Chubb and Moe (1997: 364), for example, 
view schools as open systems “and thus products of their environments.” For more insight on Coleman’s 
understanding of schools as open social systems see Schneider (2000). 
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development, how educational systems engage parents in the schooling process (either directly, 
through websites or brochures, or indirectly, by preparing educators to work with parents) might 
also impact the extent to which schools can support and maintain high achievement norms 
among students. 
 Distinguishing schools as essentially self-contained social systems allows us to view 
cultural legacies as values that are instilled in youth as opposed to beliefs that are inherited 
through blood rights or birthplace. Moreover, this perspective explains why it is beneficial to 
examine cross-regional differences between East Asian nations and the U.S. in formal 
educational arrangements and everyday practices as the former shape and the latter shed light on 
educators’ capacities to encourage achievement. However, American sociologists have not made 
significant use of the internationally comparative data that have been collected in the decades 
since Stevenson and colleagues conducted their studies. This is unfortunate because—even 
though Stevenson and Stigler (1992) identify a number of cross-regional differences in formal 
educational arrangements and everyday practices—the evidence they provide to support many of 
the factors that they pinpoint as causes of the achievement gap loses some appeal upon closer 
inspection. For example, as I detail in Chapter 4, Stevenson and colleagues argue that the 
achievement gap exists in part because compared to U.S. parents, East Asian parents are more 
effectively involved in their children’s education. But their measures of effective involvement do 
not hold up to empirical scrutiny. 
 For these reasons, the aim of this dissertation is to put research on the East Asian-U.S. 
achievement gap on sounder empirical and methodological and theoretical footing. To 
accomplish this task, I focus on just three of the many variables that Stevenson and Stigler 
covered—the uniformity of math instruction provided, teacher effectiveness and parental 
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involvement—and rely on nationally representative data from the 2003 and 2007 TIMSS fourth-
grade population. Even limited to three variables and using two rounds of TIMSS, there are not 
enough data to make any concrete conclusions. However, putting the research on a sounder 
empirical and methodological basis will help to shine the spotlight on its strengths and 
weaknesses. Further, in the future when more complete data become available, additional 
research will provide a foundation for policy recommendations.  
 
DIVERSITY OF EAST ASIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 
The majority of data that Stevenson and Stigler (1992) collected from East Asia come from 
Japan and Taiwan. This dissertation relies on data from all East Asian nations that participated in 
the TIMSS fourth-grade populations: Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. By expanding the number of 
East Asian nations in the analysis, this dissertation throws into relief the diversity of educational 
institutions and practices within East Asia. In terms of elementary school assignment, for 
example, in Japan and Taiwan the schools children attend are entirely determined by home 
address, while in Hong Kong and Singapore parents are given some choice as to their children’s 
schools. There are also differences across nations in the methods used to formally sort students 
by ability. In Japan and Taiwan, high-school entrance examinations, which are taken in the grade 
9, are used to sort students into academic or vocational high schools of varying levels of prestige. 
In Singapore, on the other hand, students in grade 6 take a Primary School Leaving Examination, 
which determines their track placement. The system in Hong Kong is similar to Singapore in that 
students are allocated to different positions in the system depending on their performance on 
three examinations taken in grade 5 and 6. Additionally, while all East Asian nations have 
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national curriculum standards, the methods they use to implement those standards, and the 
amount of autonomy schools have over textbooks and curriculum, varies within the region.  
 The fact that there is not a monolithic educational system in East Asia suggests that 
following the typical route of international comparative sociological research on education and 
focusing on institutional arrangements of educational systems will not bring us closer to 
understanding why the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap in math exists. Nor does it seem 
appropriate to continue to vitiate East Asian-U.S. comparative research by ignoring the diversity 
of institutional arrangements within East Asian educational systems. Instead, this dissertation 
treats each East Asian nation as a distinct educational system to assess the reasons for the gap. 
 
DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
What is also missing from research on the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap is a rigorous 
quantitative analysis of high-quality internationally comparative data. This dissertation utilizes 
data from the 2003 and 2007 TIMSS fourth-grade population to build on Stevenson and Stigler’s 
(1992) investigation of the reasons for the math achievement gap between elementary school 
students in the U.S. and East Asia. Stevenson and Stigler’s review of cross-regional differences 
in the educational infrastructure of China, Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. ranges broadly from the 
number of hours that teachers are scheduled to teach each week to who is responsible for 
sweeping and cleaning the classroom floors. To begin to put research on a sounder empirical and 
methodological footing, I narrow the focus of this dissertation to three major influences on 
student achievement—curriculum, teachers and parents. 
 In the remaining sections of this chapter, I discuss the TIMSS data, the methods that are 
common to all chapters, and the magnitude of the math achievement gap between fourth-grade 
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students in East Asia and the U.S., according to TIMSS. In Chapter 2, I turn attention to the 
implemented curriculum, or the quantity of math instruction that students receive. Here, I 
empirically assess Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) assertion that math instruction is more 
uniformly distributed across elementary-school classrooms in East Asian educational systems 
than in the U.S., and address the question of whether average math achievement is higher in East 
Asia because of this. I build on the discussion of curriculum in Chapter 2 by examining how the 
quantity of instruction teachers provide influences student achievement as well as measures of 
teacher effectiveness. In so doing, I empirically assess Sørensen’s (with Hallinan 1977; with 
Morgan 2000) argument that student learning depend on how much students have been taught. I 
also investigate the possibility that the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap exists, as Westbury 
(1992) contends, not because U.S. teachers are less effective than their East Asian counterparts, 
but because East Asian teachers tend to teach more TIMSS math topics than U.S. teachers.  
 In Chapter 4 I shift focus to explore the parental involvement gap between East Asia and 
the U.S., which Stevenson and colleagues finger as a prime cause of the achievement gap. The 
prevailing theory to explain why levels of parental involvement are supposedly higher in East 
Asian nations than in the U.S. is that Confucianism compels East Asian parents to make their 
children’s education their top priority. This cultural deprivation model is inherently defeatist and 
leads scholars too often to conclude that nothing can be done to eradicate the East Asian-U.S. 
parental involvement gap. I draw on case studies of Japanese preschools and elementary schools 
that have been published since Stevenson and Stigler (1992), as well as sociological theory, to 
put forth an alternative argument that schools can make a difference in the proportion of parents 
who are involved in their children’s education. Finally, in Chapter 5, I bring together the findings 
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from each chapter, and discuss the broader methodological and theoretical implications of this 
work.  
 
DATA & METHODS 
TIMSS was developed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (IEA) and has been carried out every four years since 1995 to collect data on math 
and science achievement in educational systems around the world. The most recent rounds of 
TIMSS have two target populations: the grade with the largest proportion of 9-year-olds, which 
is commonly referred to as the fourth-grade population, and the grade with the largest proportion 
of 13-year-olds, which is commonly referred to as the eighth-grade population.
9
 For this 
dissertation, I analyze data from the 2003 and 2007 rounds of the TIMSS fourth-grade 
population. I limit the analyses to the more recent rounds as changes to the questionnaires since 
1995 make comparisons with the earlier round difficult.  
 TIMSS is unique among internationally comparable datasets in using curriculum, broadly 
defined, as its major organizing concept. TIMSS conceptualizes curriculum in three forms: 1) the 
intended curriculum, which represents the topics that governing bodies intend for students to 
learn, 2) the implemented curriculum, or the topics that are actually taught in the classroom, and 
3) the attained curriculum, or the material that students have learned, which is gauged by their 
achievement on the TIMSS assessments. Additionally, TIMSS asks students, teachers and school 
principals to fill out questionnaires regarding the contexts for learning math and science. This 
organizing structure has important implications for the type of data TIMSS gathers and for the 
content of its assessments. The end result is an internationally comparable dataset that provides 
                                                     
9
 Since 2003, TIMSS has been conducted at two grade levels. In 1999, just the eighth-grade population was targeted. 
The 1995 round targeted students in the third, fourth, seventh, eighth and twelfth grades. 
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more information than any other on the quantity of instruction that students receive, the extent to 
which the quantity of instruction that students receive typically varies within nations, and how 
much students in each nation have learned of what they have been taught. 
 Unlike PISA, which focuses on assessing students’ abilities to apply their knowledge and 
skills to real-life challenges, TIMSS aims to measure the extent to which students have mastered 
the topics and skills that they have been taught in the classroom. Extensive consultations among 
representatives from each participating nation, national committees and an international panel of 
math and science education and testing experts are conducted before each survey round to ensure 
that the individual math and science curricula topics included in the assessments are appropriate 
for each grade level in each participating nation. While the TIMSS assessments do not consist 
solely of the topics and skills included in the curriculum of all participating nations, the extensive 
care that goes into determining their content ensures that they are not “general use” assessments 
of students’ aptitude (such as the PISA or the Stanford Achievement Test). Instead, the TIMSS 
assessments measure the outcome of the principal activity of schools, which is what students 
have been taught in the classroom. In this way, TIMSS offers the best kind of assessment for 
studying the influence of teachers on student achievement. 
 The TIMSS assessments are administered near the end of the school year in each nation 
and contain questions in both constructed response and multiple-choice formats. The number of 
assessment items included in the entire test is too large for any one student to complete. For 
example, it would take an estimated 8.5 hours for a fourth-grade student to finish the 2007 
TIMSS assessment (Mullis et al. 2005: 99). Therefore, TIMSS employs the matrix-sampling 
technique typically used for large-scale assessments to distribute assessment items across student 
test booklets such that each booklet contains a balanced subset of the math and science items. 
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The assessment time for individual students was 72 minutes in 2003 and 2007, although the 
assessment design was modified slightly in 2007 to increase the amount of time students had to 
complete each section of the assessment. To derive the score students would have received had 
they completed the entire assessment, TIMSS uses Item Response Theory (IRT) scaling with 
conditioning and multiple imputation (for a detailed account of this method see Gonzalez et al. 
2004). IRT was originally developed by the Educational Testing Service and has been a popular 
technique for use on large-scale surveys since the 1970s (Gonzalez et al. 2004). To correct for 
the error inherent in the imputation process, TIMSS provides five plausible values of math and 
science achievement for each student. Achievement scores are internationally scaled to have a 
mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. For accuracy, I conduct each analysis of student 
achievement five times, once on each plausible value, and combine estimates using Rubin’s 
(1987) combination method.  
 According to Rubin (1987), a single set of results can be obtained from a data analysis 
performed n times (in this dissertation, n = 5) by saving the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors from each trial and combining them in the following manner. For simplicity, assume that 
each trial yields a coefficient      and a standard error     with t=1, 2... n. For coefficients, the 
formula for the combined estimate is the average of      across n trials is: 
   
 
 
    
 
   
 
 There are four steps in the calculation of standard errors. The first is to compute the 
within-imputation variance, W, which is the average of     
  across n trials:  
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The next step is to calculate the between-imputation variance, B, which is the sum of the squared 
difference between the estimated coefficients    , and the overall coefficient X divided by n-1: 
   
 
   
        
 
 
   
 
Next, the total variance, T, is obtained using the following formula: 
        
 
 
   
Lastly, to calculate the overall standard error requires taking the square root of the total variance, 
T. 
 TIMSS created a simple and easy sampling design, which National Research 
Coordinators (NRC) in each nation could implement with limited resources, that yields accurate 
and efficient samples of schools and students. TIMSS ensures that NRCs use the correct 
sampling procedures by providing easy-to-use manuals, software and expert assistance from the 
IEA Data Processing Center and Statistics Canada. NRCs were free to adapt the sampling design 
for their educational systems, but all adaptations had to be approved by the TIMSS International 
Study Center at Boston College (Foy and Joncas 2004).  
 Given the focus on curriculum, in TIMSS both the classroom and the school—in addition 
to students—are potential units of analysis. Therefore, the sampling design takes into account all 
three—schools, classrooms and students—in order to achieve sampling precision and data 
quality at all three levels. TIMSS relies on a two-stage stratified cluster sampling design. The 
first stage consists of schools that enroll the target population. Nations could decide to stratify 
schools (by factors such as geographic region or school type) to improve the efficiency of the 
sample design, to ensure adequate representation of specific subgroups of students in the sample, 
or to oversample certain subgroups of schools (Foy and Joncas 2004). Schools are then selected, 
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along with a replacement school, with probability proportional to size from each stratum. In the 
second stage, one or more intact math classrooms from the target grade in each selected school 
are sampled.  
 While TIMSS takes into account specific features of each nation’s educational system to 
determine the number of schools and students that each has to sample to yield reliable estimates, 
participating nations are required to sample a minimum of 4,000 students and 150 schools. The 
end results are probability samples that give accurate weighted estimates of population 
parameters. TIMSS provides sampling weights for each unit of analysis (students, classrooms 
and schools) that reflect the inverse of the probability of selection, controlling for non-
responding units (for a detailed account see Joncas 2004; Joncas 2008). TIMSS provides 
jackknife replicate-weight variables to use to estimate error variances. The jackknife repeated 
replication technique estimates sampling error through repeated re-sampling of the data. The 
variation of the technique used by TIMSS computes estimates once for the entire sample and 
once again for up to 74 “pseudo-replicate” samples of the original data. The jackknife variance 
estimation is the variance between the estimates for each of the replicate samples and the entire 
sample. In this dissertation, all descriptive statistics are computed using this jackknife technique. 
 Although it is generally nations that participate in TIMSS, there are a few exceptions. For 
example, Belgium, which has two educational systems (one French-speaking and one Flemish-
speaking), participated in the 2003 round but only sampled students, classrooms and schools 
from the Flemish-speaking system. Additionally, TIMSS also permits individuals states or 
provinces within nations to take part in the study as “benchmarking participants.” These 
participants are held to the same sampling standards as regular participants, with the exception 
that the minimum number of students and schools that must be sampled is lower. Three states 
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have participated in either the 2003 and 2007 TIMSS; in 2003 Indiana participated with a sample 
of 2,236 students in 56 schools, and Massachusetts and Minnesota participated in 2007. (The 
Massachusetts data include 1,747 students from 47 schools. The Minnesota data include 1,846 
students from 50 schools.) Although the number of states that have participated so far is tiny, and 
their sample sizes are small, where possible I include these data in my analyses.
10
  
 Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan and the U.S. participated in both the 2003 and 
2007 rounds of TIMSS, so there is a substantial amount of data from each nation under 
investigation. The U.S. sample includes data from 17,725 students in 994 classrooms in 505 
schools. For Hong Kong, there are data from 8,399 students in 292 classrooms in 258 schools. 
The Japan sample contains information from 9,022 students in 339 classrooms in 298 schools, 
while the Singaporean sample consists of data from 11,709 students in 536 classrooms in 359 
schools. Finally, in the Taiwan sample, there are data from 8,792 students in 324 classrooms in 
300 schools. Although this dissertation focuses primarily on these educational systems and the 
nationally representative sample from the U.S., I draw on data from other educational systems 
when the research question dictates. In Chapter 2, to assess the relationship at the system level 
between the uniformity of instruction across classrooms and student achievement, I rely on data 
from every educational system that participated in each survey round because the estimates 
become more reliable as the sample size increases. Additionally in Chapter 2, I draw on the state 
data because they allow me to examine whether math instruction is more uniformly provided 
within states than across states within the U.S. In Chapter 3, where the focus is to compare the 
efficacy of teachers in the U.S. and East Asia, I rely solely on data from those national samples. 
                                                     
10
 I do not merge the individual state data with the national sample in my analyses. The analyses of state data will be 
more fruitful once the 2011 TIMSS data are released because nine states participated in that round. 
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Finally, in Chapter 4, I use data from every high-achieving nation so I can put the proportion of 
parents in East Asian nations who are involved in their children’s education into perspective. 
 
THE EAST ASIAN-U.S.  ACHIEVEMENT GAP 
To see how well the U.S. as a whole and each of the three states that participated in either round 
of TIMSS instill math knowledge in fourth-grade students compared to educational systems in 
East Asia, I compare the average mathematics score of each educational system. Figure 1.1 
graphs these results. Nations are listed in alphabetical order from left to right, and the three states 
are listed on the right, after the U.S. data. Results from the 2003 round are in black. In the 2003 
round, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan ranked first through fourth, in that order, in 
math achievement. The U.S. ranked 12
th
, and scored almost 50 points or one-half of a standard 
deviation below the two lowest-scoring East Asian nations of Japan and Taiwan and 76 points 
below the highest-achieving nation of Singapore. Indiana state outperformed the nation as a 
whole, averaging a score about 15 points higher than the national average. These trends 
continued in 2007. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan ranked first through fourth, in that 
order, in 2007 while the U.S. ranked 11
th
. The U.S. as a whole averaged a score roughly 40 
points below the lowest-scoring East Asian nation of Japan and 78 points below the highest-
achieving nation of Hong Kong. The U.S. states that participated in the 2007 round, 
Massachusetts and Minnesota, both outperformed the nation as a whole. Massachusetts averaged 
an impressive score of 572, which puts its performance on par with Japan and Taiwan. The 
average math score of Minnesota is 25 points above the average for the U.S.  
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Figure 1.1 Fourth Grade Mean Math Achievement Scores on the 2003 and 2007 TIMSS 
 
 Another way to evaluate the capacity of educational systems to impart math knowledge is 
to compare the percentage of students in each educational system whose scores reached the 
advanced international benchmark. This provides insight into the proportion of highly 
accomplished math students each system is producing. The percentages of fourth-grade students 
from both rounds of TIMSS who reached the advanced international benchmark are displayed in 
Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.2, nations are listed in alphabetical order from left to right with the state 
data following the U.S. data on the right. The data from the 2003 round are displayed in solid 
black.  
 According to Figure 1.2, the percentage of students reaching the advanced international 
benchmark in math in the U.S. is less than half that of any East Asian nation in either round. In 
2003, 7.4 percent of U.S. fourth graders reached the advanced benchmark compared to 37.8 
percent in Singapore, 21.7 percent in Hong Kong, 20.6 percent in Japan and 16.0 percent in 
Taiwan. The percentage of highly accomplished math students from the Indiana sample, 7.5 
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percent, is on par with that of the U.S. In the 2007 round, 10.0 percent of U.S. students reached 
the advanced benchmark compared to 40.7 percent of fourth graders in Singapore, 40.4 percent 
in Hong Kong, 24.1 percent in Taiwan and 22.8 percent in Japan. On this metric, Massachusetts 
and Minnesota again outperformed the U.S. as a whole. The percentage of highly accomplished 
math students in the Massachusetts sample (22.5%) is on par with that of Japan, while the 
percentage from Minnesota (18.2%) is nearly double that of the U.S.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Percentage Meeting the Advanced International Benchmark in Math 
 
 Not only is the U.S. producing a smaller percentage of students who achieve at the 
highest level, but a look at the percentage of students who scored at or below the low 
international benchmark in each nation tells us that the nation is also producing a significantly 
larger percentage of students whose scores indicate that they do not have the ability to apply 
basic math knowledge in straightforward situations. Figure 1.3 provides a look at these data and 
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is formatted in the same manner as the two previous figures. According to Figure 1.3, the 
percentage of low achieving math students in the U.S. in 2003 is almost three times that of Japan, 
the nation with the next-highest percentage of low-achieving math students. In that round, 28.3 
percent of U.S. fourth graders scored at or below the low international benchmark in math, 
compared to just 6.4 percent of students in Hong Kong, 8.2 percent in Taiwan, 8.8 percent in 
Singapore and 11.2 percent in Japan. The percentage of students from Indiana whose scores fall 
at or below the low international benchmark, 18.1 percent, is lower than the U.S. sample, but still 
almost fifty percent higher than that of Japan.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Percentage Scoring at or Below the Low International Benchmark in Math 
 
 In 2007, the U.S. sample again contained a sizeable proportion of low-achieving math 
students. Twenty-three percent of fourth-grade students in the U.S. failed to reach the 
intermediate benchmark in math, compared to only 3.2 percent in Hong Kong, 7.6 percent in 
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Taiwan, 8.2 percent in Singapore and 10.8 percent in Japan. The percentage of students whose 
scores fall at or below the low international benchmark in Minnesota is also higher than in any 
East Asian nation, at 15.4 percent. However, the percentage from the Massachusetts sample, 8.0 
percent, is on par with Japan and Taiwan.  
 In sum, according to results from the TIMSS 2003 and 2007 math assessments, the U.S. 
as a whole continues to produce fewer elementary-school students with strong math skills than 
nations in East Asia. Compared to Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, the U.S. averaged 
a significantly lower score on both math assessments. Further, the U.S. produces a greater 
percentage of low-achieving math students than any East Asian nation that participated in the 
TIMSS 2003 or 2007 fourth-grade population. However, the results from Massachusetts are 
promising. The data from Massachusetts show that it is possible for the U.S. to succeed at 
imparting math knowledge at a rate that is nearly indistinguishable from that of East Asian 
nations and merits further study. For now, however, we can learn a great deal from examining 
education in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan—which have long succeeded in 
producing mathematically-adept youth and for which we have ample data—for insight that will 
help us improve the state of education in the U.S.  
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Chapter 2 
Curriculum 
 
ARVELING OVER THEIR VISITS to numerous fifth-grade classrooms during a short 
sojourn in Taiwan, Stevenson and Stigler (1992: 136) describe the experience as one 
of “déjà vu.” This is because, as they explain, “All fifth-graders within the school, within 
different schools in the city, even within all of Taiwan, are studying the same lesson.” Stevenson 
and Stigler are not alone in holding in high regard educational systems that have achieved 
significant uniformity of instruction across same-grade classrooms. In these educational systems, 
there is less variation in the quantity of instruction provided, more agreement among teachers 
regarding the curriculum, and less chance that some students do not receive training in basic 
knowledge and skills (Kerckhoff 1995; Stevenson and Baker 1991; Stevenson and Stigler 1992).
 
In other words, educational systems that have achieved significant uniformity of instruction 
across classrooms appear to be meeting one of the core challenges of schooling, which is to 
provide equal educational opportunities to all students (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010). This is 
not an easy challenge; the central aim of the last two Presidential Administrations has been to 
decrease the inequality of educational opportunities provided within the U.S. The abundance of 
scholarly and media critiques of President George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind policy and 
M 
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President Barack Obama’s Race to the Top funding initiative attest to the ongoing nature of the 
debate on the policies and practices that would best accomplish this task. Despite the importance 
of providing equal educational opportunities, international comparative research rarely pays 
attention to the relative uniformity of instruction offered within educational systems. 
 There is good reason to believe that realizing significant uniformity of instruction across 
same-grade classrooms is imperative, not only for equality but also for student achievement. This 
is because systems that fail to educate large portions of their youth populations should have 
lower average achievement scores than systems that tend to provide all students with basic 
knowledge and skills. Stevenson and Stigler (1992) suggest that the relative lack of uniformity of 
instruction across classrooms in the U.S. is one reason for the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap. 
However, the authors do not empirically examine this hypothesis. Instead, they contend that the 
uniformity of instruction across classrooms in Japan and Taiwan stems from the central control 
of the curriculum by the Ministry of Education in both nations, and prescribe national curriculum 
standards as a possible solution for the U.S. However, there is very little reason to believe that 
national curriculum standards on their own encourage either uniformity of instruction or student 
achievement.  
 The TIMSS data call into question the hypothesized link between national curriculum 
standards and student achievement. First, only 7 of the 42 nations that participated in the 2003 or 
2007 fourth-grade population do not have national curriculum standards in math. Of those seven 
nations (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Germany, Iran and the U.S.), three (Belgium, 
Germany and Iran) have officially defined national educational standards.
11
 Further, the 
                                                     
11
 The Flemish-speaking educational system in Belgium determines the curriculum for exit examinations that have 
consequences for students and therefore influence the curriculum used in schools; In Germany, the sixteen states 
determine their own curriculum but since 2004 each state has committed to implementing the national educational 
standards; On the 2007 survey, Iran responded that it does not have national curriculum standards but wrote in the 
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correlation between national curriculum standards (educational system has national curriculum 
standards=1; if not=0) and average achievement in math is small and negative (-0.05 for the 
2003 data and -0.03 for the 2007 data), suggesting that the relationship is weak and in the 
opposite direction than expected (e.g. systems without national curriculum standards tend to have 
higher average achievement scores).  
 Stevenson and Baker’s (1991) analysis of data from 15 educational systems that 
participated in the Second International Mathematics Study (SIMS) eighth-grade population 
provides some empirical support for the argument that centralized control of the curriculum 
encourages more uniformity of instruction. Stevenson and Baker show that compared to 
educational systems in which decisions concerning the curriculum are made at the local or 
provincial level, systems with centralized control over the curriculum tend to have less variation 
in the quantity of math instruction provided across classrooms, fewer teachers who teach little of 
the curriculum, and more agreement among teachers in the math topics they cover in class. 
Additionally, the authors’ analyses indicate that local factors, such as teaching experience and 
the heterogeneity of student ability in the classroom, exert less influence on the amount of 
instruction teachers provide in educational systems with centralized control over the 
curriculum.
12
  
 However, there is little reason to believe that national curriculum standards on their own 
promote uniformity of instruction. This is for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, having 
national curriculum standards does not prevent nations from differentiating the curriculum within 
grades. This is the point Westbury and Hsu (1996) make in their critique of Stevenson and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
survey response box: “The Organization for Educational Research and Development in Ministry of Education is the 
highest level of decision making. The program is mandatory throughout the country.” The response suggests that 
they do have some form of official standards. 
12
 Stevenson and Baker (1991) do not examine the relationship between uniformity of instruction and student 
achievement, so their work does not aid our understanding of that relationship. 
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Baker’s research. Westbury and Hsu contend that part of the reason why Stevenson and Baker 
find a relationship between central control over the curriculum and less variation in instruction 
across classrooms is because the centralized systems in their study tend to offer only one math 
course for eighth graders, while two of the five decentralized systems in their analyses offer 
multiple math courses at the eighth grade level. This type of curriculum differentiation should 
lead to greater variability of math instruction across eighth-grade classrooms—regardless of 
whether or not curricular decisions are made at the national level. 
 Focusing on the uniformity of instruction across classrooms, as opposed to indirect 
measures of educational inputs, such as national curriculum standards or curriculum 
differentiation, might bring us closer to understanding why the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap 
in math persists. If uniformity of instruction across classrooms is: 1) greater in East Asian 
nations than in the U.S., as Stevenson and Stigler (1992) assert, and 2) associated with higher 
average achievement at the system level, then the relative variability of math instruction across 
classrooms in the U.S. could be contributing to the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap. 
Fortunately, TIMSS gathered information from teachers on the number of math topics included 
on its assessment that students had been taught, which affords the opportunity to empirically 
address this research question.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to empirically assess Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) 
assertion that the uniformity of math instruction across elementary-school classrooms is greater 
in East Asian educational systems than in the U.S. and to examine, at the educational system 
level, the relationship between uniformity of instruction and achievement using data from all 
educational systems that participated in the 2003 or 2007 TIMSS fourth-grade population. If East 
Asian educational systems have achieved significant uniformity of instruction across same-grade 
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classrooms compared to the U.S., and uniformity of instruction relates to higher average 
achievement, then the institutional arrangements that allow for less uniformity of instruction 
across classrooms in the U.S. might be partially responsible for the East Asian-U.S. achievement 
gap. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on their observations of multiple classrooms in Japan, Taiwan and the U.S., Stevenson and 
Stigler (1992) claim that compared to the U.S., instruction is more uniform across classrooms in 
East Asian educational systems. But there is little empirical evidence to support or refute this 
hypothesis. Stevenson and Baker’s (1991) study is one of the few to compare the uniformity of 
instruction across educational systems. Of the educational systems under investigation in this 
dissertation—Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and the U.S.—only the U.S. and Japan are 
included in Stevenson and Baker’s analyses. Nonetheless, Stevenson and Baker’s results provide 
some support for Stevenson and Stigler’s assertion. Stevenson and Baker show that the amount 
of variation (measured in standard deviations) in the number of math topics taught across 
classrooms is twice as large in the U.S. (20.5) as in Japan (10.0). Compared to the other 
educational systems in their study, the amount of variation in the quantity of math instruction 
provided in Japan is quite small (it ranks as the second-lowest among the 15 educational 
systems), while the amount of variation in the U.S. puts it in 11
th
 place.
13
 By using data from two 
rounds of the TIMSS fourth-grade population, this chapter builds on Stevenson and Baker’s 
                                                     
13
 Stevenson and Baker (1991) also measure the minimum number of topics that teachers taught and the level of 
agreement among teachers regarding the curriculum but they do not provide descriptive statistics of these variables. 
For this reason, I am unable to compare results for Japan and the U.S. on these other measures of the uniformity of 
instruction. 
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work to expand the number of educational systems included in the analyses and to examine the 
relationship between uniformity of instruction and math achievement.  
 Stevenson and Stigler (1992) suggest that the lack of uniform math instruction across 
classrooms within the U.S. has a devastating impact on student outcomes. They explain (1992: 
137), “Enormous diversity in what is taught in the nation’s schools and the fact that not all 
children have access to a basic core of knowledge and skills means that large numbers of young 
Americans cannot compete for future employment or participate fully as citizens.” Based on 
Stevenson and Stigler’s logic, one would expect average achievement scores to increase along 
with uniformity of instruction, as the latter diminishes the odds that large numbers of students do 
not receive instruction on basic topics and skills.  
 International comparative research rarely examines the relationship between uniformity 
of instruction and achievement. International comparative educational research on the 
relationship between curriculum differentiation and achievement dispersion perhaps comes 
closest to addressing this issue. According to this research, achievement dispersion, or inequality 
in achievement, should be higher in educational systems that provide different groups of students 
with different curriculum. This argument is based on studies of ability grouping, which show that 
students in higher ability groups are given more learning opportunities than students in lower 
ability groups, and that the difference in learning opportunities contributes to the difference in 
average achievement across groups (Barr and Dreeben 1983; Carbonaro 2005; Gamoran 1986, 
1987). The expectation is that curriculum differentiation leads to greater dispersion of 
achievement.  
 In their review of the international comparative research on curriculum differentiation 
and achievement dispersion, Van de Werfhorst and Mijs (2010) report contradictory findings 
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from several studies. The mixed results could have to do with the vague nature of the variables 
used to measure curriculum differentiation, such as the number of school tracks and the age of 
selection into tracks, which do not entirely capture the amount of curriculum differentiation that 
occurs within nations. For example, the amount of curriculum differentiation that occurs in the 
U.S. appears relatively benign compared to Japan and Singapore when studies rely solely on the 
age of selection into different tracks (which is 18 in the U.S., 14 in Japan and 12 in Singapore) to 
measure curriculum differentiation.  
 This chapter contributes to international comparative research by measuring the degree of 
inequality of educational opportunities directly, as the degree of uniformity of instruction across 
same-grade classrooms, and by examining the relationships between uniformity of instruction, 
achievement and achievement dispersion. If the hypothesis developed from studies of ability 
grouping is accurate, then I should find a negative relationship between achievement dispersion 
and uniformity of instruction across classrooms (e.g. as uniformity increases, achievement 
dispersion should decrease). 
 
UNIFORMITY OF INSTRUCTION IN THE U.S. 
If educational systems that have greater uniformity of instruction across classrooms tend to have 
higher average achievement scores, then studying the relative uniformity of math instruction 
provided across classrooms within states in the U.S. might help to explain why, as I demonstrate 
in the Introduction to this dissertation, average achievement is higher in the individual states that 
participate in TIMSS than it is in the nationally representative sample. Recall that in the 2007 
sample, fourth-grade students in Massachusetts, on average, score higher on the TIMSS math 
assessment than their counterparts in Japan, and that students in Minnesota are not far behind. 
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Students in the nationally representative sample from the U.S., on the other hand, which does not 
include the students from the Minnesota and Massachusetts samples, averaged a math 
achievement score that is nearly one-half of a standard deviation below that of Japan. Given that 
the authority to determine the curriculum lies with each state, and each state uses its own 
assessment to measure student achievement, one would expect to find more uniformity of 
instruction within states than across states.   
 The National Central for Educational Statistics (NCES) provides some evidence that 
suggests that math instruction varies more across than within states. The NCES maps each state’s 
standard for proficient performance to the achievement scale for the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP). This mapping procedure allows the NCES to compare the 
strictness of the criteria for proficiency that each state employs. The NCES has conducted this 
study four times since 2003 using state data on reading and math proficiency at grades 4 and 8. 
In each study, the NCES finds that proficiency standards vary significantly across states (NCES 
2011). For example, in the most recent study the difference between the state with the lowest 
standards, Tennessee, and the highest, Massachusetts, was 60 points on the NAEP math 
assessment. To give an idea of the magnitude of this difference, the standards Tennessee 
employs are lower than the basic standard set by the NCES and the proficiency standard of 
Massachusetts is higher than the proficiency standard set by the NCES. While the rigorousness 
of each state’s standards do not foretell the variability in the math instruction that students in 
each state receive, they do suggest that there might be significant variation across states 
regarding the math skills and knowledge that educators believe fourth-grade students should 
obtain. I make use of data from the three states—Indiana, Massachusetts and Minnesota—that 
participated in TIMSS to conduct an exploratory analysis into the variation of math instruction 
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within states and across states in the U.S. Unfortunately, the number of states that have 
participated in the TIMSS is small, which precludes a substantive analysis of the relationship 
between uniformity of instruction and achievement within the U.S. at this time.
14
 
 
DATA 
TIMSS is unique among internationally comparable datasets for the amount of information it 
gathers concerning the math curriculum in each participating nation. The TIMSS assessment 
frameworks delineate the math topics included in the assessments at each grade level, and the 
Teacher Questionnaire solicits information from the math teacher(s) of each sampled classroom 
on the portion of the topics included in the TIMSS assessment that students had been taught. 
Specifically, the questionnaire lists each math topic on the TIMSS test and asks teachers to mark 
whether each topic was “mostly taught before this year,” “mostly taught this year” or “not yet 
taught or just introduced.”  An example topic from the 2007 fourth-grade Teacher Questionnaire 
reads: “Model simple situations involving unknowns with expressions or number sentences.” 
These data are similar to those used by Stevenson and Baker (1991). The main difference 
between SIMS, which Stevenson and Baker used, and TIMSS is the number of math topics listed 
on the questionnaire. The number included in SIMS is much larger (157 topics) than the number 
included in either round of TIMSS (42 topics in 2003 and 35 topics in 2007).  
 Data for this chapter come from educational systems that participated in the 2003 or 2007 
round of the TIMSS fourth-grade population and are not missing substantial information 
                                                     
14
 Nine states participated in the 2011 round of TIMSS. When those data become available I plan to include them in 
my analyses in the hopes that I will be able to contribute more insight into this research question.  
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regarding the TIMSS math topics that students had been taught.
15
 I rely on data from the fourth-
grade population, which minimizes the effect of officially sanctioned curriculum differentiation 
(e.g. tracking) on the variability of math instruction each educational system provides as none of 
the systems included in this analysis offer more than one math course to fourth-grade students. 
Table 2.1 lists the educational systems that are included in the analyses of each survey round. 
 Stevenson and Baker (1991) use educational systems, as opposed to nations, as their unit 
of reference. This distinction allows them to include data from places like Flemish-speaking 
Belgium and the Ontario province of Canada, which are not nationally representative but are 
representative of the educational system for those populations. I follow their lead to analyze data 
by educational system, as opposed to nation, which affords the opportunity to evaluate data from 
the various U.S. states that participated in the 2003 or 2007 round of TIMSS in addition to the 
nationally representative data that were also collected. Lastly, I conduct the analyses for this 
chapter separately by survey round as measures of the uniformity of classroom instruction are 
influenced by the different number of math topics included in each round’s assessment. For 
example, the minimum proportion of topics that could have been taught is smaller in the 2003 
data (1/42) than in the 2007 data (1/35).  
 The TIMSS sampling design calls for questionnaires and assessments to be administered 
to one or more math classrooms from each sampled school. This is the ideal scenario for 
empirically assessing the variability of math instruction across classrooms within each 
educational system. However, there are some instances in the TIMSS data in which the quantity 
of instruction that students received varies within the classroom. In these cases, some students in 
                                                     
15
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Russia and Yemen excluded teacher responses to some or all questions regarding the 
TIMSS math topics that students had been taught and were thus excluded from analysis. I also excluded from 
analysis educational systems in which a third or more of students are missing data on the topics they have been 
taught. This step led to eliminating Armenia (56.2% of students missing data), Iran (98.8%), Latvia (52.4%), 
Moldova (36.8%) and Tunisia (97.0%) from the 2003 sample, and Algeria (40.9%), Georgia (39.23%), Kuwait 
(47.07%), Morocco (49.6%), Mongolia (50.8%), Yemen (47.8%) and Dubai, UAE (49.1%).  
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the classroom received extra math instruction from another teacher.
16
 To use the classroom as the 
unit of analysis, I would need to: 1) average the quantity of instruction provided within these 
classrooms, which would result in inaccurate measures of the quantity of instruction each student 
in those classrooms received, 2) eliminate the whole classroom from the sample, or 3) eliminate 
the group that received additional instruction from the sample. Either of the last two options 
would affect the amount of variability of instruction that I measure at the system level. Although 
the number of instances in which the quantity of instruction varies within a classroom is small,
17
 
I use the student as the unit of analysis to keep the system-level measure of variability of 
instruction as accurate as possible.  
 There are other reasons as well to avoid using the teacher as the unit of analysis in the 
TIMSS data. In some cases, classrooms were taught math by more than one teacher. If I use the 
teacher as the unit of analysis, then students who were taught by more than one math teacher 
would be included in the analyses more than once. Further, the number of topics taught by any 
one of the teachers linked to the classroom would not be representative of the entire quantity of 
math instruction that students received. To accurately measure the quantity of instruction 
students in these classrooms received, I combine topic responses from their math teachers. In 
other cases, more than one math classroom was sampled from a school, and the same math 
teacher was responsible for teaching both classrooms. The quantity of instruction that these 
teachers provide sometimes differs across classrooms. To take the teacher as the unit of analysis 
                                                     
16
 It is unclear why these situations occur. They could be signs of ability grouping within classrooms, or signs that 
some students receive remedial (or advanced) mathematics training outside the classroom from another mathematics 
teacher at the school. 
17
 In the 2003 data, 2 classrooms from the U.S. sample, 1 classroom from the Australia sample, and 5 classrooms 
from the Indiana sample include a proportion of students who were taught additional mathematics topics by another 
math teacher. In the 2007 data, 16 classrooms in the U.S., 4 in Japan, 7 in Singapore, 1 in Australia, 4 in New 
Zealand, 1 in Scotland, 4 in Sweden and 5 in Massachusetts include a small proportion of students who were taught 
extra mathematics topics by another mathematics teacher. 
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would require averaging the quantity of instruction these teachers provided across classrooms or 
eliminating one of their classrooms from the analysis. Given that one of the central aims of 
schooling is to provide equal educational opportunities to all students, it seems reasonable, given 
the scenarios present in the data, to measure the variability across students (as opposed to 
classrooms) in the quantity of math instruction received.  
 Finally, missing topic responses are a problem in the TIMSS data. If I include partial 
information about the number of topics that students were taught, I risk building less accurate 
measures of the uniformity of  instruction within each educational system. For precision, I 
exclude from the analyses teacher-student pairings that are missing information on the number of 
TIMSS topics taught. The fourth column of Table 2.1 reports for each survey round the number 
of students from each educational system’s sample that are included in the analyses as a 
percentage of the total. (The percentage that is not included represent students who are missing 
data from their math teachers regarding the quantity of instruction they received.) 
 As explained in the Introduction, TIMSS is generally referred to as a two-stage stratified 
cluster design, which ensures a representative sample of fourth-grade students. To obtain 
accurate estimates of the population mean, median and variance of all variables under 
consideration, it is necessary to take the TIMSS sampling design into account. To account for the 
stratified nature of the sample, in all analyses I use the sampling weights for students, which 
represent the inverse of the probability of being selected to participate in TIMSS. Clustering 
tends to cause correlated errors, as the residuals attached to observations within clusters are no 
longer independent. To take the clustered nature of each educational system’s sample into 
account, I use Stata’s suite of survey data analysis tools to conduct the analyses using the 
jackknife replicate weight variables provided by TIMSS. The jackknife method in TIMSS fits the 
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model 74 times, each time dropping one or more schools (e.g. the primary sampling unit) from 
the estimation. The variance is estimated using the replicated point estimates.  
 
VARIABLES 
Student achievement is measured by students’ scores on the TIMSS math test. Achievement 
scores are internationally scaled to have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. I retain 
this scaling metric throughout the analyses of this chapter. As is typical of large-scale 
educational assessments, test questions are distributed across test booklets and each student 
completes a portion of the total assessment. TIMSS predicts students’ scores on the entire 
assessment using Item Response Theory (IRT). To correct for the error inherent in this 
imputation process, TIMSS provides five plausible values of math achievement for each student. 
For accuracy, I conduct each analysis five times, once on each plausible value, and combine 
estimates using Rubin’s (1987) combination method, which is explained in the Introduction.  
 I use measures of the mean, median and interquartile range (IQR) in student achievement 
for analyses of the relationship between uniformity of instruction and student achievement at the 
system level. Descriptive statistics of these math achievement variables for each educational 
system are provided in Table 2.1. Educational systems are listed from top to bottom in each 
survey round by mean math achievement. Descriptive statistics for the 2003 and 2007 data are 
provided in the first and second panel, respectively. The last row of data in each panel reports the 
average across educational systems in that survey round. Mean math achievement scores vary 
slightly from those published in the official TIMSS literature due to the fact that the analyses are 
carried out on a subsample of students (e.g. those not missing data on the math topics they have 
been taught).  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Math Achievement and Sample Size 
2003 Sample 
  Math Achievement 
N Students 
% in 
Subsample Educational systems Mean Median IQR 
Singapore 593 599 105 5,796 86.9 
Hong Kong 574 577 85 4,089 88.7 
Taiwan 564 567 81 4,188 89.9 
Japan 563 567 96 3,923 86.5 
Belgium (Fl) 550 551 82 3,533 76.6 
Netherlands 541 543 72 2,106 71.7 
Indiana, US 534 537 86 2,044 91.6 
Lithuania 534 539 98 3,421 77.4 
England 532 536 120 2,412 69.4 
Hungary 530 535 105 2,509 75.6 
United States 521 525 103 7,477 76.9 
Ontario, Canada 512 514 93 3,225 75.8 
Cyprus 511 516 113 3,319 76.7 
Quebec, Canada 505 508 88 3,292 76.1 
Italy 503 507 109 4,282 100.0 
Australia 499 504 107 3,160 80.3 
New Zealand 493 499 113 3,179 73.8 
Scotland 492 494 103 2,563 68.5 
Slovenia 480 486 106 2,490 79.7 
Norway 451 457 108 3,328 76.6 
Philippines 363 356 159 3,380 73.9 
Sample Average 516 520 102 3,510 79.7 
2007 Sample 
  Math Achievement 
N Students 
% in 
Subsample Educational systems Mean Median IQR 
Hong Kong 609 611 88 3,548 94.6 
Singapore 598 604 112 4,430 88.5 
Taiwan 575 577 91 3,561 86.2 
Massachusetts, US 572 573 91 1,570 90.3 
Japan 569 573 100 4,013 90.5 
Minnesota, US 557 563 105 1,639 89.1 
England 542 546 114 3,684 85.4 
Latvia 539 543 95 3,150 80.6 
Netherlands 534 536 82 2,371 70.8 
Lithuania 530 536 102 3,217 80.8 
United States 528 530 102 7,121 91.0 
Denmark 525 527 92 2,496 70.9 
Germany 523 527 89 3,969 76.7 
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      Table 2.1 Continued 
     2007 Sample, cont. 
  Math Achievement 
N Students 
% in 
Subsample Educational systems Mean Median IQR 
Quebec, Canada 520 522 93 2,783 71.6 
Australia 517 519 110 3,278 80.4 
Ontario, Canada 514 516 91 2,698 77.6 
Hungary 508 515 125 3,077 76.0 
Austria 507 511 90 3,769 77.6 
Italy 506 509 104 3,434 76.8 
B.C., Canada 506 507 91 2,973 72.5 
Alberta, Canada 504 506 88 3,492 86.5 
Sweden 502 504 87 3,383 75.6 
Armenia 502 500 121 3,237 79.4 
Slovenia 501 505 95 3,161 72.6 
Slovak Republic 497 504 107 4,132 83.3 
Scotland 496 501 107 2,683 70.1 
New Zealand 493 498 119 3,744 79.2 
Czech Republic 489 492 95 3,640 86.0 
Norway 474 479 102 2,950 72.4 
Ukraine 469 475 114 4,292 100.0 
Iran 403 407 119 2,625 68.5 
Colombia 361 360 120 3,468 72.2 
El Salvador 330 328 126 3,294 79.1 
Tunisia 319 322 157 2,809 67.9 
Qatar 297 298 127 5,155 73.5 
Sample Average 498 501 104 3,396 79.8 
 
 As shown in Table 2.1, in the 2003 sample, mean achievement ranges from a high of 593 
in Singapore to a low of 363 in the Philippines. In the 2007 sample, mean achievement ranges 
from a high of 609 in Hong Kong to a low of 297 in Qatar. Given that mean achievement 
depends on the distribution of achievement scores in the population, to isolate the effects of 
student achievement scores that fall on either end of the distribution, I also run the analyses on 
the median achievement score in each educational system. According to Table 2.1, the minor 
differences between the mean and median achievement of educational systems do not seriously 
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affect the ranking of educational systems by mean achievement. For example, in the 2003 data, 
although the mean achievement score of Indiana state (534) is equal to that of Lithuania, the 
median achievement score of Lithuania (539) is higher than that of Indiana (537).  
 The IQR measures the inequality or dispersion in achievement scores within each 
educational system. According to the results in Table 2.1, in the 2003 data, dispersion in math 
achievement is smallest in the Netherlands (72) and largest in the Philippines (159). In the 2007 
data, dispersion is smallest again in the Netherlands (82) and largest in Tunisia (157). Among 
East Asian and U.S. educational systems, dispersion in math achievement is largest in Singapore 
in both survey rounds (105 in 2003, 112 in 2007). In the 2003 data, Taiwan has the smallest 
dispersion in achievement, at 81, while Hong Kong has the smallest dispersion of 88 in the 2007 
data. Table 2.1 indicates that measures of student achievement vary between the nationally 
representative sample from the U.S. and the state samples. Each individual state outperformed 
the nationally representative sample on the TIMSS math assessment. Dispersion in achievement 
is considerably smaller in the Indiana sample (86) than in the nationally representative sample 
(103) from 2003. In 2007, dispersion in achievement was greatest in the Minnesota sample (105) 
followed by the nationally representative sample (102) while the Massachusetts sample has rate 
of dispersion (91) that is on par with Taiwan (91) and lower than Japan (100).  
 
Curriculum variables 
To gauge the average quantity of instruction provided by each educational system, I add up for 
each student the number of TIMSS math topics teachers indicate had been either “mostly taught 
this year” or “mostly taught before this year” and average the results across students within each 
educational system. Scores on this scale could range from 0 to 42 in the 2003 data and 0 to 35 in 
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the 2007 data, although the range of scores is much smaller in both rounds. In the 2003 data, the 
minimum average number of topics students had been taught is 21.3 in Norway and the 
maximum average is 37.2 in England. In the 2007 data, the minimum average quantity of 
instruction provided is 16.7 in Sweden while the maximum average is 30.8 in Singapore.  
 I create three variables to measure the uniformity of instruction provided within each 
educational system. First, I use the standard deviation in the quantity of instruction each student 
received to assess the variation in the quantity of instruction provided. Scores on this scale range 
from 3.7 in England to 8.1 in the Philippines in the 2003 data and, in the 2007 data, from 2.9 in 
Singapore to 7.15 in Qatar. Lower scores on this scale signal greater uniformity of instruction. I 
developed the other two measures of uniformity of instruction based on Stevenson and Baker’s 
(1991) research. The first assesses the level of agreement among teachers in each educational 
system as to what fourth-grade students should and should not be taught. To create this measure, 
I add up the number of topics that 10 percent or fewer or 80 percent or more fourth-grade 
students had been taught this year.
18
 Scores on this scale range from a minimum of 0 for several 
educational systems in both survey rounds to a high of 6 (for the Netherlands) in the 2003 data 
and 10 (for Japan) in the 2007 data. Larger values on this scale signal a greater degree of 
agreement among math teachers regarding the fourth grade math curriculum.  
 I use the minimum number of topics that students could have been taught relative to the 
average as my final measure of the uniformity of instruction that each educational system 
provides.
19
 To create this measure, I divide the minimum number of topics taught by the average 
number of topics taught in each educational system and multiply the results by 100 to get the 
                                                     
18
 Stevenson and Baker (1991) use the number of topics that had been taught by 90% or more, or 10% or fewer 
teachers within each educational system as their measure of agreement. Due to the much smaller number of topics 
included in the TIMSS, I use the number of topics that had been taught to 80% or more, or 10% or fewer students.  
19
 Stevenson and Baker (1991) do not take into account the average quantity of instruction provided to measure the 
minimum number of topics taught.   
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minimum percentage of the average quantity of instruction that students might receive. For 
example, the lowest score on this measure in the 2003 data is 26.7 percent (for the Philippines), 
which means that students who were taught the fewest number of topics in the Philippines 
received instruction on only 26.7 percent of the average number of topics that fourth-grade 
students in the Philippines tend to be taught. The highest score on this measure in the 2003 data 
is 70.0 percent (for England). In the 2007 data, scores on this scale range from a low of 0 (for 
New Zealand) to a high of 61.9 percent (for Taiwan). Lower scores on this scale signal less 
uniformity of instruction.  
 
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix for Measures of Uniformity of Instruction 
  2003 
   Variation Minimum % Agreement 
 Variation 1.00 . . 
 Minimum % -0.69*** 1.00 . 
 Agreement -0.45* 0.22 1.00 
 N = 21 
  
  
   2007 
   Variation Minimum % Agreement 
 Variation 1.00 . . 
 Minimum % -0.70*** 1.00 . 
 Agreement -0.57*** 0.48** 1.00 
 N = 35       
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
    
 Given that the three variables are derived from the same distributions, they are correlated 
by design. Table 2.2 displays the correlation matrix for the three measures of uniformity of 
instruction. The results show that the association between variation in quantity of instruction and 
minimum percentage of instruction is negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the 
p<0.001 level in both the 2003 and 2007 data. This finding suggests that the two variables are 
highly related but are measuring opposite ends of the same latent construct. The relationship 
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between agreement and variation is also negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the 
p<0.05 level in the 2003 data and at the p<0.001 level in the 2007 data, suggesting that these two 
variables are also tapping into opposite ends of the same latent construct. The relationship 
between agreement and minimum percentage is positive, as expected, but the weakest of the 
three for both survey rounds and statistically insignificant in the 2003 data (it is statistically 
significant in the 2007 data, at the p<0.01 level). The statistical insignificance of the relationship 
in the 2003 data could be due to the small sample size (N=21). These facts suggest that the 
agreement among teachers regarding the math curriculum and the minimum percentage of topics 
taught are related to the variation of instruction, but are capturing different dimensions of the 
concept of uniformity of instruction. 
 To examine the relationship between achievement and uniformity of instruction in greater 
depth, I need to combine the three measures of uniformity to form a single variable, because, as 
Table 2.2 indicates, the three measures of uniformity of instruction are highly correlated. To do 
this, I reverse score the variation in quantity of instruction variable so that higher scores signal 
smaller standard deviations in the number of math topics students had been taught. Then I 
standardize all three variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity before 
combining them into a single measure of the uniformity of instruction.  
 
RESULTS 
Is the provision of instruction more uniform in East Asia than in the U.S.? 
Stevenson and Stigler (1992) contend that compared to the U.S., instruction is more uniform 
across classrooms in East Asian educational systems. This assertion is based on their 
observations of multiple classrooms in Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. I empirically assess the 
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difference in the uniformity of instruction provided in multiple East Asian educational systems 
and the U.S. by utilizing nationally representative data from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan and the U.S., as well as data that are representative of the fourth-grade population in 
Indiana, Massachusetts and Minnesota. Table 2.3 displays the average quantity of instruction 
students in each of these educational systems received, the degree to which the quantity of 
instruction varied across students, the minimum percentage of topics students were taught and 
the extent of agreement among math teachers regarding the math curriculum. Results from the 
U.S. data, which includes separate datasets for Indiana, Massachusetts and Minnesota in addition 
to the national sample, are displayed in the first four rows of Table 2.3. The next four rows of 
data provide results from East Asian educational systems. The second to last row of data gives 
the average from the sample of eight East Asian and U.S. educational systems. The last row of 
data provides the sample average from all educational systems that participated in each round. 
 
Table 2.3 Quantity and Uniformity of Instruction in East Asia and the U.S.  
  
Quantity of 
Instruction Variation 
Minimum 
Percentage Agreement 
Educational Systems 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 
United States 34.5 30.0 6.4 4.8 29.0 26.7 5.0 5.0 
Indiana, US 32.0 . 5.8 . 65.6 . 2.0 . 
Massachusetts, US . 29.2 . 5.0 . 37.7 . 7.0 
Minnesota, US . 29.4 . 5.3 . 44.3 . 4.0 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hong Kong 30.7 26.2 6.1 3.7 45.5 57.2 3.0 6.0 
Japan 22.7 21.4 5.3 4.0 39.6 46.7 6.0 11.0 
Singapore 34.7 30.8 4.2 2.9 57.7 61.7 8.0 9.0 
Taiwan 32.8 27.5 5.0 4.6 54.9 61.9 7.0 1.0 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
East Asia-U.S. Sample 
Average 31.2 27.8 5.5 4.3 48.7 48.0 5.2 6.1 
Full Sample Average 31.1 24.5 5.5 4.9 46.6 38.7 4.3 3.9 
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 The first two columns of Table 2.3 show the average quantity of instruction students in 
each educational system received in 2003 (column 1) and 2007 (column 2). This measure tells us 
the average size of the implemented curriculum in each educational system. The East Asian-U.S. 
sample average in the 2003 data is 31.2 (out of 42, or 74.4%), which is nearly identical to the 
average for the entire sample of 21 systems (31.1, or 74.1%). In the 2007 data, the East Asian-
U.S. sample average is 27.8 (out of 35, or 79.4%), which is higher than the average for the entire 
sample of 35 educational systems (24.5, or 70.1%).  
 The results in Table 2.3 indicate that students in Singapore, on average, were taught the 
largest number of topics (34.7 or 82.6% in 2003, 30.8 or 88.0% in 2007) followed by students in 
the U.S. (34.5 or 82.1% in 2003, 30.0 or 85.6% in 2007), Minnesota (29.4 or 83.9%), 
Massachusetts (29.2 or 83.3%), Taiwan (32.8 or 78.0% in 2003, 27.5 or 78.5% in 2007), Indiana 
(32.0 or 76.2%) and Hong Kong (30.7 or 73.2% in 2003, 26.2 or 74.9% in 2007). In both rounds, 
students in Japan typically received instruction on significantly fewer topics (22.7 or 54.1% in 
2003; 21.4 or 61.2% in 2007) than their counterparts in East Asia and the U.S. This finding is 
particularly interesting in light of Stevenson and Baker’s (1991) work, which shows that out of 
all educational systems in their sample, Japan averaged the largest number of topics taught. The 
difference between the findings of this chapter and Stevenson and Baker’s likely reflect the 
extensive curriculum reforms that have taken place in educational systems around  the world 
since the 1980s. The results across both rounds of data show that, on average, all of the 
educational systems in East Asia and the U.S.—except for Japan—provide a greater-than-
average amount of math instruction.  
 The next two columns of Table 2.3 tell us the degree of variation in the number of topics 
taught in 2003 (column 3) and 2007 (column 4). The East Asia-U.S. sample average variation is 
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5.5 in the 2003 data, which is equivalent to the average for the entire sample. Variation in the 
2003 data is greatest in the U.S. (6.4), and is 152 percent that of Singapore (4.2), the educational 
system with the smallest variation in instruction. Interestingly, in the 2003 data, variation in the 
quantity of instruction students received is larger in Hong Kong (6.1) than in Indiana (5.8), 
which suggests that the variability of instruction is not always consistently lower in East Asia 
than in parts of the U.S. Variation is smaller than the average for the entire sample in Japan (5.3) 
and Taiwan (5.0), which is consistent with Stevenson and Stigler’s assertion that these 
educational systems have achieved significant uniformity of instruction.  
 In the 2007 data, shown in column 4 of Table 2.3, variation in the quantity of instruction 
that students received is again smaller than the entire sample average in Japan (4.0) and Taiwan 
(4.6); smallest among all East Asian and U.S. educational systems in Singapore (2.9), and 
greatest for students in parts of the U.S. (5.3 in Minnesota and 5.0 in Massachusetts). Across 
rounds, variation declined in the nationally representative U.S. sample from the largest amount in 
the 2003 sample to 4.8 in 2007, which is below the entire sample average and close to that of 
Taiwan. A similar trend can be seen in the Hong Kong data. Variation in the 2003 data for Hong 
Kong was higher than the entire sample average, but in 2007 it is smaller (3.9) than the average 
for the entire sample. Despite the decrease in variation in the U.S. across rounds of data, 
variation in the quantity of instruction in 2007 is still larger in all U.S. educational systems than 
East Asian systems. Additionally, the results in these columns do not support the hypothesis that 
math instruction varies less within than across states. 
 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.3 indicate the minimum percentage of the average quantity 
of instruction provided in each educational system. The East Asian-U.S. sample average on this 
scale is 48.7 percent in the 2003 data, which is slightly higher than the average of 44.6 percent 
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for the entire sample. Interestingly, the minimum is both highest and lowest in the U.S. in the 
2003 data. In the nationally representative sample, students who received the least amount of 
instruction were taught only 29.0 percent of the average while students in Indiana who were 
taught the fewest number of topics received instruction on 65.6 percent of the average number of 
topics taught. Among East Asian educational systems, the minimum percentage is below the 
entire sample average in Japan (39.6%) and Hong Kong (45.5%), and above the entire sample 
average in Singapore (57.7%) and Taiwan (54.9%). In the 2007 data, the East Asia-U.S. sample 
average of 48.0 percent is well above the entire sample average of 38.7 percent. In this round, the 
minimum percentage taught is again lowest in the nationally representative sample from the U.S. 
(26.7%). The states that participated in this round had the second and third lowest scores, of 37.7 
percent for Massachusetts and 44.3 percent for Minnesota. The minimum percentage taught in all 
East Asian educational systems is above the entire sample average. The minimum is highest in 
Taiwan (61.9%) followed by Singapore (61.7%), Hong Kong (57.2%) and Japan (46.7%). The 
data from 2007 conform to expectations more so than the data from 2003. 
 The last two columns of data of Table 2.3 tell us the number of topics that were taught 
mostly this year to either 80 percent or more or to 10 percent or fewer students in each 
educational system. In the 2003 data, the East Asia-U.S. sample average is 5.2, which is larger 
than the average of 4.3 for the entire sample. On this measure of agreement, Indiana fares the 
worst, with a score of 2, followed by Hong Kong (3). The remaining educational systems scored 
above the average for the entire sample. The level of agreement is highest in Singapore (8) 
followed by Taiwan (7), Japan (6) and the U.S. (5). In the 2007 data, the average of 6.1 for the 
East Asian-U.S. sample is again higher than the average of 3.9 for the entire sample. 
Interestingly, East Asian educational systems have the highest and lowest scores on this scale. 
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Japan’s score of 11 is highest among all educational systems that participated and suggests a 
high level of agreement among teachers regarding the material that students should and should 
not be taught. The number of topics on which teachers agree is smallest in Taiwan (1). 
Minnesota’s score of 4 is roughly equivalent to the entire sample average. After Japan, the 
educational system with the largest score is Singapore (9), followed by Massachusetts (7), Hong 
Kong (6) and the U.S. (5).   
 Taken together, the results of Table 2.3 support Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) assertion 
that East Asian educational systems have achieved significant uniformity of instruction. The 
results indicate that the quantity of instruction provided within the U.S. varies considerably more 
than it does within any East Asian educational system. Further, the minimum percentage of 
instruction that students in the U.S. might receive is much smaller than the minimum percentage 
that students in East Asian educational systems might receive. Additionally, there tends to be 
more agreement among math teachers regarding the curriculum in East Asia than in the U.S. The 
notable exception is Taiwan, where agreement is low in the 2007 data. In short, the nationally 
representative sample from the U.S. ranks at or near the bottom of every measure of uniformity 
of instruction in each survey round. Among East Asian educational systems, math instruction 
appears to be most uniformly distributed in Singapore, as Singapore had the first- or second-best 
score on each measure of uniformity of instruction in both rounds of data.  
 The picture regarding the uniformity of math instruction within states as opposed to 
across states is less clear. Each state that participated in TIMSS ensured that its students received 
a higher minimum percentage of instruction relative to the average than the U.S. Beyond that, 
however, the results are not conclusive. Given the small sample size, it is likely that increasing 
the number of states in the analyses would shed more light on this research question.  
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Is uniformity of instruction related to achievement? 
Results from the previous section suggest that the uniformity of math instruction is greater in 
East Asian educational systems than in the U.S. The next question is whether uniformity of math 
instruction is related to higher average math achievement. Evidence of a positive relationship 
between uniformity of instruction and average achievement would be consistent with the 
argument that greater variability of math instruction in the U.S. compared to East Asia is 
contributing to the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap. To empirically examine this research 
question, I first calculate Pearson product-moment correlations between measures of uniformity 
of instruction and achievement at the educational system level in each survey round.
20
 To test the 
statistical significance of these relationships, I calculate the t-test probability statistics for the null 
hypothesis that each individual correlation equals zero. Table 2.4 reports the results from these 
analyses. The first two columns of data in Table 2.4 give the Pearson product-moment, r , 
between mean achievement and each of the three measures of uniformity in instruction in the 
2003 round (column 1) and 2007 round (column 2). The next two columns show results for the 
relationships between measures of uniformity and median student achievement. The final two 
columns of data report the r for each relationship between achievement dispersion and measures 
of uniformity.  
 The results displayed in Table 2.4 indicate a strong, negative and statistically significant 
relationship between variation in the quantity of math instruction provided and average math 
achievement (measured using either the mean or the median) in both survey rounds. This finding 
suggests that average student achievement tends to be higher in educational systems with less 
                                                     
20
 I ran the analysis using data from each U.S. state as well as from the national sample and then again on a sample 
that excludes the U.S. states. Results from each analysis are similar (e.g. relationships are in the same direction and 
have the same statistical significance). Results reported here are from the analysis that includes each U.S. state. 
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variation in the quantity of instruction provided, and this relationship is not sensitive to the 
survey year or sample size. There is some evidence, too, that average achievement is higher in 
educational systems where students receive a higher minimum percentage of instruction. In both 
survey rounds, the minimum percentage of instruction that students might receive is positively 
and statistically significantly related to average student achievement (measured as either the 
mean or the median).  
 
Table 2.4 System-level Correlates between Achievement and Uniformity 
  Student Achievement 
  Mean Median Dispersion 
Variables 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 
Variation -0.65** -0.65*** -0.66*** -0.64*** 0.40^ 0.34* 
Minimum Percent 0.45* 0.45** 0.47* 0.44** -0.22 -0.26 
Agreement 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.21 -0.07 0.12 
N 21 35 21 35 21 35 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10 
    
 Table 2.4 shows that the relationships between indicators of average student achievement 
and agreement (measured as the number of topics that were taught to 80% or more or 10% or 
fewer students) are in the expected direction. The relationships are positive, suggesting that 
average achievement scores increase when teachers are in agreement regarding the math 
curriculum. However, the relationships are not statistically significant, which could be due to the 
relatively small sample size in each survey round (21 educational systems in the 2003 data and 
35 in the 2007 data). In these data, it seems safe to say that the relationships between average 
achievement and measures of variation and minimum percentage are stronger than the 
relationship between agreement and achievement. 
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 The relationships between achievement dispersion and measures of uniformity of 
instruction are all in the expected direction. The results of Table 2.4 suggest that dispersion in 
achievement increases with the variability of instruction and decreases with the minimum 
percentage of instruction and with agreement among teachers. However, the only relationship 
that is statistically significant is between variation and achievement dispersion. In both rounds, 
the relationship is statistically significant (at the p<0.10 level in 2003 and at the p<0.05 level in 
2007). Table 2.4 also sheds light on a question raised by internationally comparative research 
concerning the relationship between curriculum differentiation and inequality of achievement. 
The results indicate that inequality in achievement tends to be greater in educational systems 
with more variation in the quantity of instruction provided.  
 Overall, the results of Table 2.4 show that average achievement scores are higher in 
educational systems with less variation in the quantity of instruction provided, and in systems 
with higher minimum percentages of instruction. These findings provide some support for the 
argument that the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap persists in part because there is less 
uniformity of math instruction in the U.S. compared to East Asia. 
 To gain greater insight into the relationship between uniformity of instruction and 
achievement, I conduct OLS regression analyses of average achievement and achievement 
dispersion on the combined measure of uniformity of instruction. Table 2.5 reports the results 
from these analyses. The table is divided into three panels, one each for regressions on the mean, 
median and achievement dispersion. Results from the 2003 sample are in the first column of 
data, results from the 2007 sample are in the second.  The last row of each panel provides the 
adjusted R-squared for each model. Standard errors are given below the coefficient for 
uniformity.  
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Table 2.5 OLS Estimates of Uniformity on Achievement 
Variables 2003 2007 
  Mean 
Uniformity 11.87*** 14.45*** 
  (1.99) (2.03) 
Adj. R-squared 0.286 0.248 
  Median 
Uniformity 12.07*** 14.59*** 
  (1.98) (2.09) 
Adj. R-squared 0.297 0.232 
  Dispersion  
Uniformity -2.21 -1.19 
  (1.31) (1.03) 
Adj. R-squared 0.037 0.008 
***p<0.001; Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 Results displayed in Table 2.5 suggest that educational systems with more uniformity of 
math instruction have higher average math achievement scores than educational systems with 
greater variability of math instruction. In both the 2003 and 2007 round of TIMSS, uniformity of 
instruction is positively and statistically significantly (at the p<0.001 level) related to average 
achievement, measured as either the mean or the median. Uniformity of instruction explains 
around 30 percent of the variance in mean and median student achievement in the 2003 round 
and between 23 and 25 percent in the 2007 sample.  
 Results of the regressions of achievement dispersion on uniformity of instruction show a 
relationship in the expected direction. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant, 
and the variable explains little of the variance in achievement dispersion. Given the findings 
from Table 2.4, which show that achievement dispersion is only statistically significantly related 
to variation in the quantity of instruction provided, these last OLS regression results are not 
surprising. Achievement dispersion appears to be mildly related to the variability in the quantity 
of instruction provided but not to the minimum percentage of instruction that students might 
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receive nor to the variable indicating the level of agreement among teachers. These results are 
not surprising, given the mixed results of previous research. They suggest, perhaps, that the 
amount of achievement dispersion in an educational system depends not only on the degree of 
curriculum differentiation within the system but also on the extent to which students within the 
system differ by ability and effort. In other words, if an educational system could achieve 
significant uniformity in both the quantity and quality of instruction it provides, the system 
would still have some degree of achievement dispersion due to differences across students in 
ability and effort (including parental support and involvement).  
 
CONCLUSION 
The principal aim of this chapter is to empirically assess the possibility that average math 
achievement is higher in East Asia than in the U.S. because math instruction is more uniformly 
distributed in East Asian educational systems.  Using representative data from educational 
systems that participated in the 2003 and 2007 TIMSS fourth-grade population, I provide 
empirical evidence consist with this hypothesis.  I show that variation in the quantity of math 
instruction students receive is smaller in all East Asian educational systems than in the U.S.; that 
the minimum percentage of math topics students might be taught is higher in East Asian 
educational systems than in the U.S., and that there tends to be more agreement on the fourth 
grade math curriculum among teachers in East Asian educational systems than in the U.S. All of 
these findings support Stevenson and Stigler’s assertion that compared to the U.S., East Asian 
educational systems have achieved significant uniformity of instruction across classrooms. 
 This chapter suggests that uniformity of instruction is related to higher average 
achievement because uniformity ensures that all students receive at least a basic education. The 
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analyses of this chapter provide some support for this notion. They show strong relationships at 
the system level between average achievement and the amount of variation in the quantity of 
instruction provided as well as between achievement and the minimum percentage of instruction 
relative to the average that students might receive. These relationships were statistically 
significant across rounds. Educational systems with more variation in the quantity of math 
provided tend to have lower average math achievement scores. Additionally, educational systems 
that ensure all students receive at least a basic education tend to have higher average 
achievement scores than those in which students might be taught a small fraction of the topics 
that students in that system typically learn.  
 The evidence provided in this chapter is consistent with the argument that the 
institutional arrangements in the U.S. that allow for greater variability of math instruction might 
be partially responsible for the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap. However, the results are far 
from conclusive. It might be the case that, among educational systems that participate in TIMSS, 
uniformity of instruction goes hand-in-hand with more finely-tuned curricular guidelines, 
textbooks, teacher-training manuals or other variables that influence the quality of the curriculum 
but are not included in the analyses of this chapter. Thus, before policy recommendations can be 
made, work should be done to learn more about the similarities and differences in the math 
curriculum offered in educational systems with uniformity of instruction compared to those 
without. 
 While this chapter has shown that the uniformity of instruction is greater in East Asia 
than in the U.S., it does not examine the institutional arrangements that might be promoting 
greater uniformity of instruction in East Asia and other educational systems. Future research 
might try to empirically assess the policy measures and practices that relate to uniformity of 
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instruction. This chapter has paved the way for this type of research by showing how the TIMSS 
data can be used to measure the uniformity of instruction provided by educational systems. 
 There are some factors that might influence the relationship between uniformity of 
instruction and student achievement that this chapter does not address. For example, the quality 
of the curriculum could vary among educational systems with the same degree of uniformity of 
instruction, which might influence the relationship between uniformity of instruction and student 
achievement. Further, it is possible for educational systems to achieve a high degree of 
uniformity of instruction and not provide equal educational opportunities to all students. This 
happens when all students receive the same quantity of instruction, but the quality of instruction 
differs. For educational systems to provide equal learning opportunities to all students, variation 
in both the quantity and quality of instruction should be small. The next chapter examines this 
research question directly, by showing how teacher effectiveness in the fourth grade varies 
within and across nations. 
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Chapter 3 
Teachers 
 
F THE ACTORS INVOLVED in the process of student learning, other than students math 
teachers primarily are responsible for student achievement on a math test. The centrality 
of teachers to student learning, coupled with the fact that the least proficient 5 percent of students 
in East Asian nations tend to perform on par with the average U.S. student on the TIMSS math 
assessments, provides reason to believe that math teachers in East Asian nations do a better job 
than their U.S. counterparts of promoting achievement. Currently, there is limited empirical 
evidence to support or repudiate this hypothesis. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically 
address the claim that math achievement is higher in East Asian nations in part because math 
teachers there are more effective than their U.S. counterparts.  
International comparative research provides compelling reasons to believe that math 
teachers in East Asian nations are more effective than those in the U.S. Observational studies 
show that math teachers in East Asia tend to introduce conceptually challenging problems, and 
work to develop their students’ knowledge of underlying procedures (Stevenson and Stigler 
1992; Stigler and Hiebert 1999; Ma 1999; Perry 2000; Leung 2005). By contrast, teachers in the 
O 
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U.S. tend to present problems that are less intellectually stimulating (Leung 2005), and their 
lessons tend to involve mainly memorization of mathematical rules and terms, and drill (Stigler 
and Hiebert 1999). These studies argue that even when teachers are teaching the same material, 
cross-national variations in instructional strategies ensure that students in East Asia develop a 
richer understanding of the subject matter. In other words, East Asian teachers are more effective 
due to the high quality of their instruction. 
This scholarship also highlights structural features of East Asian educational systems that 
act to produce a more effective teaching corps. These features include lighter instructional 
workloads (Stevenson and Stigler 1992), continuing professional support and development 
(Stigler and Hiebert 1999; Akiba and LeTendre 2009), formally scheduled time to plan lessons 
(Stevenson and Stigler 1992), better teacher compensation (Stevenson and Stigler 1992), and 
more rigorous teacher training and selection programs (Wang et al. 2003). Wang et al.’s (2003) 
exploratory analysis of national differences in policies related to teacher training and 
development demonstrates that, compared to other nations that scored as well or better than the 
U.S. on the 1999 TIMSS achievement tests, the U.S. employs a less robust teacher education and 
development process.
21
 Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore (Taiwan was not included in their 
analysis), for example, formally monitor teachers’ performance during the induction period, 
and/or their professional development. Additionally, in Hong Kong and Japan, tenure is not 
automatically granted. The U.S., on the other hand, lacks such filters (Wang et al. 2003).  
                                                     
21
 Although the U.S. does not have a national teacher certification program, 42 states  participate in a reciprocal 
teacher certification agreement through the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and 
Certification (NASDTEC), which makes it easier for teachers certified in one state to become certified in another. 
The states that do not participate in this agreement are concentrated in the Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin) and Alaska. Features such as this reciprocity program and 
influential accreditation organizations “result in teacher education and certification systems that are more alike than 
different” (Wang et al 2003: 4). 
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The main thrust of this research is that teachers in East Asian nations are more effective 
than their U.S. counterparts because East Asian educational systems select more promising 
candidates and/or provide better training and support structures, which in turn encourage high-
quality instruction. According to this research, we should find that the overall level of teacher 
effectiveness is high in East Asia and that, within each East Asian nations, teachers vary less in 
their ability to promote achievement. 
Curriculum specialists, on the other hand, contend that U.S. teachers are equally as 
effective as their counterparts in East Asian nations. According to Westbury (1992), the reason 
why Japanese students tend to outperform U.S. students on international assessments in math is 
because the mandated math coursework for all eighth and twelfth graders in Japan is more 
advanced than that completed by the majority of U.S. students.  To empirically support this 
argument, Westbury (1992) uses data from the Second International Mathematics Study (SIMS) 
to show that there is no real difference in the achievement scores of U.S. students who received a 
similarly amount of math instruction to their Japanese counterparts. This finding has important 
implications for teachers, as Westbury (1992: 21) explains: “[W]hen the curricula of the two 
countries are similar, there is essentially no difference in the performance of U.S. and Japanese 
students, and, by implication, of teachers.” Westbury contends that the curriculum structure in 
the U.S. is to blame for the U.S.’s relatively low achievement scores; if all U.S. students were 
given the challenging math coursework typically reserved for college- and enrichment-track 
students, then average achievement would be higher and it would be clear that U.S. teachers are 
equally as effective as their East Asian counterparts at promoting achievement. 
Westbury (1992) relies on the maxim that the more students are taught, the more they 
will learn and the better they will score on international assessments. According to a National 
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Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) report prepared by Medrich and Griffith (1992), 
findings from the first four international assessments in math and science provide evidence in 
support of this idea. Sørensen and Morgan (2000: 149-50) make a similar argument: “Schools 
that cover extensive material in their instruction provide many opportunities for learning and will 
create more growth in achievement.” The authors allow for the possibility that individual 
teachers might influence how much students learn, but only in so far as teacher effort partially 
determines the quantity of material covered. (In this formulation, formal curricular guidelines act 
as the primary determinant of the quantity of material taught in the classroom.) Once the quantity 
of instruction is taken into account, variations in student effort and ability explain variations in 
student achievement. The implication here is that student achievement depends far more on the 
quantity of instruction than on the quality of instruction.  
The idea that the quantity of instruction largely determines student learning and by 
implication, teacher effectiveness, presents an interesting foil to U.S.-based studies of teacher 
effects (for example: Nye, Konstantopoulos and Hedges 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain 2005; 
Kane, Rockhoff and Staiger 2006). These studies tend to ignore curricular differences across 
classrooms. Instead, teacher effectiveness is measured as the amount of variance in (residualized) 
gains in student achievement that is due to differences between classrooms within schools. 
According to results from these studies, U.S. teachers vary tremendously in their ability to 
promote achievement. To put the magnitude of the difference between effective and less 
effective teachers in the U.S. into perspective, Palardy and Rumberger (2008) offer the following 
comparisons: being assigned to an effective teacher has five times greater the effect of family 
socioeconomic background and two-and-a-half-times greater the effect of reducing class size 
from 25 to 15 students on students’ math achievement.  
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Westbury’s (1992) research and Sørensen and Morgan’s (2000) theory raise the 
possibility that U.S. teachers vary less in their ability to promote achievement than teacher 
effects research leads us to believe. This is because some of the variation in teacher effectiveness 
might be due to differences across classrooms within schools in the amount of material covered. 
Since the datasets used to compute teacher effects generally do not contain information on the 
test material that teachers covered in class (Palardy and Rumberger 2009; Sørensen and Morgan 
2000), the extent to which differences in quantity of instruction influence the amount of variation 
in teacher effectiveness is an empirical question.  
Although Westbury (1992) and Sørensen and Morgan (2000) make a good case that 
student learning increases with quantity of instruction, this hypothesis is hotly contested among 
educators. There are generally considered to be two competing philosophies regarding optimal 
curriculum coverage. On the one hand, there is the “breadth” or “full coverage” philosophy that 
Sørensen and Morgan’s (2000) theory illustrates. On the other is the “deep coverage” or “depth” 
philosophy, whose proponents contend that some topics within a discipline are more important 
than others and focusing solely on those topics is more beneficial to student achievement than  
covering as many topics as possible. This debate raises the possibility that there might not be a 
systematic relationship between quantity of instruction and student achievement, and in turn, 
between the amount of material teachers cover and their ability to promote achievement. Which 
topics are taught, in which sequence and in how much depth could be very relevant to 
understanding variation in teacher effectiveness both cross-nationally and—given decentralized 
nature of curriculum in the U.S.—within the U.S. as well. 
The relationship between quantity of instruction and student achievement becomes less 
clear when we examine aggregate data from Japan and Singapore. For fourth-grade math, 
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Singapore might be seen as a prime example of the “breadth” philosophy while Japan stands as 
an archetype of  the “depth” camp. As we saw in the curriculum chapter, the average student in 
Singapore receives instruction on about 85 percent of the TIMSS test topics while the average 
student in Japan receives instruction on roughly 58 percent. In both nations, average math 
achievement is roughly equivalent. In the aggregate, therefore, both nations stand as exemplars 
for each philosophy. Because there is variation among classrooms within Japan and Singapore in 
the amount of material covered, however, the relationship between student achievement and 
quantity of instruction within each nation is uncertain.  
This chapter capitalizes on the variation in the quantity of instruction that exists within 
each nation to assess whether U.S. teachers who cover the same average percentage of test topics 
as their Japanese and Singaporean counterparts are equally effective at increasing achievement. 
If student achievement is strongly dependent upon the quality of instruction, as Stigler and 
Hiebert (1999) and others contend, then even after controlling for quantity of instruction I should 
find that math teachers in East Asian nations are more effective than their U.S. counterparts. 
The literature suggests not only that math teachers in East Asia are more effective than 
their U.S. counterparts, but also that there is less variation among teachers within each East 
Asian nation in their ability to promote achievement. To empirically address this question, I 
utilize multilevel “value-added” models to assess the proportion of variance in student 
achievement that is due to classrooms within schools, separately for the U.S. and each East Asian 
nation. Before describing these analyses and results, I briefly review the ways that teacher 
effectiveness is typically measured in international comparative studies and the method preferred 
in U.S. research. 
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HOW IS TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS MEASURED? 
International comparative research tends to rely on teacher background characteristics to assess 
teacher quality. Montt (2011), for example, uses the proportion of teachers with ISCED 5a 
degrees as measures of teacher quality at the school and national level. Research conducted by 
Akiba and colleagues (2007; Akiba and LeTendre 2009) also defines a high-quality teacher a 
priori as a teacher with full teaching certification, more than three years of experience and 
certified subject-matter knowledge (e.g. whether or not teachers majored in math or math 
education). In other words, international comparative research tends to equate high-quality 
teachers with highly qualified teachers.  
The dominant viewpoint among U.S.-based educational researchers is that easily 
measureable teacher characteristics, such as teacher qualifications, do not readily distinguish 
effective teachers from less effective ones (Hanushek 2011; Hanushek and Rivkin 2010; Gordan, 
Kane and Staiger 2006; Kane, Rockhoff and Staiger 2005; OECD 2005; Palardy and Rumberger 
2008). Several studies that analyze the relationship between student achievement and teacher 
qualifications do not find a significant relationship (for example: Nye et al. 2004; Palardy and 
Rumberger 2008, Rivkin et al. 2005). When research does find a statistically significant 
relationship between measures of teacher qualifications and student achievement, it is not 
particularly strong. For example, Darling-Hammond and colleagues (2005) found a statistically 
significant difference in achievement gains between the group of students taught by certified 
teachers and the group taught by uncertified teachers. However, the difference is small—one-half 
a percentile point—and is, as Gordon et al. (2006: 9) point out, “dwarfed by the differences 
within groups.”  
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Research also indicates that teaching experience is not significantly related to student 
achievement beyond the initial years of teaching (Gordon et al. 2006; Nye et al. 2004; Rivkin et 
al. 2005). Beginning teachers tend to be less effective at promoting achievement than teachers 
with three or more years of experience, but there is still a considerable range of effectiveness 
among experienced teachers (Gordon et al. 2006). Warns the OECD (2005: 27), “in light of the 
lack of strong evidence linking teacher credentials such as qualifications and experience to 
student results, alternative indicators of teacher quality are crucial.” 
Multilevel, “value-added” models of teacher effects circumvent the issue of predicting 
teacher effectiveness directly using measured teacher characteristics by computing teacher 
effectiveness indirectly, as the amount of variance in (residualized) student achievement gains 
that is not explained by student characteristics. The more sophisticated of these “value-added” 
models recognizes the differences among schools in student achievement and uses three-level 
hierarchical models in which students are nested in classrooms within schools. These models 
allow researchers to assess the relative explanatory power of schools, classrooms within schools 
(or teachers) and students on student achievement gains. There appear to be few studies that 
examine cross-national differences in teacher effectiveness using three-level hierarchical linear 
models. This chapter represents a pioneering effort to examine cross-national differences in the 
proportion of variance in student achievement that can be attributed to classrooms within 
schools. 
In an ideal setting, value-added estimates of individual teachers’ effectiveness would use 
information on student achievement on a pre- and post-test, and the contents of both tests would 
correspond to the curriculum that teachers cover in class. This way, achievement differences 
between students’ pre-test and post-test scores would tell us how much students learned from 
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what their teachers taught. Most large-scale educational data sets, however, rely on “general use” 
assessments, such as the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT), which were not designed to assess 
students’ abilities on a specific classroom curriculum. They were instead designed to cover a 
broad range of concepts that were deemed appropriate for each grade level.  
Two problems arise from using student outcomes on general assessments to measure 
teacher effectiveness. The first has to do with the design of the test. General-use test publishers 
produce a different test for each grade level. The content of each grade’s test differs from the 
next, which means that the pre- and post-test achievement scores that researchers use to calculate 
achievement gains actually measure students’ performance on tests that cover different material. 
If the concepts differ across tests, or if the weights given to each concept differ across grade 
levels, then measures of teachers’ valued-added will be biased (Lockwood et al. 2007; Martineau 
2006). Further, student achievement scores on these tests are vertically scaled from Kindergarten 
to the twelfth grade so that researchers can ascertain student achievement gains over the long 
term. A fundamental assumption of vertical scaling is that the tests being scaled measure the 
same concepts. The differences between the mathematical concepts on the Kindergarten test and 
those on the twelfth-grade test are great enough, as Martineau (2006) points out, to make even 
psychometricians seriously question the accuracy of such practices. This is important because 
inaccuracies in the scaling procedure can lead to inaccuracies in the amount of variance in 
achievement gains that is attributed to teachers.  
The second concern researchers have expressed over the use of general assessments to 
measure teacher effects stems from a lack of information on the correspondence between the test 
curriculum and the classroom curriculum. Most educational data sets do not include information 
from teachers on the specific test topics they taught. Since the correspondence between the class 
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curriculum and the test curriculum is unknown, the appropriateness of the test for measuring 
teachers’ impact on student achievement is uncertain (Lockwood et al. 2007; Martineau 2006). 
The test could be measuring students’ knowledge of topics they were taught in previous years, 
for example, or encompass only a narrow range of the topics teachers covered. Since the aim of 
value-added research is to adjudicate teacher ability to produce achievement, the instrument used 
to measure achievement needs to accurately reflect what the teacher taught. Without knowing the 
correspondence between the assessment curriculum and the classroom curriculum, effective 
teachers might be misidentified as ineffective (or vice versa). Although these matters deserve 
attention, as Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) point out, few teacher-effects studies question the 
appropriateness of the achievement tests to measure teachers’ effectiveness. 
While the TIMSS assessments could be considered “general use,” the datasets differ from 
others because they provide information from teachers regarding the test topics their students 
have been taught. This information offers insight into the correspondence between the test 
curriculum and the classroom curriculum. As such, I am able to compare teachers across nations 
who taught similar percentages of test topics, which I do in the next section. These data also 
afford the opportunity to contribute to the debate on the relationship between quantity of 
instruction and student achievement. Lastly, information on the correspondence between the test 
curriculum and the classroom curriculum allows me to address the question of the 
appropriateness of the TIMSS math test for gauging teacher effectiveness. By running multilevel 
models of teacher effects on the full sample, and again on the subsample of students for whom 
the test appears to be a good fit with the math curriculum their teachers covered, I demonstrate 
the extent to which the correspondence between the test curriculum and classroom curriculum 
impact estimates of teacher effects.  
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VARIABLES 
The outcome variable is student’s overall achievement on the TIMSS math assessment. As I 
explained in the Introduction to this dissertation, achievement scores are internationally scaled to 
have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. I retain this scaling metric throughout the 
analyses in this chapter. Students’ scores were imputed using Item Response Theory (IRT). To 
correct for the error inherent in the imputation process, TIMSS provides five plausible values for 
each student. For accuracy, I conduct each analysis five times, once on each plausible value, and 
combine estimates using Rubin’s (1987) combination method, which I provide in the 
Introduction to this dissertation.  
Neither round of TIMSS is longitudinal, so I do not have a measure of student 
achievement in a prior year to use to measure gains in achievement. (This information is not 
available in any current, international educational data set.) I have not yet found an international 
comparative study of student achievement that controls for student ability to estimate 
relationships between student achievement and student, school, and national factors. I therefore 
propose to use students’ self-reports of how well they usually do in math to measure their prior 
ability.
22
 By standardizing this variable on the national mean, I control for potential cross-
national variations in the ways that student represent their past achievement in math. This 
variable has a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Since these are not direct measures of 
pre-test achievement, I follow Nye et al.’s (2004) lead and acknowledge that I am examining 
teacher effects on achievement status as opposed to achievement gains.  
                                                     
22
 I assume that this measure is about as accurate as students’ self-reports of their grades. Meta-analyses conducted 
on U.S. data to assess the reliability of students self-reports of grades vary substantially in their conclusions (for a 
review see Kuncel et al 2005.) According to Kuncel et al (2005), students’ self-reports on grades are highly accurate 
for high ability students and less accurate for low ability students. It is unclear whether there is a pattern to self-
reported measures of ability in East Asian nations. 
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To assess the quantity of instruction students received, I use data from the Teacher 
Questionnaire. The questionnaire lists, by content domain, the main topics that appear on the 
TIMSS assessment and asks teachers to mark whether a test topic was “mostly taught before this 
year,” “mostly taught this year” or “not yet taught or just introduced.” On the 2003 test, there are 
five math content domains: Number, Patterns and Relationships, Measurement, Geometry and 
Data. The 2007 round divides topics into three content domains: Number, Geometry, Shapes and 
Measures, and Data Display. An example test topic from the Geometry domain of the 2003 
questionnaire reads: “Congruent triangle (i.e., same shape and size).” The 2003 round includes 
42 main topics; 35 topics are included in the 2007 round.  
It seems unlikely that each topic was given equal weight on the assessment. For this 
reason, I use the distribution of score points across content domains to measure the percentage of 
points each topic is worth. Specifically, I assign a weight to each topic based on the percentage 
of assessment points given to its content domain and the number of topics in the domain. This 
information is displayed in Table 3.1. For example, the 12 topics within the Number domain 
were worth a combined 68 points, which represents 40.24 percent  (68/169) of the total. To 
calculate the percentage of points each topic in the Number domain is worth, I divide 40.24 
percent by 12 to get 3.35. The value of each topic thus varies by round and content domain.  
I calculate the quantity of instruction students received by first adding up the number of 
topics within each content domain that students were taught in the test year and in the previous 
year (e.g. in the third or fourth grade). Then I multiply the sum for each domain by its 
corresponding weight. The results indicate the “assessment-weighted” percentage of topics 
students have been taught. For example, according to this scale participants in the 2007 round 
who were taught 10 Number topics, 10 Geometric shapes topics and 5 Data Display topics 
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received instruction on ((10x2.686) +(10x3.078) +(5x3.021)) 72.7 percent of the test topics. For 
the multilevel models, I center this variable on 75 percent, which is roughly the average 
percentage of topics taught across all countries. I chose a common mean to aid cross-national 
comparisons of point estimates.  
 
Table 3.1 Information Used to Assign Assessment-Specific Values to each Topic 
Round Content Domain 
Number of 
topics 
Point 
distribution 
% of total 
points 
Value for 
each topic 
2003 Numbers 12 68 40.2% 3.353 
  Patterns 6 25 14.8% 2.465 
  Measurement  6 33 19.5% 3.254 
  Geometry 11 25 14.8% 1.345 
  Data 7 18 10.7% 1.522 
  Total: 42 169     
2007 Number 19 98 51.0% 2.686 
  Geometric Shapes  11 65 33.9% 3.078 
  Data Display 5 29 15.1% 3.021 
  Total: 35 192     
 
As mentioned previously, it is standard practice in the teacher effects literature to base 
estimates of an individual teacher’s ability to increase achievement on students’ knowledge of 
topics that they might have been taught by other teachers. Having data on the correspondence 
between the classroom curriculum and the assessment curriculum suggests that this concession is 
a necessity: few teachers—in any nation, in any round of TIMSS—are responsible for teaching 
100 percent of the test topics their students were taught. For this reason, among students who 
have been taught similar percentages of topics, I do not distinguish among them those who were 
taught exclusively by their test-year teacher. Although this is common practice, I do not consider 
results from these analyses to be indicative of an individual teacher’s effectiveness and do not 
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attempt to calculate a teacher effectiveness score for individual teachers. Instead, results are 
indicative of the overall instructional effectiveness of each nation’s teachers. 
Any model of student achievement that attempts to partition variance components to 
different levels of analysis needs to take into account factors that influence both the assignment 
of students to classrooms and student achievement (Reardon and Raudenbush 2009). This 
happens most obviously when schools track students according to ability. In these schools in 
particular, it seem highly probable that schools determine the assignment of both students and 
teachers to classrooms based on how well they believe students and teachers will do if assigned 
to a particular classroom. In effort to eliminate the problem of confounding, I capitalize on 
information provided in the Principal Questionnaire, which tells us which schools organize math 
instruction by grouping students by ability. Schools in which principals indicated that student 
ability is taken into account to organize math in any manner are coded 1. All other schools not 
missing data are coded zero. As best as possible given the data, I also control for student SES, 
classroom mean SES, classroom mean ability and the variance within classrooms in student 
ability.  
The best indicator of student SES available in the TIMSS fourth-grade population comes 
from a question posed to students regarding the approximate number of books in their homes. 
Specifically, students are asked “About how many books are there in your home? (Do not count 
magazines, newspapers, or your school books.)” and given five response choices, “None or very 
few (0-10 books),” “Enough to fill one shelf (11-25 books),” “Enough to fill one bookcase (26-
100 books),” “Enough to fill two bookcases (101-200 books),” “Enough to fill three or more 
bookcases (more than 200 books),” which are each accompanied by a graphic illustration of a 
shelf or bookcase filled with the greatest number of books in that category. (For example, the 
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illustration accompanying the response “Enough to fill one bookcase (26-100 books)” shows a 
bookcase with 100 books.) TIMSS does not ask fourth-grade students about their parents’ 
educational background, occupational position or income level because they have found that 
fourth graders’ knowledge of these facts is weak.23 I control for student SES by creating two 
dummy variables indicating high or low SES as whether or not student responses fall one 
standard deviation above or below the national mean, respectively.  
At the student level, I also control for gender (female = 1), immigrant status (student 
and/or parent(s) are immigrants = 1), age (one standard deviation or more below the national 
mean = 1) and non-native language (students rarely or never speak the language of the 
assessment at home = 1) as these factors might influence student achievement or the variance in 
student achievement within classrooms. For the same reason, at the classroom level I control for 
the percentage of non-native language speakers in class and class size. In addition to their 
potential influence on student achievement, I include these variables in the analyses as they 
might interfere with teachers’ abilities to effectively convey math knowledge to students. At the 
school level, I control for school size.  I include the school size variable for two reasons. First, 
the TIMSS sample was stratified by school size, with larger schools receiving a higher 
probability of selection than smaller schools. Second, I include school size because Hong Kong, 
Japan and Taiwan were more likely to sample two or more classrooms from large schools than 
they were from small schools. 
Unless otherwise specified, all continuous variables are standardized within each nation 
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In other words, for each nation, a score 
of zero indicates the average score in that nation; means differ across nations. Variables are 
standardized to ease interpretations. They are centered on the national mean as opposed to the 
                                                     
23
 TIMSS research coordinator, personal communication. 
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international mean to account for cross-national differences in self-ratings of ability (Lee, 
Graham and Stevenson 1996) and national differences in response styles (Harzing 2006). 
 Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and the U.S. participated in both rounds of the 
2003 and 2007 TIMSS fourth-grade population. The U.S. sample includes data from 17,725 
students in 994 classrooms in 505 schools. From Hong Kong there are data from 8,399 students 
in 292 classrooms in 258 schools. The Japan sample contains information from 9,022 students in 
339 classrooms in 298 schools, while the Singaporean sample includes data from 11,709 students 
in 536 classrooms in 359 schools. Rounding out the list is Taiwan, with 8,792 students in 324 
classrooms in 300 schools. I run the multilevel analyses on the complete cases (e.g. students not 
missing information on any variables used in the analyses). This decreases the sample size by 8.9 
percent for Hong Kong , 9.0 percent for Japan, 9.3 percent for Singapore, 9.6 percent for Taiwan 
and 7.4 percent for the U.S. 
 
ARE MATH TEACHERS IN EAST ASIA MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THOSE IN THE U.S.? 
Westbury (1992) contends that once curricular differences are taken into account, U.S. math 
teachers are equally as effective as their Japanese counterparts. At each grade level, Westbury 
compares just one group of U.S. teachers—those who teach advanced math courses—to Japanese 
teachers. I conduct this analysis on two subsets of the sample in order to include a broad 
spectrum of students and teachers from all nations in my analyses. The first subset contains 
students who were taught 58-63 percent of the test topics, which represents the lower bound of 
the average percentage of test topics taught in the five nations under investigation. This is the 
average for Japanese students (and by implication, for Japanese teachers) but is low for the 
average student (and teacher) in Singapore and the U.S. The number of students in this sample 
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ranges from 116 in Singapore to 1,339 in Japan. In Hong Kong, Taiwan and the U.S. the sample 
size is 668, 469 and 510, respectively. The second subset includes students who were taught 86-
91 percent of the test topics, which represents the upper bound of the averages among nations. 
This is the average for Singaporean students (and teachers) and just slightly above the U.S. 
average of 85 percent. This subset contains 837 students from Hong Kong, 224 from Japan, 
2,942 from Singapore, 1,223 from Taiwan and 2,042 from the U.S. I use jackknife replicate 
weights, which take into account the TIMSS sampling design, to calculate accurate point 
estimates.  
Table 3.2 presents the results from these analyses. The table is partitioned into two 
sections. The top section displays results for the sample of students who were taught 58-63 
percent of the test topics; the bottom section displays results for students who were taught 86-91 
percent of the test topics. Within each section, nations are ordered from top to bottom by the 
mean achievement of students in this subsample, which is given in column 2. The top row of 
each section displays results from the nation with the largest mean achievement score. Columns 
3 and 4 indicate the 95 percent confidence interval for mean achievement. The last column 
provides insight into relative instructional effectiveness across nations; it tells us the average 
points earned for every percentage of test topics taught. 
The results displayed in Table 3.2 do not support Westbury’s (1992) earlier findings. In 
both subsamples, mean achievement in the U.S. is outside the 95 percent confidence interval of 
mean achievement in every East Asian nation. The mean achievement of students who were 
taught 58-63 percent of the test topics in each nation ranges from a high of 586 in Hong Kong to 
a low of 518 in the U.S.—a difference of 68 points or about two-thirds of a standard deviation. 
Among students who were taught 86-91 percent of the test topics, mean achievement within each 
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nation ranges from a high of 597 in Singapore, to a low of 530 in the U.S. Again, the difference 
between the two nations is a substantial 67 points. 
 
Table 3.2 Cross-National Differences in Average Math Achievement 
  Math Achievement Points per Topic 
Nation Mean 
95% confidence 
interval Mean 
Among students who were taught 58-63% of the test topics 
Hong Kong 586.2 579.7 592.7 9.65 
Singapore 573.7 564.7 582.7 9.26 
Japan 569.1 565.0 573.2 9.40 
Taiwan 562.6 557.7 567.6 9.30 
United States 518.2 513.4 523.0 8.58 
Among students who were taught 86-91% of the test topics 
Singapore 597.0 592.1 601.8 6.72 
Hong Kong 591.3 586.2 596.3 6.72 
Taiwan 570.8 567.1 574.6 6.42 
Japan 561.1 554.8 567.4 6.34 
United States 529.9 525.9 533.9 6.01 
 
The figures displayed in column 4 of Table 3.2 describe cross-national differences in the 
rate at which teachers increase achievement. It is based on a simple measure of productivity and 
is calculated by dividing student achievement (the output) by the assessment-weighted 
percentage of test topics students were taught (the input). The results tell us the average number 
of achievement points teachers in each nation produce for every one percent of test topics they 
teach, or the points per topic taught. In the top section of Table 3.2, we see that teachers in Hong 
Kong tend to increase student achievement by 9.65 points per topic. By contrast, U.S. teachers 
increase achievement at the rate of 8.58 points. The difference in points per topic between Hong 
Kong and the U.S. (9.65-8.58=1.07) is three times larger than the difference between Hong Kong 
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and Singapore (9.65-9.3=0.35), the least-highest achieving East Asian nation in that subsample.  
In the 86-91 percent subsample, Singaporean and Hong Kong teachers appear to be the most 
effective; they increase achievement by an average of 6.7 points per topic. In this subsample, too, 
the figure for U.S. teachers is much lower (6.01 points per topic) than their East Asian 
counterparts. 
To gain a sense of the relationship between the quantity of instruction and student 
achievement, I compare each nation’s results across the subsamples. According to previous 
international assessment results (Medrich and Griffith 1992) as well as Sørensen and Morgan 
(2000), student achievement should increase with quantity of instruction. If this were true, then 
we should see that within each nation, achievement is higher among students who learned 86-91 
percent of the test topics compared to students who learned 58-63 percent. The results displayed 
in Table 3.2 provide mixed support for this argument. In Singapore, Taiwan and the U.S., 
average student achievement is higher in the 86-91 percent subsample than in the 58-63 percent 
subsample. This pattern is not evident in the sample data from Hong Kong and Japan, however. 
In Hong Kong, mean achievement is higher among the 86-91 percent subsample, but it is within 
the 95 percent confidence interval of achievement in the 58-63 percent subsample. In Japan, the 
pattern contradicts previous findings: average achievement is actually lower in the 86-91 percent 
subsample than in the 58-61 percent one, suggesting the possibility that achievement in Japan 
declines as the quantity of instruction increases. 
It is possible that the positive relationship between quantity of instruction and student 
achievement that is evident in Singapore, Taiwan and the U.S. exists because in those nations, 
quality of instruction is correlated with quantity of instruction. In other words, teachers who can 
teach really well tend to cover more material. The analyses conducted so far do not permit us to 
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examine the relative impact of quality of instruction versus quantity of instruction on student 
achievement. To address this research question, in the next section I build three-level 
hierarchical linear models that allow me to assess, 1) the extent to which teachers within nations 
vary in their effectiveness, 2) whether or not teachers who teach more material produce more 
learning and, 3) the degree to which the association between quantity of instruction and student 
achievement differs across nations. 
 
DOES TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS VARY LESS IN EAST ASIA?  
International comparative educational research emphasizes the role that structural features of 
East Asian educational systems play in promoting high levels of teacher effectiveness. These 
structural features, such as robust teacher education and development programs (Stigler and 
Hiebert 1999; Wang et al. 2003), should not only increase the overall levels of teacher 
effectiveness, but also should decrease the amount of variation in teacher effectiveness. 
Moreover, if quantity of instruction determines student achievement, as Westbury (1992) and 
Sørensen and Morgan (2000) contend, then I should find higher levels of achievement in 
classrooms that cover more test topics. Since curriculum coverage can also vary across 
classrooms within the same school (especially in those that track by ability), including a measure 
of quantity of instruction might also explain some of the variation in teacher effectiveness within 
each nation.   
I develop a three-level hierarchical model in which students are nested within classrooms 
within schools to empirically assess these hypotheses. To take into account the possibility that 
the TIMSS math assessment is not a good indicator of the material that teachers covered in class, 
and would thus provide biased estimates of teacher effects (Martineau 2006), I carry out the 
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analyses twice, once on all complete cases and once again on the subset for whom the TIMSS 
test curriculum seems to correspond well to their classroom curriculum. I use the same models 
for both sets of analyses. 
I first examine a model that predicts student achievement using only an indicator of test 
round (whether or not data come from the 2003 round). In the second model, I include classroom 
and school contextual features that might influence student achievement or the assignment of 
students and teachers to classrooms within schools. In the third model, I include the quantity of 
instruction variable. 
 
Statistical model 
The complete level-1 or student-level model is: 
                                                                                
                                                         
where      is student i in the j classroom of the kth school’s achievement score and      is a 
random “student” effect that captures the deviation of student ijk’s score from the classroom 
mean (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). I assume that these effects are normally distributed with a 
mean of 0 and variance   . 
Mean student achievement        is the only coefficient allowed to vary over classrooms 
and schools. All other coefficients are fixed because how they might vary over classrooms and 
schools is not the central focus of this chapter. Mean student achievement is the outcome 
variable of the level-2 or classroom model, which adjusts predictions of mean student 
achievement at the classroom level by classroom contextual factors in the second analysis model. 
The third model also adjusts for the quantity of instruction students received. The classroom 
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contextual variables used are the percentage of non-native language speakers in class, classroom 
mean prior ability, variance in prior ability in class, classroom mean SES and class size. The 
complete level-2 or classroom model is: 
                                                                        
                                    
 
where      is a classroom-specific random effect that tells us how much the jk classroom’s mean 
achievement deviates from the school mean. The variance of      or    tells us how much 
achievement varies across classrooms net of the student and classroom level controls. I assume 
that it is normally distributed with a mean of 0.  
The level-3 model is the school model. As in the classroom model, only achievement is 
allowed to vary across schools. I adjust estimates of school mean student achievement by a 
dummy variable indicating that schools group by ability and an indicator of school size. The 
complete level-3 model is: 
                                                
 
where      is a school-specific random effect with mean 0 and variance   , and       and      
give us the effects of ability grouping and school size, respectively, on school mean 
achievement, β00k.. All level-1 coefficients are constrained to be constant within classrooms and 
schools, which means that π1jk  = β10k  = ϒ100 ,  π2jk  = β20k = ϒ200  ...   π7jk  = β70k  = ϒ700 . Similarly, 
all classroom-level variables are fixed within schools such that β01k  = ϒ010 , β02k  = ϒ020 ... β05k  = 
ϒ050 . 
 Table 3.3 displays the estimates and standard errors for average classroom achievement 
(π0jk) and quantity of instruction (β05k) as well as the random effects estimates σ
2
 , τπ , and  τβ and 
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the percentage of the total variation in achievement status that is explained by each level. The 
number of students, schools and classrooms in the sample, as well as the average number of 
students per classroom, are also included in Table 3.3. Results from analyses on the Complete 
Case sample are on the right, results from the Test-Appropriate sample are on the left. For space 
reasons, results from the Null model are not included in the Table. Columns 2-3 and 6-7 display 
results from the models that include classroom and school contextual variables and columns 4-5 
and  8-9 display results from the model that includes quantity of instruction. Each horizontal 
panel of Table 3.3 displays the results for a different nation.  
 
How much do math teachers within each nation vary in effectiveness? 
Starting with the first panel of Table 3.3, which displays results from the hierarchical linear 
model analysis of math achievement status in the U.S., we see that estimates of the between-
classroom variance component account for around 11.5 percent of the variation in student 
achievement status in both subsamples of data. This is consistent with previous studies (Nye et 
al. 2004). According to the second panel of Table 3.3, which display results from the analyses 
using data from Hong Kong, estimates of the between-classroom variance component explain 
between 16-19 percent of the variation in student achievement status. In Japan (the third panel of 
data in Table 3.3), estimates of the between-classroom variance component account for around 2 
percent of the variation in student achievement. Estimates of the between- classroom variance 
component from the Singaporean data (presented in the fourth panel of Table 3.3) explain 20-22 
percent of the variation in student achievement. In Taiwan, estimates of the between-classroom 
variance component account for 2-3 percent of the variation in student achievement status.  
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Table 3.3 Results from Three-level Models of Student Achievement 
      Complete Case sample Test-Appropriate sample 
Nations Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
United States     
 
  
   
  
  Fixed Effects coef. se coef. se coef. se coef. se 
  Intercept 536.8 2.19 533.8 2.25 537.3 2.17 532.8 2.3 
  
Quantity of Instruction 
   
0.32 0.28 
  
0.37 0.33 
  Random Effects Var. % Var. % Var. % Var. % 
  Students  eijk 3188.4 81.1% 3190.1 81.2% 3193.3 81.2% 3193.3 81.6% 
  Classes  r0jk 446.5 11.4% 445.8 11.4% 454.4 11.6% 445.7 11.4% 
  Schools  u00k 298.5 7.6% 291.1 7.4% 285.1 7.2% 275.8 7.0% 
      
  
  
   
  
  N students 11,815 
 
11,815   10,967 
 
10,967   
  N schools 424 
 
424   406 
 
406   
  N classes 730 
 
730   681 
 
681   
  Class Avg. 16   16   16   16   
Hong Kong    
  
  
   
  
  Fixed Effects coef. se coef. se coef. se coef. se 
  Intercept 599.1 3.11 598.5 3.21 596.6 3.61 596.5 3.53 
  
Quantity of Instruction 
  
 
0.03 0.38 
  
0.04 0.41 
  Random Effects Var. % Var. % Var. % Var. % 
  Students  eijk 2487.9 81.3% 2496.3 80.7% 2503.6 81.7% 2503.5 81.7% 
  Classes  r0jk 564.9 18.5% 564.5 18.3% 504.1 16.5% 506.5 16.5% 
  Schools  u00k 8.2 0.3% 32.0 1.0% 56.5 1.8% 54.2 1.8% 
      
  
  
   
  
  N students 6,738 
 
6,738   6,120 
 
6,120   
  N schools 223 
 
223   206 
 
206   
  N classes 248 
 
248   227 
 
227   
  Class Avg. 27   27   27   27   
Japan   
  
  
   
  
  Fixed Effects coef. se coef. se coef. se coef. se 
  Intercept 569.4 3.10 570.8 3.35 569.2 4.36 565.4 2.89 
  
Quantity of Instruction 
  
 
0.10 0.32 
  
-0.44 0.45 
  Random Effects Var. % Var. % Var. % Var. % 
  Students  eijk 4143.7 94.6% 4146.8 94.3% 4047.3 94.9% 4059.8 95.2% 
  Classes  r0jk 154.6 1.9% 89.3 2.0% 109.3 2.6% 98.6 2.3% 
  Schools  u00k 83.1 3.5% 162.4 3.7% 110.2 2.6% 105.5 2.5% 
      
  
  
   
  
  N students 7,141 
 
7,141   3,656 
 
3,656   
  N schools 265 
 
265   135 
 
135   
  N classes 299 
 
299   154 
 
154   
  Class Avg. 24   24   24   24   
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Table 3.3 Continued               
    Complete Case sample Test-Appropriate sample 
Nations Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Singapore   
  
  
   
  
  Fixed Effects coef. se coef. se coef. se coef. se 
  Intercept 583.9 8.62 584.7 8.63 583.7 8.64 584.1 8.63 
  
Quantity of Instruction 
  
 
-0.08 0.42 
  
-0.03 0.42 
  Random Effects Var. % Var. % Var. % Var. % 
  Students  eijk 2775.4 76.8% 2777.0 76.3% 2776.5 76.8% 2776.4 76.8% 
  Classes  r0jk 775.1 21.5% 782.5 21.5% 745.0 20.6% 744.72 20.6% 
  Schools  u00k 62.8 1.7% 79.4 2.2% 91.8 2.5% 92.69 2.6% 
      
  
  
   
  
  N students 9,627 
 
9,627   9,613 
 
9,613   
  N schools 323 
 
323   323 
 
323   
  N classes 459 
 
459   458 
 
458   
  Class Avg. 21   21   21   21   
Taiwan   
  
  
   
  
  Fixed Effects coef. se coef. se coef. se coef. se 
  Intercept 593.3 2.23 593.1 2.22 593.0 2.24 592.1 2.19 
  
Quantity of Instruction 
  
 
0.17 0.32 
  
0.24 0.31 
  Random Effects Var. % Var. % Var. % Var. % 
  Students  eijk 2838.4 95.1% 2840.5 94.9% 2828.6 95.1% 2828.5 95.3% 
  Classes  r0jk 65.8 2.2% 77.4 2.6% 50.72 1.7% 83.44 1.9% 
  Schools  u00k 81.2 2.7% 74.9 2.5% 96.33 3.2% 57.23 2.8% 
      
  
  
   
  
  N students 7,458 
 
7,458   7,073 
  
7,073 
  N schools 264 
 
264   250 
  
250 
  N classes 284 
 
284   268 
  
268 
  Class Avg. 26   26   26     26 
 
 To gauge the magnitude of the difference in achievement status between having a highly 
effective teacher versus a less effective teacher in each nation, I calculate the difference between 
the minimum and maximum mean classroom achievement scores that fall in the 95 percent 
plausible values range of the standard normal distribution. For each nation, I measure this 
difference using estimates from the Quantity of Instruction Models. Calculations based on the 
Complete Case sample are given first, followed by estimates from the Test-Appropriate sample. 
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Results from these computations suggest that the difference between being assigned to a highly 
effective versus a less effective teacher in the U.S. ranges from 79 to 83 achievement points, or 
four-fifths of a standard deviation in achievement scores. In Hong Kong, the difference between 
being assigned to a highly effective teacher versus a less effective teacher is about the same as it 
is in the U.S.: the difference ranges from 82 to 88 points. In Japan, the difference between being 
assigned to a highly effective teacher versus a less effective teacher is either 37 or 39 points, 
depending on the sample data used. In Singapore, the difference between being assigned to a 
highly effective teacher versus a less effective teacher is about 110 points in either estimation. In 
Taiwan, the difference between being assigned to a highly effective teacher versus a less 
effective teacher is 35 or 30 points, depending on the sample.   
 We can also use the range of plausible values among teachers within each nation to gain 
insight into how the most effective teachers in the U.S. stack up to their counterparts in East 
Asia. For simplicity, I will limit the discussion to results from the model including the quantity 
of instruction from the Test Appropriate sample (the results displayed in the final two columns of 
Table 3.3). The mean classroom achievement of highly effective U.S. teachers is 574 
(=532.8+(1.96*√445.7)). This figure is just slightly higher than the average classroom mean 
achievement score in Japan (565.4, falling within a 95 percent confidence interval of 560 to 571), 
suggesting that, when the sample is limited to students who learned between 60 and 100 percent 
of the TIMSS test topics, the most effective teachers in the U.S. rank roughly on par with a 
teacher of average effectiveness in Japan. Compared to the rest of the East Asian nations, 
however, the most effective math teachers in the U.S. are not as effective as the average. But, the 
most effective teachers in the U.S. are more effective than the least effective teachers in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, where the average mean achievement score in the bottom 5 percent of 
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classrooms in those nations comes to 552 (=596.5-(1.96*√506.5)) and 531 (=584.1-
(1.96*√744.7)), respectively. In Taiwan, the least effective teachers who covered between 60 and 
100 percent of the TIMSS topics appear to be equally as effective as the most effective teachers 
in the U.S. (The average mean achievement score in the bottom 5 percent of classrooms in 
Taiwan is 577, compared to the average mean achievement score of 574 in the 95 percent of 
classrooms in the U.S.)  
 These findings indicate that teacher effectiveness does not vary more within the U.S. than 
it does in all East Asian nations. Teacher effectiveness does vary less in Japan and Taiwan than it 
does in the U.S. but there is considerably more variation in teacher effectiveness in Singapore. 
While differences between classrooms within schools explains more of the variation in student 
achievement in Hong Kong than in the U.S., estimated differences between having a highly 
effective teacher versus a less effective teacher  are roughly equivalent in the two nations. 
 
Do teachers who teach more material produce more learning?  
The coefficients and standard errors for the quantity of instruction variables are given in the third 
row of every panel in Table 3.3. The results from all samples and nations indicate that in these 
data, the relationship between quantity of instruction and achievement is weak. The coefficient is 
never greater than 0.37 (in the Test-Appropriate Sample for the U.S.) and is negative in Japan 
and Singapore. Further, the relationship between quantity of instruction and student achievement 
is not statistically significant in any nation or sample. The relation between quantity of 
instruction and student achievement is similar across nations in that it is weak and statistically 
insignificant in all models and samples for each nation.  
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 Results from the models using the Test-Appropriate sample data (the right-hand side of 
Table 3.3) indicate that the addition of the quantity of instruction variable in the final model did 
not affect estimates of the between-classroom variance component in any nation,  which suggests 
that differences across classrooms within schools in the quantity of instruction teachers provide 
do not explain variations in teacher effectiveness.   
 Comparing between-classroom variance component estimates from the Complete Case 
sample to those from the Test-Appropriate sample sheds light on the effect that relying on a 
“general use” assessment has on estimates of teacher effectiveness. In each nation, estimates of 
the between-classroom variance component vary slightly across subsamples. The greatest 
difference appears in Hong Kong, where the percentage of variance explained by between-
classroom differences declines from 18.5 percent in the Complete Case sample to 16.5 percent in 
the Test-Appropriate sample. In the U.S., the difference across subsamples in between-classroom 
variance component estimates is quite small—0.2 percent, suggesting that the correspondence 
(or lack thereof) between the test curriculum and the classroom curriculum does not strongly 
influence estimates of teacher effects. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For several decades researchers have claimed that East Asian math teachers are more effective 
than their U.S. counterparts. However, there is limited empirical evidence to support or repudiate 
this argument. The analyses presented in this chapter contribute much-needed empirical insight 
into international differences in variations in teacher effectiveness across nations. Using pooled 
data from the 2003 and 2007 rounds of TIMSS from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and 
the U.S., I show how teacher effectiveness in the fourth grade varies within and across nations. I 
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also test hypotheses drawn from the international comparative literature as well as from U.S.-
based research to assess the relationship between quantity of instruction and student 
achievement. 
Results from this study suggest that math teachers in East Asian nations are indeed more 
effective than their U.S. counterparts. I show that, accounting for student and classroom 
characteristics, among students who have received the same quantity of instruction, average 
achievement is higher in East Asian nations than in the U.S. and further, that the differences in 
average achievement are not insignificant. These findings contradict Westbury’s (1992) research, 
which shows that U.S. and Japanese eighth graders who were taught similar percentages of 
algebra topics and scored similarly on a pre-test scored equally as well on the algebra section of 
the SIMS post-test.  
There are several possible explanations for the inconsistency between the findings 
presented in this chapter and Westbury’s (1992). These involve differences in methodology and 
time period. Westbury’s sample of U.S. teachers contains only those who were assigned to teach 
advanced math courses in the U.S. Given that advanced math courses in the 1980s in particular 
were usually only offered at high-performing schools (Gamoran 1986), it is likely that this select 
sample is composed of the most effective eighth-grade math teachers in the U.S. The subsamples 
of U.S. teachers that I use are far less likely to include only highly effective teachers. 
Additionally, extensive curricular reforms have occurred in both the U.S. and Japan in the three 
decades since the data Westbury used were collected. For example, U.S. math curriculum is far 
more extensive at all grade levels than it was in the early 1980s. It is possible that this ever-
changing curricular environment has influenced U.S. math teachers’ ability to promote 
achievement, which would also explain the inconsistencies between findings. 
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The findings of this chapter suggest that the relationship between quantity of instruction 
and student achievement is much more complex than the idea espoused by earlier international 
comparative scholars as well as Sørensen and Morgan (2000), which is: “the more content 
students are taught, the more they learn, and the better they perform on the achievement tests” 
(Medrich and Griffith 1992: 30). I find a very weak and statistically insignificant relationship 
between quantity of instruction and student achievement in every nation under investigation. It is 
likely that the relationship between quantity of instruction and student achievement is not clear 
because a number of previously overlooked factors, such as curriculum sequencing and 
instructional strategies, are interfering in the relationship. It is possible that previous international 
assessments provide evidence of a positive relationship between quantity of instruction and 
student achievement because at that time, the educational systems that covered more content also 
had more effective curricular guidelines and/or more effective teachers. In the intervening years, 
as more nations—including the U.S.—strove to provide greater content coverage, the association 
between quantity of instruction and curriculum sequencing, guidelines, instructional strategies, 
etc., weakened thereby allowing us to see that quantity of instruction alone does not determine 
student achievement. Future research might attempt to assess the relative importance of factors 
such as curriculum sequencing and curricular guidelines on the effectiveness of instruction.    
Results from this chapter also dispute the hypothesis that the difference between effective 
and less effective teachers in the U.S. is greater than it is in East Asian nations. Differences 
between classrooms in the U.S. account for about 11 percent of the variation in achievement, 
which mirrors Nye et al.’s (2004) findings for achievement status in math. While teachers in 
Japan and Taiwan vary less in their effectiveness, teachers in Hong Kong and Singapore vary 
more in their ability to promote achievement than math teachers in the U.S.  
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The sizeable differences within East Asia in terms of how much teachers vary in their 
ability to promote achievement calls into question the suggestion that structural features of East 
Asian educational systems act to reduce the amount of variation in teacher effectiveness in those 
nations. The findings from this chapter’s analysis suggest that this argument holds for the cases 
of Japan and Taiwan, but not for Hong Kong or Singapore. In Japan and Taiwan, teachers tend 
not to differ much in terms of effectiveness. Differences between classrooms and schools 
combined account for just 6 percent of the variation in student achievement in the final models. 
Coleman et al. (1966) used a similar finding to argue that families tend to matter more than 
schools for student achievement. However, Sørensen and Morgan (2000) provide a difference 
take on the issue. They point out that if schools and teachers provide all students with the same 
learning opportunities, then students with more natural ability, and those who put more effort 
into their learning (or both), will outperform their peers. In other words, student characteristics 
should explain the largest proportion of variance in student achievement if the educational 
system ensures that all students receive the same quantity and quality of instruction. Thus, the 
findings from Japan and Taiwan could imply that it matters very little which school or teacher a 
student is assigned to because all schools and teachers in Japan and Taiwan provide an equal 
amount of high-quality learning opportunities. It is what students do with those opportunities that 
determines their achievement.  
Compared to Japan, Taiwan and the U.S., the amount of variation in teacher effectiveness 
within  Hong Kong and Singapore is substantial. In both nations, however, differences between 
schools account for very little of the variation in student achievement in the final models. In 
other words, in Hong Kong and Singapore, which teacher a student is assigned to matters more 
than the school a student attends. It might be that all schools in Hong Kong and Singapore 
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provide the same amount of resources to their teachers such that differences in teachers’ skills 
are intensified. Why this situation occurs in Hong Kong and Singapore but not in Taiwan and 
Japan is an interesting question. Future research might examine similarities and differences 
between Japan and Taiwan compared to Hong Kong and Singapore in the amount of autonomy 
given to teachers and in the frequency and depth of professional support they receive.  
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Chapter 4 
Parents 
 
HIS CHAPTER SHIFTS  FOCUS from the relationship between math teachers and student 
achievement to the relationship between schools and parents. Parents play a principal role 
in their children’s early educational development. For this reason, it is possible that a disparity 
between East Asia and the U.S. in the proportion of parents who are effectively involved in their 
children’s education explains some of the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for laypeople and scholars, including Stevenson and Stigler (1992), to credit parents 
in East Asia for their children’s superior performance on international assessments. Despite the 
widespread belief (fueled most recently by Chua’s 2011 best-selling Battle Hymn of the Tiger 
Mother) that East Asian parents are relentless in their quest to raise academic overachievers, 
there is no study of nationally representative data to support this argument. Further, while it is 
commonly believed among policymakers that it is possible to increase the proportion of parents 
who are effectively involved in their children’s education (doing so is now a major policy goal at 
the federal, state and local levels in the U.S. (Domina 2005) as well as in Hong Kong (Cheung 
2001), Singapore (Singapore Ministry of Education 2012) and Taiwan (Hung 2007)), the 
T 
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prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap would suggest that such 
policy efforts, at least in the U.S., are futile.  
 A sociological approach that is both empirically and theoretically grounded could 
contribute to this debate. Although some sociologists, notably Coleman (1991) and Epstein 
(1986, 1995), have put forth theories to explain how the proportion of parents who are involved 
in their children’s education might be increased, their theories have yet to be applied to East 
Asian-U.S. comparative research. In this chapter, I discuss the limitations of the existing 
evidence and prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap before 
providing an alternative theory using Coleman and Epstein’s work. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible with the TIMSS data (nor with any other internationally comparable dataset on early 
education) to isolate the mechanisms through which schools encourage parents to become 
involved. This is because no internationally comparable dataset on elementary-school education 
focuses specifically on the strategies schools utilize to encourage parents to become involved in 
their children’s education, nor includes multiple, suitable indicators of parental involvement 
from the U.S. and the East Asian nations under investigation.
24
  
 I conclude this chapter by exploring the relationships between features of the school 
community that Coleman and Epstein link to parental involvement and the likelihood of parental 
involvement within each nation, and by assessing how these relationships vary across nations. 
Unfortunately, given the state of the evidence, it would be premature to draw any firm 
conclusions; my aim is to put the study of the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap on a 
sounder footing so that such conclusions might be made possible. 
                                                     
24
 The Progress in Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) is the only internationally comparable dataset to survey the 
parents of elementary-school children and thus to provide more insight into parental involvement within each nation. 
However, Japan and Taiwan do not participate in PIRLS and responses to the family survey are not available from 
the U.S.   
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PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN CHILDREN’S EDUCATION 
A necessary precondition for this research is a thorough definition of the concept of parental 
involvement (Feuerstein 2000). The concept has been defined broadly to encompass all parenting 
practices that might influence children’s educational development. Epstein (1995) created a 
typology to account for the concept’s multifaceted nature. She identifies six different types of 
parental involvement: 1) child-rearing practices that establish the home as an environment 
conducive to study, including practices indirectly related to educational development, such as 
nutrition and health, 2) home-school communications concerning school programs and children’s 
progress, 3) volunteering at school, 4) home-based activities related to school including helping 
with homework, course selection and planning, 5) participation in school decisions through 
active parent-teacher associations (PTA), advisory councils or special committees, and 6) 
collaborating with the community to strengthen school programs and children’s learning 
opportunities.  
 There does not appear to be a consensus on the form of parental involvement that best 
captures parents’ commitment to their children’s education. Over the years, scholars have relied 
on a variety of indicators to measure parental involvement, including: parents’ expectations for 
children’s educational attainment (Coleman 1988; Roksa and Potter 2011; Sandefur et al 2006), 
parent-child discussions about school (Desimone 1999; Kao 2004; Teachman, Paasch and Carver 
1996),  children’s participation in high-status cultural activities (Dumais 2006), and the number 
of social ties that parents have to the parents of their children’s friends (Carbonaro 1998; Morgan 
and Sørensen 1999). The multiplicity of ways in which parents can be involved in their 
children’s education complicates efforts to compare relative levels of parental involvement 
across nations using limited, survey-based information—a topic I return to in the next section. 
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 There are two additional points to note regarding parental involvement. First, although 
much of the sociological work is narrowly focused on the connections between parental 
involvement and children’s achievement scores or grades, Epstein (1986, 1995) and others 
(Hoover-Dempsey et al 2005; Domina 2005) suggest that many forms of parental involvement 
influence learning indirectly, through their effect on children’s non-cognitive attributes such as 
feelings of self-efficacy, organizational skills and engagement with school. Thus, parental 
involvement can be considered effective if it is associated with either cognitive or non-cognitive 
attributes. With this in mind, I test the relevance of my measure of parental involvement by 
assessing the relations between it and student’s math achievement as well as students’ 
engagement with school and self-confidence in learning math. Second, U.S.-based research has 
found that both the extent and efficacy of parental involvement might decline with children’s age 
(Domina 2005). For this reason, analyses that rely on data from elementary-school students as 
opposed to high-school students should be more fruitful—which is why I chose to rely solely on 
data from the TIMSS fourth-grade populations for these analyses. 
 
EXISTING EVIDENCE OF AN EAST ASIAN-U.S.  PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT GAP 
The best source of evidence of a parental involvement gap between East Asia and the U.S. comes 
from a series of studies conducted by Stevenson and colleagues during the 1980s and 1990s in 
Beijing, Chicago, Minneapolis, Sendai and Taipei.
25
 Although Stevenson and colleagues (Chen 
and Stevenson 1989; Stevenson and Stigler 1992; Stevenson, Chen and Lee 1993) clearly state 
that the level of parental involvement is lower in the U.S. than in East Asian nations, they do not 
clearly define whether this is because a smaller proportion of parents in the U.S. than in East 
                                                     
25
 Much of the evidence of an East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap comes from studies of immigrants to the 
U.S. Given that Asian immigrants to the U.S. are a select group and are thus not representative of their native 
countrymen, I do not draw on evidence from immigrant studies in this chapter. 
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Asian nations is involved in their children’s education or because, compared to their counterparts 
in East Asia, U.S. parents are less effectively involved in their children’s education. In this 
section, I show why the existing evidence does not necessarily support the second argument (that 
East Asian parents are more effectively involved), although it does provide some compelling 
support for the first argument (that a greater proportion of parents in East Asian nations than in 
the U.S. is involved).  
 One of the key findings from Stevenson and colleagues’ research is that U.S. parents tend 
to be more satisfied than parents in East Asia with their children’s academic achievement and 
with the quality of their children’s schools. As Stevenson, Chen and Lee (1993) explain, this 
trend continued throughout the 1980s—despite a growing awareness among the U.S. parents 
they interviewed that the U.S. educational system lags behind those of other industrialized 
nations. Stevenson et al’s (1993) study shows that the U.S. mothers interviewed in 1990 were 
just as likely as the U.S. mothers interviewed in 1980 and 1984 to describe their attitude towards 
their children’s academic achievement as “very satisfied” (as opposed to “satisfied” or “not 
satisfied”).  In each survey round, more than 40 percent of U.S. mothers surveyed gave this 
response, compared to less than 10 percent of mothers in Sendai and Taipei. Similarly, when 
asked to rate the efficacy of their children’s schools, almost twice as many U.S. mothers than 
Japanese or Taiwanese mothers responded that their children’s schools were doing an “excellent” 
or “good” job. According to Stevenson et al, the fact that U.S. mothers are cognizant that the 
U.S. lags behind other nations on international assessments but overall remain more satisfied 
with their children’s education than Japanese and Taiwanese mothers signals their low academic 
standards. Similarly, the authors take as a sign of higher academic standards the fact that mothers 
in Japan and Taiwan continue to express a low level of satisfaction with their children’s 
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education despite their awareness of their nation’s stellar performance on international 
assessments. The authors use this cross-regional disparity in levels of satisfaction to argue that 
U.S. parents are less effectively involved than their counterparts in East Asia. 
 However, the fact Stevenson, Chen and Lee (1993) found that the groups of U.S. mothers 
surveyed tend to be more satisfied with their children’s education than the groups of mothers 
surveyed in Japan and Taiwan could have more to do with national differences in response styles 
than with real differences in mothers’ attitudes. Studies focused on international differences in 
response styles consistently show that, when asked to rank their responses on a scale, East 
Asians tend to check the middle response categories while respondents in the U.S. tend to check 
the extreme categories (Harzing 2006). This could explain why Chen and Stevenson (1989) find 
average ranked responses to be higher among U.S. mothers than among Japanese and Taiwanese 
mothers. Given that there are national differences in response styles, the evidence that U.S. 
parents are less effectively involved in their children’s education than East Asian parents would 
be more convincing if researchers were to either factor national differences in response styles 
into their analyses or to rely on evidence that is not based on parents’ rated responses to survey 
questions.   
 Additional evidence that U.S. parents are less effectively involved than parents in East 
Asia is that, of the mothers surveyed in 1980 and 1986, those in Chicago and Minneapolis spent 
less time, on average, helping their children with homework each week than parents in Beijing, 
Sendai and Taipei (Chen and Stevenson 1989). Yet the amount of time that parents spend 
helping their children with homework might not act as a good indicator of parents’ commitment 
of resources to their children’s education because it strongly depends on the amount of 
homework that their children’s teachers assign. For example, if teachers do not assign any math 
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homework, then even parents who undertake other forms of involvement in their children’s 
education cannot spend time helping with math homework. Given that math teachers in East 
Asian nations tend to assign more homework than their counterparts in the U.S., it is possible 
that a disparity in minutes of homework assigned (as opposed to a difference in the effectiveness 
of parents’ involvement) explains Chen and Stevenson’s findings. To test this hypothesis, I use 
data from Chen and Stevenson (pp. 556, 558) to calculate the ratio of average minutes mothers 
spent helping with homework to average minutes of homework teachers assigned per week. The 
resulting ratios indicate that—almost without exception—mothers in Chicago and Minneapolis 
actually spent more time, relative to the amount of homework assigned, helping with homework 
than did mothers in any Asian city. 
 
Table 4.1 Ratio of Minutes of Homework Assigned to Minutes of Help Mothers Provide 
  1980 Study 1986 Study  
Cities Grade 1 Grade 5 Grade 1 Grade 3 Grade 5 
Chicago . . 2.87 0.99 0.78 
Minneapolis 4.57 0.71 . . . 
Beijing . . 2.25 0.90 0.58 
Taipei 0.68 0.35 2.31 . 0.92 
Sendai 1.52 0.39 1.85 . 0.63 
 
 Table 4.1 displays the ratios of average minutes of homework help to average minutes of 
homework assigned that I calculated using data from Chen and Stevenson (1989). The table is 
divided into 2 panels. The panel on the left displays the ratios derived from their 1980 data, 
which include Grades 1 and 5 in Minneapolis, Taipei and Sendai. The panel on the right displays 
ratios derived from Chen and Stevenson’s 1986 data, which includes Grades 1, 3 and 5 in 
Chicago and Beijing and Grades 1 and 5 in Taipei and Sendai.  
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The ratios presented in Table 4.1 for mothers of Grade 1 students indicate that for every 
minute of homework assigned each week, mothers in Minneapolis and Chicago spent an average 
of four-and-a-half minutes and almost three minutes, respectively, helping with homework. In 
comparison, for every minute of homework assigned, mothers of first graders in Beijing spent an 
average of two-and-a-quarter minutes helping with homework while across survey rounds 
mothers in Sendai spent less than two minutes, on average, helping with homework for every 
minute of homework assigned and mothers in Taipei spent about forty-five seconds in 1980 and 
two-and-a-half minutes in 1986 helping with homework for every minute of homework assigned. 
The only instance in which mothers in the U.S., on average, did not spend more time helping 
with homework relative to the minutes of homework assigned is in the 1986 study of mothers of 
Grade 5 students. Here, the ratio is highest in Taipei (0.92) followed by Chicago (0.78), Sendai 
(0.63) and Beijing (0.58). 
 Once the average minutes of homework that teachers assign each week is taken into 
account, the evidence used to support the idea that parents in East Asia are more involved in their 
children’s education than parents in the U.S. now appears to suggest the opposite: that parents in 
the U.S. tend to be more involved than their counterparts in East Asia. However, there is another 
contextual factor that likely influences this measure of parental involvement. This is the amount 
of time that children need to complete their homework assignments. Mothers in the U.S. might 
spend more time helping their children with homework relative to the minutes of homework 
assigned because their children need more help than do children in East Asia. Chen and 
Stevenson (1989: 559) allude to this possibility when they note that the amount of time mothers 
spent helping with homework is negatively correlated with 24 of their 27 measures of cognitive 
ability. In other words, in all three nations, mothers whose children are struggling academically 
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tend to invest more time helping their children with homework. Given that the amount of time 
parents spend helping with homework appears to be strongly influenced both by the amount of 
homework assigned and by children’s cognitive attributes, cross-national comparisons of the 
time mothers spend on homework  help would yield compelling evidence of a parental 
involvement gap only if the analysis pool were narrowed to the parents of students who are 
struggling academically and the amount of homework assigned were taken into account. Even 
then it would be difficult, without longitudinal data on students’ cognitive and non-cognitive 
attributes, to use time spent on homework help to assess whether parents in the U.S. are less 
effectively involved than parents in East Asian nations. 
 So far in this section I have given three examples of the evidence Stevenson and 
colleagues (Chen and Stevenson 1989; Stevenson and Stigler 1992; Stevenson, Chen and Lee 
1993) use to buttress their argument that parents in East Asian nations are more effectively 
involved in their children’s education than parents in the U.S. I have suggested that the evidence 
based on ranked responses is biased by national differences in response styles. I have also shown 
how overlooked contextual factors weaken the evidence. But the greatest limitation to the 
existing evidence is that it does not demonstrate cross-regional differences in the effectiveness of 
parents’ involvement. To do so, research would need to show that the effect of parental 
involvement on growth in student achievement is greater in East Asian nations than in the U.S. 
holding other factors that influence achievement constant. Scholarship has yet to provide this 
type of analysis. For these reasons, there is little evidence to suggest that U.S. parents are less 
effectively involved in their children’s education than parents in East Asian nations.  
 The best evidence of an East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap comes from Stevenson 
and Stigler (1992), who show that even though homes are considerably smaller, on average, in 
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Japan and Taiwan than in the U.S., 98 percent of the parents interviewed in Sendai and 95 
percent of parents in Taipei had provided their fifth graders with a study desk at home compared 
to just 63 percent of parents in Minneapolis. It is unlikely that this finding reflects a greater 
household income disparity in the U.S. than in Japan and Taiwan: according to Deininger and 
Squire (1996), the average Gini coefficient of income inequality over the latter half of the 20
th
 
century is roughly equivalent between the U.S. and Japan (35.3 and 34.8, respectively) and 
considerably smaller in Taiwan (29.6) than in Japan. The fact that almost all parents Stevenson 
and colleagues interviewed in Japan and Taiwan had provided their fifth-graders with a study 
desk at home compared to less than two-thirds of parents interviewed in the U.S. gives reason to 
believe that a greater proportion of parents in East Asian nations than in the U.S. is involved in 
their children’s education.  
 There is some merit to measuring parental involvement as provision of a desk at home. 
Provision of a desk at home is a permanent indicator of parents’ commitment of resources to 
their children’s education, as opposed to a form of involvement that parents might engage in only 
sporadically. Further, there are not too many reasons why parents would provide their child with 
a desk other than to benefit children’s schoolwork.26 It is also a common way that parents can 
demonstrate the importance of education to their children in both East Asia and the U.S. Another 
advantage is that every student should benefit from having a place to study at home regardless of 
their individual abilities and needs. Even if educators point out to parents the benefits of 
providing a study space, and point out that a suitable desk can be had at all price points, whether 
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 The fact that there are not too many reasons why parents would provide their child with a desk at home other than 
their belief that it is important for their child to have a place to study is noteworthy because studies suggest that the 
reasons why parents engage in certain forms of involvement vary across racial/ethnic groups. For example, using 
data from the 1988 NELS, Kao (2004) shows that the relationship between parent-child discussions about school 
and student achievement are positive among Hispanic immigrants and negative among Asian immigrants. She 
hypothesizes that this is because Asian parents only discuss school on a regular basis when their children are 
performing poorly.  
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or not parents decide to provide the desk is a decision that is up to parents. Additionally, this 
measure relies on a simple “yes” or “no” response and therefore should not be biased by national 
differences in response styles.  
 This section has reviewed the evidence on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap 
and has argued that while the evidence given to support the idea that U.S. parents are less 
effectively involved in their children’s education than parents in East Asian nations is weak, 
there is some compelling evidence to suggest that a greater proportion of parents in Japan and 
Taiwan than in the U.S. is involved in their children’s education.  Therefore, I use the phrase 
“East-Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap” to refer solely to a cross-regional disparity in the 
proportion of involved parents. In the next section, I review the prevailing theory to explain why 
a larger proportion of parents in East Asian nations than in the U.S. is involved in their children’s 
education before showing how the theory can be improved. 
 
PREVAILING THEORY ON THE EAST ASIAN-U.S.  PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT GAP  
The prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap is supported by both 
cross-regional and immigrant studies (for example: Chen and Stevenson 1995; Kao 1995; Kao 
and Thompson 2003; Okagaki and Frensch 1998; Schneider and Lee 1990; Stevenson and Stigler 
1992; Stevenson, Chen and Lee 1993; Sun 1998). According to these studies, the reason why a 
greater proportion of East Asian parents than U.S. parents is involved in their children’s 
education is because East Asian culture prompts parents to regard doing well in school as their 
children’s most pressing task (Stevenson and Stigler 1992). Scholars note than in Confucianism, 
education is important for family honor, self-esteem and self-improvement (Schneider and Lee 
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1990). These strong cultural beliefs concerning the value of education supposedly drive East 
Asian parents to become involved in their children’s education.27  
 The prevailing argument is that how much parents value education is rooted in their 
national culture and determines whether or not they become involved in their children’s 
education. Given that immigrant studies of parental involvement also tend to attribute the greater 
educational investments of immigrant East Asian parents compared to other racial/ethnic groups 
to East Asian culture, the implication is that Confucianism is unique among world cultures in the 
emphasis it places on education. This literature yields the first hypothesis to be examined in the 
analysis section: 
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s 
education is uniquely high in East Asia, given that it is the region where 
Confucianism is most prevalent.  
 
 There are significant weaknesses to the prevailing theory. For one, it rests on three a 
priori assumptions that have little if any empirical foundation: 1) Parents’ beliefs about the value 
of education determine whether or not they become involved in their children’s education, 2) 
Beliefs about the value of education are rooted in national cultures,  and 3) U.S. culture places 
less value on education than East Asian culture. As for the first assumption, U.S.-based research 
on parental involvement has looked for but cannot find evidence to support the idea that whether 
or not parents value education determines their degree of involvement (Chin and Phillips 2004; 
Hoover-Dempsey et al 2005; Lareau 2000[1989]). The second assumption suggests that beliefs 
about the importance of education are inscribed by “nature” as opposed to “nurture,” or by place 
of birth as opposed to structural or institutional factors. It is a defeatist argument; the implication 
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 A passage from Lin and Fu (1990: 429) demonstrates the degree to which scholars attribute Asian parenting 
practices to Confucianism: “Definitive views on parental control, obedience, strict discipline, emphasis on 
education, filial piety, respect for elders, family obligations, reverence for tradition, maintenance of harmony, and 
negation of conflict are attributed to the influence of Confucianism.”  
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is that the proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education will always be 
higher in East Asian nations than in the U.S.  
 The third assumption—that U.S. culture places less value on education than East Asian 
culture—indicates that the prevailing theory is based on a cultural depravity model. This type of 
model was used to explain the lower performance of African-Americans in the U.S. public 
school system (e.g. Moynihan 1965) but fell out of fashion in sociology in the 1970s (Corcoran 
1995). Yet alternative explanations for the parental involvement gap between parents in East 
Asia and the U.S. are virtually nonexistent (Kao and Thompson 2003).  
 Another limitation to the prevailing theory is that it does not allow for factors other than 
how much a national culture values education to influence whether or not parents become 
involved in their children’s education. For example, cross-regional research rarely considers how 
schools might influences parents’ decisions to become involved in their children’s education. 
Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) work is a prominent exception. The authors note that elementary 
schools in both Japan and Taiwan engage parents in the schooling process through the daily use 
of a communications booklet, which updates parents on their children’s progress and keeps them 
abreast of what is going on at school. The authors acknowledge that this school practice 
facilitates the involvement of Japanese and Taiwanese parents, writing (p. 84), “Only through 
this degree of intimate knowledge of what is happening at school can parents hope to be aware of 
the ways they can help their children and provide a home environment that is conducive to 
studying.” Yet the authors ultimately attribute the greater proportion of involved parents in Japan 
and Taiwan to Confucianism as opposed to the communications booklets. In other words, school 
programs meant to engage parents in the schooling process in Taiwan and Japan do not actually 
encourage parents to become involved in their children’s education because, thanks to 
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Confucianism, all parents in East Asia are already involved. The cumulative effect of these 
weaknesses in the prevailing theory is that scholars too readily conclude that nothing can be done 
to increase the proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education in the U.S. In 
the next section I explain, using sociological theories from U.S.-based research, what can be 
done. 
 
AN ALTERNATE THEORY ON THE EAST ASIAN-U.S.  PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT GAP 
Case studies of preschools and elementary schools in Japan published since Stevenson and 
Stigler’s (1992) book provide the empirical groundwork for a more positive assessment of what 
schools and educational systems can do to increase the proportion of parents who are involved in 
their children’s education. These studies do not rest on the assumption that Confucianism propels 
all parents of East Asian descent to become involved in their children’s education. Instead, they 
provide reason to believe that the communications booklets and other widely-used school 
practices to engage parents in the schooling process in Japan are succeeding in encouraging 
parents, who would otherwise take a backseat to their children’s education, to become involved. 
For example, to analyze variation in parental involvement across social-class backgrounds in 
Japan, Yamamoto, Holloway and Suzuki (2006) interviewed 108 mothers of 5- and 6-year-olds 
in two urban centers. They find that while highly educated mothers tend to use a more rigorous 
preschool selection process and to spend more time reading to their children at home than their 
less-educated counterparts, the group of mothers with less education tends to spend more time 
participating in school-based activities. The reason why the group of less educated mothers 
actually spend more time at school, the authors suggest, is that all mothers, but particularly those 
with less education, find it difficult to say no to requests from school staff to participate or 
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volunteer at school. The authors’ research raises the possibility that the invitations to 
involvement from school staff are increasing the proportion of mothers who are involved in their 
children’s education in Japan.  
 Additional support for the idea that widespread, school-based practices to engage parents 
in the schooling process in Japan and Taiwan are encouraging parents who might otherwise take 
a backseat to their children’s education to become involved comes from four anthropological 
studies of preschools and elementary schools in Japan written by Americans (Allison 1996, 
Benjamin 1997, Lewis 1995, Peak 1991). Three of the four authors (Allison, Benjamin and 
Lewis) enrolled their own children in school in Japan and provide firsthand accounts of their 
interactions with their children’s schools.28 All four studies provide similar descriptions of the 
formal mechanisms through which schools in Japan engage parents in the schooling process. 
These mechanisms are not limited to the communications booklets that Stevenson and Stigler 
(1992) note, but also include frequent face-to-face meetings, invitations to volunteer at school, 
and other written directives from school to home. It is possible, although unclear from these 
studies, that many of these mechanisms are institutionalized at the system level. For example, the 
educational system in Japan requires parents to meet with the school principal before their child 
enters a new school.
29
 Regardless, all four studies suggest that compared to elementary schools 
in the U.S., elementary schools in Japan go to greater lengths to encourage parental involvement.  
 Two of the authors explicitly attribute the high proportion of involved parents in Japan to 
schools’ efforts to engage parents in their children’s education. Benjamin (1997) found the mass 
of written communication from school to be particularly effective in enlisting her support, 
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 I looked for, but could not find, similar accounts of preschools and elementary schools in Hong Kong, Singapore 
and  Taiwan. 
29
 Information last retrieved on March 12, 2012 from www.education-in-japan.info/sub106.html 
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writing (p. 196), “the volume of information and advice and demands [from the school] resulted 
in a higher level of cooperation. Maybe every mother could decide to ignore 20 percent of what 
the school suggested or demanded, but following 80 percent of a hundred directions means that 
mothers are doing a lot.” From Allison’s (1996) perspective, the demands of Japanese schools on 
mothers are so extensive—and so effective—that she titled her piece “Producing Mothers.”  The 
aim of Allison’s work is to combat the prevailing theory that Japanese mothers decide on their 
own to become involved in their children’s education. Instead, her central thesis is that the 
Japanese school system coerces mothers to play a leading role in their children’s education. 
Whereas the prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap attributes the 
greater proportion of involved parents in East Asian nations than in the U.S. to Confucianism, 
which acts like an internal rudder guiding East Asian parents to act for the benefit of their 
children’s education, Allison attributes the high proportion of involved parents in Japan to the 
Japanese educational system, which does its best not to let parents (particularly mothers) take a 
backseat to their children’s education.   
 Case studies of Japanese preschools and elementary schools suggest the possibility that 
the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap stems from the relative inability of schools within 
the U.S. to foster parental involvement. If this is true, then within each nation we would expect 
to find that the likelihood of involvement is greater at schools with parental involvement 
programs than at those without such programs, and that parental involvement programs are 
relatively less extensive or less successful in the U.S. The lack of data on the specific strategies 
schools use to encourage parental involvement makes it impossible to directly assess the impact 
of various school-based programs on the likelihood of parental involvement within nations, and 
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to compare the scope of parental involvement programs across nations.
30
 Nonetheless, it is 
possible to assess whether or not the likelihood that parents from similar backgrounds are 
involved differs across schools within each nation. If so, then this chapter would provide some 
support for the alternate argument. Therefore, the second hypothesis this chapter examines is: 
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for parents’ background, the likelihood that parents are 
involved in their children’s education varies across schools within each nation. 
 
 While the case studies leave open the possibility that schools can make a difference in the 
proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education, they do not explain why 
schools might make a difference. For this reason, I use Coleman (1991) and Epstein’s (1986) 
work to put research of the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap on sounder theoretical 
footing.  
 Both Coleman (1991) and Epstein (1986, 1995) draw connections between the social 
capital in the school community and the proportion of parents who are involved in their 
children’s education. As such, a brief description of the concept of social capital is in order. 
Coleman (1988) conceived of social capital as taking multiple forms, all of which have in 
common two features: 1) they consist of a social organization or network, and 2) they facilitate 
certain actions of actors within the social organization. The three forms of social capital that 
Coleman elaborated on were obligations and expectations (e.g. mutual trust among actors in the 
social organization), information channels, and norms that encourage action for the common 
good. Coleman contends that social closure, or strong social ties between all actors in the 
network, facilitates the creation of trust and of social norms that lead to positive social control. 
Coleman’s concept of social capital draws attention to the role that social structure plays in 
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 Initially I planned to use school principals’ responses to questions regarding the activities schools ask parents to 
take part in to differentiate schools based on the strength of their parental involvement programs. Unfortunately, 
these data proved inadequate as principals’ responses do not vary within nations. 
 112 
 
determining access to resources, and the power that social structure has over individuals’ 
actions.
31
 
 Scholars have pointed out that Coleman did not distinguish between the resources 
individuals gain through the social structure and the social structure itself, which leads to 
tautological arguments (Portes 1998). A case in point is that Coleman referred to parental 
involvement as both social capital and as an outcome of social capital. For this reason, I find it 
useful to keep the concept of parental involvement distinct from the concept of social capital and 
to decompose the latter into three components: 1) resources that accrue to individuals 
(“individual resources”), 2) resources that stay in the social network and are available to all 
actors within the social organization (“social resources”), and 3) the social organization itself.32 
Examples of resources that individuals might gain through a social network are job offers, 
marriage partners, and as Coleman emphasizes for children, human capital. Examples of what I 
call social resources are mutual trust and respect, information channels, and high achievement 
norms. Decomposing the concept of social capital into three components makes it possible to 
discuss the importance of each aspect of social capital with greater clarity, and helps to 
distinguish between the causes and consequences of social capital. 
  Coleman (1991) pointed to intergenerational social closure and information sharing as the 
forms of social capital, or social resources, that most influence the proportion of parents who are 
involved in their children’s education at each school. Coleman (1988; 1991) believed that 
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 Dika and Singh (2002) rightly point out that Coleman’s conceptualization of social capital highlights the 
importance of social norms and positive social control. However, it is clear that Coleman also viewed social capital 
as a means of accessing resources. The main point of his 1988 article “Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital,” is that without “social capital in the family,” (e.g. the time and effort parents spend with children on 
intellectual matters), children may not have access to their parents’ human capital.   
32
 Bourdieu (2000[1986]) provided a contemporaneous conceptualization of social capital which emphasizes the 
importance of social capital in accessing scarce resources. Each person’s social capital is defined by the number of 
people in his social network and the amount of economic and cultural capital possessed by each person in the 
network. While this conceptualization provides greater clarity on how to measure social capital, it neglects the 
importance of the volume of social resources within the network. 
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intergenerational closure—a dense social organization characterized by strong ties among 
parents in the school community—leads to the creation of shared norms and standards regarding 
children’s behavior, imposes strong social sanctions on deviant behavior, and incentivizes 
parents and children to work for the common good of the school community. In school 
communities characterized by intergenerational closure, informal social sanctions against 
nonparticipation in school-related activities compel parents—even those who prefer to take a 
backseat to their children’s education—to become involved. Coleman urged schools that lack 
intergenerational closure (or strong PTA associations) to create it by bringing parents in the 
school community together on matters related to their common interests (such as having children 
in the same grade).  
 The other form of social capital that Coleman (1991) identified as most likely to 
influence the proportion of involved parents in the school community is information sharing. 
Apparently, Coleman perceived of parents’ decisions to become involved in their children’s 
education as depending in large part on their knowledge of what their children need to succeed in 
school and of how best to support their children’s education. Coleman (1991: 18) explained, 
“parents are unskilled in helping their children to succeed in school. Even well-educated parents 
often lack the knowledge of what practices in the home will most help their children to succeed 
in school.” By sharing this information with parents, schools can help parents become aware of 
the importance of their involvement in their children’s education and in so doing encourage 
parents who would otherwise take a backseat to their children’s education to become involved.   
 The quantitative data available at the time Coleman developed his theory did not allow 
him to satisfactorily test the relationship between social capital in school communities and 
parental involvement. The best evidence to support his hypotheses comes from his research on 
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Catholic schools (Coleman and Hoffer 1987: 55), which shows that levels of parental 
involvement, as measured by attendance at PTA meetings, parent-teacher conferences and 
volunteering for school projects, are higher on average at Catholic schools than at public schools, 
even after family socioeconomic status (SES) is taken into account.  
 Empirical assessments of Coleman’s theory since help to refine his argument and 
highlight the data still needed to adequately test his theory. For example, Morgan and Sørensen’s 
(1999) analysis of the NELS data suggest that Coleman overemphasized the importance of 
intergenerational closure for parental involvement. Their findings indicate that intergenerational 
closure, measured at the school level as the average number of parents of children’s friends from 
school that parents know, does not entirely explain the Catholic school advantage in parental 
involvement and is negatively associated with student achievement in public schools. The 
authors challenge Coleman’s idea that intergenerational closure automatically incentives parents 
to act to benefit their children’s education. The implication is that the level of intergenerational 
closure in the school community, on its own, does not predict the proportion of involved parents 
at school. 
 Scholars have also criticized Coleman for overlooking the possibility that non-dominant 
groups are excluded from the social structure of the school community (Dika and Singh 2002; 
Stanton-Salazar 1997, with Dornbusch 1995). Parents who are excluded from the social structure 
are denied access to the social resources that are theorized to influence parental involvement. 
This is an important point because it suggests that even if social resources adhere in the structure 
of relations in the school community, the proportion of parents who are involved in their 
children’s education might still be low because a large portion have been excluded from the 
social structure. These criticisms suggest the need for empirical evidence not only of whether or 
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not schools encourage parents to interact with one another but also of whether the programs 
target all parents or only a fraction of them.  
 Similarly, some research suggests that there is considerable variation in the effectiveness 
with which schools might share information with parents and create opportunities for parents to 
interact with one another. Hoover-Dempsey (et al 2005), whose primary research focuses on the 
factors motivating parents to become involved in their children’s education, reports that it is 
difficult for teachers to encourage effective involvement—particularly when the backgrounds of 
the parents they are trying to reach differ dramatically from one another. This is because a 
meaningful invitation to involvement needs to target all parents and to include strategies for 
involvement that might be implemented by parents from a range of educational backgrounds. An 
ill-prepared invitation to involvement could have the unintended consequence of excluding some 
parents from becoming involved in their children’s education. The implication is that the 
correspondence between parental involvement and information sharing might be weaker than 
Coleman anticipated. Scholars hoping to test Coleman’s hypothesis that information sharing is 
associated with higher proportions of involved parents might require more fine-grained data on 
the tactics schools use to share information with parents as well as on the content of the 
information that is shared.   
 Lareau’s (2001[1989]) ethnographic study of two elementary schools in California also 
raises the possibility that the proportion of involved parents in the school community might not 
relate to the extent of information sharing in the school community. This is because parents 
might gain access to the knowledge they need to help their children succeed in school from their 
personal social networks. Lareau reports that the upper-middle class parents in her study most 
often relied on their personal social networks to learn how to best support their children’s 
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education. On the other hand, the working class parents in her study were more apt to lack social 
ties to knowledgeable others and thus tended to rely almost exclusively on the school for this 
information. Lareau’s findings support Coleman’s notion of the importance of knowledge for 
parental involvement but imply that the need for schools to share information in order to increase 
the proportion of involved parents is less pressing at high SES schools than at low SES schools.  
 To sum, according to Coleman (1991),  schools can make a difference in the proportion 
of parents who are involved in their children’s education by sharing information about successful 
forms of parental involvement with parents and by helping to build close ties among parents 
(which in turn should incentive parents to be involved in their children’s education). Research 
published since calls into question the simiplicity of the connections Coleman draws between 
social resources and the proportion of involved parents in the school community and suggests 
that empirical tests of Coleman’s theory would require more data than are currently available. 
Fortunately, Epstein’s (1986, 1995) theory offers some hypotheses that we can begin to assess 
using the TIMSS data. 
 As the Director of the Center on School, Family, and Community Partnerships at Johns 
Hopkins University and the founder and Principal Research Scientist at the National Network of 
Partnership Schools, Epstein has dedicated her professional career to the research and 
development of programs to increase the proportion of parents who are effectively involved in 
their children’s education. Similar to Coleman (1988, 1991), Epstein’s research (1986, 1995) 
underscores the importance of social resources in school community to promote parental 
involvement. However, Epstein draws attention to another social resource in the school 
community—mutual trust and respect—that she argues is crucial for school administrators to 
develop if they hope to increase the proportion of involved parents at their school. Additionally, 
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unlike Coleman who emphasized social ties among parents, Epstein focuses on family-school 
relationships.  
 According to Epstein (1986), family-school relationships must be grounded in mutual 
trust and respect if they are to increase the proportion of parents who are involved in their 
children’s education. Epstein bases this idea on a simple premise of reference group theory, 
which claims that individuals and groups take into account the actions and ideas of those they 
know and recognize as important. Therefore, to influence parents’ actions and behaviors towards 
their children’s education, school personnel must earn the trust and respect of all parents. 
Similarly, because trust and respect needs to be mutual between parents and school staff, staff 
must view parents as their partners in children’s education and development. Epstein’s emphasis 
on family-school relationships for encouraging parents to become involved in their children’s 
education leads to the third hypothesis that this chapter will empirically assess: 
Hypothesis 3: The quality of family-school relationships in the school community 
influences the likelihood that parents become involved in their children’s 
education, net of parents’ background. 
 
 Given the importance of mutual trust and respect in the school community for parental 
involvement, it is possible that the level of concentrated disadvantage in a school community 
also affects the likelihood of involvement. This is because concentrated disadvantage in a 
community has been shown to stymie the development of mutual trust and respect or “collective 
efficacy.” Using data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods 1995 
from over 8,000 residents representing 343 neighborhood communities in Chicago, Sampson, 
Raudenbush and Earls (1997) reveal a strong and statistically significant, negative association 
between concentrated disadvantage and collective efficacy that cannot be attributed to the 
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aggregated demographic characteristics of individuals. This argument provides the fourth 
hypothesis that I will test in this chapter: 
Hypothesis 4: Concentrated disadvantage in the school community decreases the 
likelihood that parents are involved in their children’s education, net of parents’ 
background. 
 
 The alternative argument suggests that two features of the school community explain 
variations in the likelihood that parents are involved in their children’s education that are not 
accounted for by parent background factors. Specifically, this argument suggests that high-
quality family-school relationships increase and concentrated disadvantage decreases the 
likelihood of involvement in children’s education. The question left to ask is why schools in the 
U.S. seem to lag behind those in Japan and Taiwan when it comes to encouraging parents to 
become involved in their children’s education.  
 One reason might be that there are more school communities characterized by 
concentrated disadvantage in the U.S. than in East Asian nations. This would make it more 
difficult, on average, for schools in the U.S. to foster family-school relationships that are based 
on mutual trust and respect. To assess the merit of this possibility, I empirically analyze the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: There are fewer school communities characterized by concentrated 
disadvantage in East Asian nations than in the U.S. 
 
 Another reason why schools in the U.S. might be less adept at fostering parental 
involvement than schools in Japan or Taiwan might be because educators in the U.S. have not 
receiving adequate training in how to encourage parents to become involved in their children’s 
education. Epstein (1995) reports a dearth of college and university courses geared towards 
providing future educators with an understanding of the importance of partnerships with parents, 
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and the tools they need to develop, evaluate, guide and implement successful parental 
involvement programs. Similar studies of teacher-training programs in the East Asian nations 
under investigations are not readily available. However, given the reported institutionalized 
nature of parental involvement programs in Japan and Taiwan (Allison 1996, Benjamin 1997, 
Lewis 1995, Stevenson and Stigler 1992), it seems highly likely that educators in these nations 
have been made aware of the importance of involving parents for their occupational success. 
 Both the lack of professional training and of institutions such as the communications 
booklets of Japan and Taiwan could mean that school staff in the U.S. do not perceive the job of 
teaching parents how to help their children succeed in school as part of their occupational 
responsibilities. Indeed, Lareau’s (2000[1989]) ethnographic study of two first-grade classrooms, 
one at a predominantly white middle-class public school and the other at a predominantly white 
working-class public school, provides evidence to suggest that school staff in the U.S. view what 
parents do to support their children’s education as something over which they have no control. 
Lareau (2000[1989]) reports that personnel at both schools interpret parental involvement as a 
sign of how much parents value education, and tend to associate parental involvement with 
social class. As the principal at the working-class school explained to Lareau (2000: 98), parents 
who are not involved in their children’s education, “don’t value education because they don’t 
have much of it themselves.” Lareau also notes that teachers at the middle-class school attribute 
the ease of their face-to-face meetings with parents to parents’ high social status.  
 If school staff in the U.S. typically view parents’ decisions to become involved in their 
children’s education as determined by social class, then it is unlikely that they perceive of 
parental involvement as something that they can influence. In turn, they likely devote less of 
their time and energy to encouraging parents who are not already involved in their children’s 
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education to become involved. This could explain why the proportion of involved parents is 
lower in the U.S. than in Japan and Taiwan if school staff in those nations do not share the same 
perceptions (e.g. if staff in Japan and Taiwan do not link parental involvement to social class 
background). This argument leads to the sixth and final hypothesis that this chapter will 
examine: 
Hypothesis 6: Staff perceptions of parental involvement are influenced by parents’ 
social class background more so in the U.S. than in East Asian nations. 
 
 In the following sections I briefly outline the data and variables before moving on to the 
analyses. The analyses cover a range of hypotheses regarding relationships at the national, school 
and individual level. Tests of the first hypothesis examine the proportion of parents who are 
involved in their children’s education at the national level. Findings from this analysis let us 
know whether the disparity in the proportion of parents who provide their children with a desk at 
home continues to be higher in Japan and Taiwan than in the U.S., and where the percentages of 
involved parents in East Asian nations rank among all high-achieving nations that participated in 
either the 2003 or 2007 TIMSS fourth-grade population. Including other high-achieving nations 
in tests of Hypothesis 1 provides the opportunity to begin to address a key tenet of the prevailing 
theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap, which is that national cultural beliefs 
determine the proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education.  
Next, tests of the second, third, and fourth hypothesis focus on the relationship between 
features of the school community and the likelihood that individual parents are involved in their 
children’s education. By conducting these analyses separately for the U.S. and the four East 
Asian nations under investigation, I am able to shed light on the universality of the alternative 
argument I presented to explain the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap. Lastly, tests of 
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the fifth and sixth hypothesis are meant to provide insight into the reasons for the East Asian-
U.S. parental involvement gap. These analyses focus on cross-regional variations in the features 
of the school community that are expected to influence involvement.   
 
DATA 
To put research of the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap into comparative perspective, I 
use data from all high-achieving nations that participated in either the 2003 or 2007 round of the 
TIMSS fourth-grade population. I define a high-achieving nation as one with an average score on 
the TIMSS math assessment that is at or above the international mean of 500. The nations 
included in this analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan and the U.S. Cases with missing data that could not be obtained 
from another source were dropped from analysis.
33
 
 
VARIABLES   
I have argued that one of the most compelling pieces of evidence that an East Asian-U.S. 
parental involvement gap exists is that a greater proportion of parents in Japan and Taiwan than 
in the U.S. had provided their fifth graders with a desk at home (Stevenson and Stigler 1992). I 
base the empirical analyses of this chapter on the same measure of parental involvement. 
Specifically, the TIMSS Student Questionnaire asks students to respond “yes” or “no” to the 
question of whether they have a study desk or table to use at home.  
                                                     
33
 Many of the variables in this study rely on information that was collected from multiple sources within a school. 
As long as the information was provided by one source within a school, the cases were not dropped from analysis. 
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 To confirm that provision of a study desk acts as a respectable indicator of parental 
involvement for each East Asian nation and the U.S., I compare the mean score of the group of 
students with a desk at home to the group without on measures of students cognitive abilities, 
non-cognitive attributes, and additional indicators of parental involvement. I use adjusted Wald 
tests of significance to ascertain whether or not the difference in means between the two groups 
of students is statistically significant. To ensure that the relationship between provision of a 
study desk at home and student outcomes cannot be attributed to family SES, I also calculated 
within each family SES stratum the difference in means between students with a desk and 
students without. (As in the Teacher chapter, SES is measured using information on the number 
of books students have at home.) Table 4.2 displays the results of these tests for the full sample, 
the sample of low SES students, and the sample of average SES students. Results for the whole 
sample are provided in the first two columns of data, results for the sample of low SES families 
are given in the next two columns, and results from the sample of average SES families are 
provided in the last two columns. Results for each nation are provided in a separate panel.  
 According to Table 4.2, within each nation provision of a desk is positively associated 
with students’ cognitive abilities in all nations except Hong Kong. In the U.S., Japan, Singapore 
and Taiwan the group of students with desks have a higher average math achievement score than 
the group of students without desks. In the whole sample for these nations, the difference in 
mean achievement between students with a desk and those without is statistically significant (at 
the p<0.001 level). The difference in mean achievement between the groups of students with and 
without a study desk at home is statistically significant (at the p<0.05 level or smaller) in the low 
SES and average SES samples in each of these nations as well. For example, among students of 
low SES background in Singapore, the group with desks at home averages a score of 543 on the 
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TIMSS math assessment, while the group without desks averaged a score of 504. The difference 
of 39 achievement points is statistically significant (at the p<0.001 level).  
 
Table 4.2 Mean Characteristics of Students With and Without Desks at Home 
  Whole Sample Low SES Average SES 
Nations 
Without 
desk With desk 
Without 
desk With desk 
Without 
desk With desk 
United States 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Achievement 498 532*** 470 484*** 506 534*** 
Enjoy Math 3.12 3.22*** 3.13 3.17 3.13 3.23*** 
Like School 3.02 3.18*** 3.00 3.05 3.05 3.19*** 
Watch TV 3.18 3.11** 3.21 3.30 3.16 3.09** 
Read Books 2.25 2.44*** 2.04 2.12 2.30 2.40*** 
Hong Kong 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Achievement 593 589 577 567* 599 592** 
Enjoy Math 2.94 2.99* 2.82 2.83 2.98 3.01 
Like School 2.82 2.92*** 2.73 2.74 2.85 2.95** 
Watch TV 3.14 3.03*** 3.26 3.22 3.11 3.01** 
Read Books 2.30 2.49*** 2.03 2.07 2.36 2.51*** 
Japan 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Achievement 549 568*** 507 528* 555 567** 
Enjoy Math 2.83 2.90 2.77 2.75 2.80 2.90 
Like School 3.10 3.18* 3.01 3.01 3.13 3.19 
Watch TV 3.35 3.22** 3.34 3.32 3.36 3.23* 
Read Books 2.09 2.17 1.86 1.80 2.10 2.13 
Singapore 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Achievement 558 602*** 504 543*** 575 603*** 
Enjoy Math 3.13 3.31*** 3.09 3.22 3.14 3.32*** 
Like School 3.38 3.46* 3.33 3.41 3.42 3.47 
Watch TV 3.36 3.22*** 3.45 3.34 3.36 3.23** 
Read Books 2.37 2.61*** 2.05 2.14 2.44 2.56* 
Taiwan 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Achievement 555 573*** 525 534* 567 575* 
Enjoy Math 2.61 2.78*** 2.53 2.66 2.63 2.79*** 
Like School 2.90 3.03*** 2.88 2.95 2.89 3.03*** 
Watch TV 2.67 2.54*** 2.73 2.70 2.69 2.55** 
Read Books 2.25 2.47*** 2.07 2.11 2.30 2.44*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Placed after the mean value for students with desks at home if 
adjusted Wald tests of significance indicate that the difference in means between the group of students 
with desks is statistically significant different from the mean of the group of students without desks. 
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 In Hong Kong, the relationship between having a desk and achievement is reversed. The 
difference in average achievement between the two groups of students is small (4 points in the 
whole sample, 10 points in the low SES sample and 7 points in the average SES sample) but 
statistically significant for the low and average SES subsamples.  
 Table 4.2 also reports the mean score on measures of non-cognitive attributes for the 
groups of students with and without a study desk at home. Within each nation, responses to the 
statements “I enjoy learning mathematics” and “I like being in school,” which could range from 
“disagree a lot” (score=1) to “agree a lot” (score=4) are higher (e.g. more positive) for the group 
of students with desks than for the group without. In the whole sample for each nation, the 
difference in average responses between the two groups of students is statistically significant (at 
the p<0.05 level or smaller) in all nations save Japan (where the difference is statistically 
significant for liking school but not for enjoying math). The differences are not statistically 
significantly different in any of the low SES samples, but some are statistically significant in the 
average SES samples. In the U.S. and Taiwan, the difference between the group of average SES 
students with a desk and those without a desk is statistically significant (at the p<0.001) for both 
enjoying math and liking school; In the average SES sample in Singapore the difference in 
enjoying math is statistically significant (at the p<0.001 level), and in the average SES sample in 
Hong Kong the difference in liking school is statistically significant (at the p<0.01 level). These 
findings indicate a positive association between provision of a study desk and non-cognitive 
attributes that have been linked to success in school (Rothstein 2004).
34
  
 Scholars have sometimes relied on the amount of time that children spend reading books 
for enjoyment or watching TV outside of school as indicators of more or less, respectively, 
                                                     
34
 Note that the findings do not indicate a causal relationship between provision of a desk and non-cognitive 
attributes linked to academic success. It could be that parents are more likely to provide a desk to children who 
display a taste for studying. 
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parental involvement (Fan and Chen 2001). Table 4.2 shows that in most cases, the group of 
students with a desk at home typically spent more time reading books for enjoyment and less 
time watching TV per week than the group of students without a desk.
35
  In the average SES and 
whole samples, the differences between groups are statistically significant (at the p<0.05 level or 
smaller) in all nations except Japan, where the difference is statistically significant only for TV 
watching. These findings indicate relationships in the appropriate direction between provision of 
a desk and other measures of parental involvement, which lends additional support to the idea 
that provision of a study desk acts as a respectable measure of parental involvement. Although 
provision of a desk is not related to higher math achievement in Hong Kong, it is positively 
associated with non-cognitive attributes, and with other indicators of parental involvement. 
Therefore, familial provision of a desk acts as a fair measure of parental involvement in Hong 
Kong as well as in the other nations under investigation.  
 To measure the proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education at 
each school, I divide the number of students who have a study desk at home by the total number 
of students surveyed at each school. For a nation-level measure of the proportion of involved 
parents, I calculate the percentage of fourth-grade students in each nation who responded that 
they had a study desk or table to use at home. I perform these calculations using population 
weights that take into account the stratified nature of the TIMSS sampling design to provide 
measures of the proportion of involved parents that are nationally representative. 
 I rely on two questions posed to school principals regarding the relative percentages of 
students in their schools who come from economically advantaged and disadvantaged homes to 
measure the degree of Disadvantage in the school community. Responses to both questions were 
                                                     
35
 The only instance in which the relationship is reversed is in the low SES sample from Japan. Here, the group of 
students without desks average more time reading books for enjoyment than the group of students with desks, 
although the difference in means is not statistically significant. 
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limited to four categories:  “0-10%,” “11-25%,” “26-50%,” or “more than 50%.” I recode each 
variable with values equal to the midrange (e.g. responses of “0-10%” are given a value of 5) and 
code responses of “more than 50%” as 63. Next, I subtract the percentage of economically 
advantaged students from the percentage of economically disadvantaged students at each school. 
Thus, this measure differs from typical measures of school SES in that higher scores indicate 
concentrated disadvantage. For example, the highest score on this variable is 58, which means 
that more than 50 percent of the student population comes from economically disadvantaged 
homes and 0-10 percent come from economically advantaged homes. The low score of -58, 
meanwhile, indicates a high proportion of advantaged students relative to disadvantaged students 
at the school. Finally, I create two dummy variables to indicate schools that are one standard 
deviation above or below the mean level of disadvantage. 
 Criminal or violent activity tends to be higher in communities of concentrated 
disadvantage (Sampson et al 1997). Therefore, I create another indicator of the degree of 
disadvantage in the school community using teachers’ responses to the following statements: 1) 
“This school is located in a safe neighborhood” and, 2) “I feel safe at this school,” which could 
range on a 4-point scale from “Agree a lot” to “Disagree a lot.”  The Cronbach’s alphas for this 
scale measure of Neighborhood Violence range from 0.65 for the Japan data to 0.86 for the 
Singapore data. On this scale, higher values indicate higher-than-average levels of violence or 
crime in the school neighborhood. 
 To gauge the quality of parent-school relationships at each school, I rely on two questions 
that are included in both the School Principal Questionnaire and the Teacher Questionnaire. 
These questions ask respondents to characterize the level of “Parental support for student 
achievement” and “Parental involvement in school activities” at their school on a 5-point scale 
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ranging from “very low” to “very high.”36 I combine teacher and principal responses to make this 
a school-level variable.
37  Cronbach’s alphas for this measure range from 0.76 in Taiwan to 0.91 
in the U.S., suggesting that the two questions on which this scale is based are tapping into the 
same latent construct.  
 It is also possible that language barriers within the school community restrict the depth 
and strength of the social relationships that can be developed among parents and between parents 
and school staff. To control for this possibility, I create a proxy measure of the Language 
Barriers within each school community based on school principals’ rough categorization of the 
percentage of students enrolled in school who do not speak the language of the TIMSS 
assessment at home.  Responses could be, “More than 90%,” “75 to 90%,” “50 to 75%,” or “Less 
than 50%.” Higher values on this scale represent schools with more linguistic barriers for school 
community to overcome. In the case of Singapore, this variable is not indicative of the language 
barriers in the school community because the TIMSS assessment was given in English. While 
English is the first language of the nation, Singapore has three other official languages (Chinese, 
Malay and Tamil) that are often the main language spoken in homes, and students in Singapore 
generally attend schools that offer instruction in both English and their mother-tongue. (For 
example, ethnic Chinese in Singapore typically attend public schools that offer instruction in 
Chinese.) For the Singaporean analyses I use the percentage of students in the TIMSS sample 
whose parents are immigrants as this provides some insight on, perhaps, the cultural barriers 
                                                     
36
 These are similar to the survey questions that Lee and Burkan (2003) used to measure the positive relationships 
between teachers and students.   
37
 Research on social organizations offers a more accurate and reliable method for aggregating responses, which 
takes into account measurement error due to item and rater inconsistencies (Raudenbush, Rowan and Kang 1991; 
Raudenbush and Sampson 1999a, 1999b). However, this method requires data from more than 5 respondents from 
each organization (Harding 2011). As there are only, on average, two teachers surveyed per school in each nation, 
this method is not a feasible option for these data. 
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parents and school staff must overcome to work together to advance children’s educational 
development. 
 At the family level, I control for students’ age and sex, as well as the language the family 
speaks at home, immigrant status, and  family SES. The variable for family SES indicates 
whether or not the number of books students have at home falls one standard deviation above or 
below the national mean. The variable for immigrant status indicates that one or both of students’ 
parents were born outside the nation and/or that the student did not immigrate to the nation 
before the age of one.  A score of 1 on the non-native language variable indicates that families 
rarely speak the language of the test at home, while a score of zero indicates that students always 
or almost always speak the language of the test at home. For all nations but Singapore, this 
variable indicates that families are non-native language speakers. For Singapore, this variable 
provides insight into whether or not families prefer to speak with one another in English at home.  
 At the school level, I include two dummy variables indicating the size of the school 
community. The first indicates that schools are located in Large Communities of more than 
100,001 people. The second indicates schools in Small Communities of fewer than 15,000 
people. This variable is not included in analyses of the Singapore data because all school 
principals’ responses to the question of school community were gang punched to the same 
answer. I also include one variable indicating the School Size (e.g. the total number of students 
enrolled in the school). Lastly, to control for the sample round I include a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not data came from the 2003 TIMSS (as opposed to the 2007 round). 
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RESULTS 
Are the proportions of involved parents uniquely high in East Asia? 
Stevenson and Stigler (1992) demonstrate the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap by 
showing that the proportion of parents who had provided their fifth grader with a desk at home is 
higher in Japan and Taiwan than in the U.S. Beyond that, however, international comparative 
research has yet to show that the proportion of involved parents is uniquely high in East Asia. 
This is important because the prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap 
suggests that national cultural beliefs are the principal motivating factor of parental involvement 
and that Confucianism is exceptional among world cultures in the premium it places on 
education. If this were true, then the proportion of involved parents would be higher in East 
Asian nations than in other nations. To test this theory, I calculate the percentage of students with 
a desk at home in each high-achieving nation and display them in Figure 4.1. The results confirm 
Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) finding that a greater proportion of parents in Japan and Taiwan 
than in the U.S. provides their children with a desk at home, but casts doubt on the argument that 
Confucian culture sets East Asian parents apart.  
 According to Figure 4.1, the percentages of parents who provide their fourth grader with 
a desk at home are not abnormally high in East Asian nations compared to other high-achieving 
nations. In fact, the percentages are greater in Austria (98.1%), Germany (98.0%), Sweden 
(97.3%), Lithuania (97.2%), and Hungary (95.6%) than in any East Asian nation. Further, the 
percentage of parents who provide their children with a desk at home varies considerably within 
East Asia. Among East Asian nations, Japan boasts the highest percentage of students with a 
study desk (94.0%), while the percentage is around the international mean of 88.1 percent in 
Singapore (89.2%) and Taiwan (86.7%) but considerably lower in Hong Kong (71.5%). In fact, 
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the percentage of parents who provide a desk at home is lower in Hong Kong than in the U.S. 
(77.4%).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Percentage in each High-Achieving Nation with a Desk at Home 
 
 The differences across East Asian nations and the U.S. in the proportion of parents who 
provide a desk at home are not simple reflections of cross-national differences in income 
inequality. If the proportion of parents who provide a desk at home were to mirror the level of 
income inequality in each nation, then the Gini coefficient would be highest in Hong Kong 
followed by the U.S., Taiwan, Singapore and Japan. This is not the case. According to Deininger 
and Squire (1996), the Gini coefficient of income inequality over the latter half of the twentieth 
century is roughly equivalent between the U.S. (35.3) and Japan (34.8), highest in Hong Kong 
(41.6) and Singapore (40.1) and lowest in Taiwan (29.6).  
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 Overall, the results indicate that among the higher achieving nations that participated in 
the TIMSS fourth-grade population, parental involvement, as measured by the provision of a 
desk at home, is lowest in Italy, Hong Kong and the U.S. and highest in Europe. The percentage 
of parents who are uninvolved, according to this measure of parental involvement, is about 23 
percent in the U.S., which is roughly four times the percentage of uninvolved parents in Japan 
and twice that of Singapore and Taiwan. The implication of these findings is that Confucianism 
is not a prerequisite to obtaining high levels of parental involvement within a nation.  
 
Do schools influence the likelihood of involvement? 
The alternative explanation for the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap presented in this 
chapter shifts focus from national cultural beliefs to schools. Case studies of preschools and 
elementary schools in Japan contend that the Japanese educational system, through formal school 
practices to engage parents in the schooling process, prompt parents who might otherwise take a 
backseat to their children’s education to become involved. Sociologists provide a theoretical 
basis to understand why schools might make a difference in the proportion of involved parents. 
Tests of the second, third, and fourth hypothesis—that the likelihood of involvement varies 
across schools within each nation after controlling for family background; that the quality of 
family-school relationships influences the likelihood of involvement, and that concentrated 
disadvantage in this school community decreases the likelihood of involvement— give us some 
indication of the relevance of this argument. To empirically address these hypotheses, I predict 
whether or not parents provide a desk at home using two-level, random-intercept logistic 
regression models. These models allow examination of relationships between features of the 
school community and provision of a desk at home while holding constant parent background 
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factors and student characteristics. This method also allows me to assess the extent to which the 
likelihood that parents provide a desk at home varies across schools.  
 In these models, the school-specific random intercept ζj , which has a mean of zero and 
variance ψ, is in the linear predictor of provision of a desk at home. I assume that underlying the 
observed dichotomous response yij (whether or not family i in school j had provided their fourth 
grader with a study desk at home) is an unobserved or latent continuous response yij
*
, 
representing the propensity of family i in school j to provide a desk at home (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008). The residual error term associated with each family, ϵi, is assumed to have a 
standard logistic distribution with a mean of zero and variance π2/3 ≈ 3.29.  By conceptualizing 
the binomial outcome as a latent-response variable, I am able to quantify the between-school 
heterogeneity as the residual intraclass correlation, rho, or the proportion of the total variation in 
the propensity of families to provide a desk that is attributed to schools (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The equation for calculating the residual intraclass 
correlation is: 
rho  =  ψ / (ψ+ π2/3) 
 
 To address the second hypothesis, that the likelihood of involvement varies across 
schools within each nation even after controlling for parents’ background, I model provision of a 
desk at home using measures of parents’ background and student characteristics. I call this 
“Model 1.” The rho value of this model addresses the second hypothesis by telling us the 
proportion of variation in the propensity to provide a desk that is explained by differences 
between schools within each nation. The statistical software program Stata provides sensitivity 
tests of rho by testing the null hypothesis that ψ = 0 (that there is no between-school 
heterogeneity in parental involvement) with likelihood-ratio tests, and provides a p-value based 
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on the correct sampling distribution of the test statistic (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Tests 
of the null hypothesis that result in small p-values can be rejected at standard significance levels, 
and confirm that the likelihood that parents provide a desk at home varies significantly across 
schools.  
 To test the third and fourth hypothesis, that family-school relationships and concentrated 
disadvantage are positively and negatively associated, respectively, with the likelihood of 
parental involvement, I create another model, Model 2, which adds to Model 1 indicators of the 
quality of family-school relationships according to school staffs’ reports, the level of 
concentrated disadvantage in the school community, the degree of neighborhood violence in the 
school community according to teachers, and other school-level controls.  
 Results from these analyses are presented in Table 4.3. The table is separated into five 
vertical panels, one for each nation. The first three panels provide results for the U.S., Hong 
Kong and Japan. The last two panels provide results for Singapore and Taiwan. For each nation, 
the results of Model 1 are displayed in the first column of data and results for Model 2 are in the 
second column. The coefficients are given as estimated log odds ratios, which can be interpreted 
as the difference in log-odds associated with a unit change in the corresponding variable. For 
ease of interpretation, I standardize all variables that are not dichotomous to have means equal to 
the national mean and a standard deviations of one. In this way, the coefficients explain the 
effect associated with a one standard deviation increase from the national mean. Following Lee 
and Burkam (2003), I denote relationships that are statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level in 
addition to the 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 levels, because the reliability of multilevel relationships is 
influenced by the within-school sample size, which is considerably smaller than the full 
 134 
 
sample.
38
 I limit my description of the results of Model 1 to the rho values and to the coefficients 
for family-school relationships and concentrated disadvantage in Model 2, as these are the focus 
of my analyses.  
 According to the results presented in Table 4.3, the rho values of Model 1, which are 
located in the third-to-last row of the first column of data for each nation, indicate that the 
proportion of the total variance associated with differences between schools is small (0.045 in 
the U.S. sample, 0.035 in the Hong Kong sample, 0.047 in the Japan sample, 0.044 in the 
Singapore sample and 0.023 in the Taiwan sample) but statistically significant (at the p< 0.001 
level) in every nation. This finding suggests that the likelihood that parents from similar 
backgrounds provide a desk at home depends to some extent on their children’s school. This 
evidence is consistent with the second hypothesis; it tells us that the likelihood of providing a 
desk at home varies statistically significantly across schools within each nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
38
 The average number of families clustered in each school within each nation is sufficient for multilevel estimations 
(32 in the U.S., 31 in Hong Kong, 28 in Japan, 32 in Singapore and 29 in Taiwan). 
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Table 4.3 Two-Level Logistic Regression of Provision of a Desk at Home 
  United States Hong Kong  Japan 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
2003 TIMSS -0.104^ -0.085 -0.084 -0.071 0.047 -0.046 
  (0.061) (0.052) (0.077) (0.076) (0.113) (0.117) 
Family Background 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Low SES -0.776*** -0.688*** -0.513*** -0.474*** -0.563*** -0.552*** 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.071) (0.071) (0.130) (0.130) 
High SES 0.537*** 0.485*** 0.466*** 0.421*** 0.265^ 0.257^ 
  (0.075) (0.075) (0.096) (0.096) (0.141) (0.141) 
Non-native Language -0.111^ -0.051 0.096 0.106 -1.000*** -0.996*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.072) (0.072) (0.282) (0.281) 
Immigrant Status -0.166** -0.118* -0.280*** -0.230*** -0.747*** -0.715** 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.062) (0.063) (0.221) (0.221) 
Student Characteristics   
 
  
 
  
Age -0.053* -0.043^ -0.108*** -0.088** -0.122* -0.122* 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.048) (0.048) 
Girl 0.407*** 0.417*** 0.067 0.063 0.433*** 0.430*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.059) (0.102) (0.102) 
School Community 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Staff Reports of Parental 
Support 
 
0.110** 
 
0.080^ 
 
0.157** 
  
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.061) 
Concentrated Disadvantage -0.169*** 
 
-0.110* 
 
0.026 
  
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.060) 
Neighborhood Violence -0.125*** 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.026 
  
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.058) 
% Non-native Lang. 
 
0.012 
 
0.126* 
 
-0.010 
  
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.065) 
School Size 
 
0.007 
 
0.073^ 
 
0.068 
  
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.061) 
Large Community 
 
0.102 
 
0.133 
 
-0.348* 
  
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.135) 
Small Community 
 
-0.090 
 
0.026 
 
0.055 
  
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.262) 
Constant 1.267*** 1.215*** 1.194*** 1.064*** 2.783*** 3.056*** 
  (0.053) (0.060) (0.075) (0.099) (0.101) (0.145) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
rho 0.045  0.020  0.035  0.020  0.047  0.033  
N of Students 12,640 12,640 6,339 6,339 7,747 7,747 
N of Schools 393 393 206 206 281 281 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10; Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
  Singapore
a
 Taiwan 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
2003 TIMSS 0.227** 0.226** 0.156* 0.170* 
  (0.078) (0.074) (0.077) (0.073) 
Family Background 
 
  
 
  
Low SES -0.823*** -0.786*** -0.838*** -0.799*** 
  (0.083) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
High SES 0.308** 0.276** 0.530*** 0.505*** 
  (0.101) (0.101) (0.119) (0.119) 
Non-native Language -0.664*** -0.605*** -0.281*** -0.239** 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.081) (0.081) 
Immigrant Status 0.063 0.122^ -0.195* -0.177* 
  (0.067) (0.068) (0.087) (0.087) 
Student Characteristics   
 
  
Age 0.028 0.038 -0.048 -0.048 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
Girl 0.212** 0.221*** 0.058 0.060 
  (0.066) (0.065) (0.068) (0.068) 
School Community 
 
  
 
  
Staff Reports of Parental 
Support 
 
0.126** 
 
0.051 
  
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.040) 
Concentrated Disadvantage -0.042 
 
-0.093* 
  
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.043) 
Neighborhood Violence 0.019 
 
-0.099** 
  
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
% Non-native Lang. 
 
-0.114** 
 
-0.055 
  
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
School Size 
 
0.083* 
 
0.075^ 
  
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.045) 
Large Community 
 
- 
 
-0.031 
  
 
  
 
(0.089) 
Small Community 
 
- 
 
0.170 
  
 
  
 
(0.248) 
Constant 2.358*** 2.305*** 2.048*** 2.030*** 
  (0.084) (0.083) (0.073) (0.094) 
  
 
  
 
  
rho 0.044  0.028  0.023  0.010  
N of Students 10,447 10,447 8,193 8,193 
N of Schools 331 331 286 286 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10; Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
a
 The Singaporean sample does not include indicators of community size 
because principals' responses were "gang punched" to "more than 500,000 
people." 
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 Evidence consistent with Hypothesis 3, that high quality, family-school relationships act 
to increase the proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education, would be a 
positive association between the quality of family-school relationships, measured as staff 
characterizations of parental involvement and support, and the likelihood of provision of a desk 
at home. The results of Model 2, which are displayed in second column of data for each nation in 
Table 4.3, indicate that the relationship is in the expected direction in all nations. Staff 
characterizations of parental involvement and support for children’s education are associated 
with an increase in the estimated log odds of parental provision of a desk at home in all nations, 
and statistically significantly so in all nations except Taiwan. An increase of one standard 
deviation in staffs’ characterizations of parental involvement and support at their schools is 
associated with a percentage increase in the estimated odds of provision of a desk that is largest 
in Japan, at 17 percent (=100x(1-exp(0.157)), followed by Singapore (13%), the U.S. (12%), 
Hong Kong (8%) and Taiwan (5%). In other words, non-immigrant Japanese parents of average 
SES background whose son attends an average elementary school in a medium-size community 
with high-quality family-school relationships are 17 percent more likely than their counterparts 
at a similar school with average family-school relationships to provide their son with a desk at 
home.  
 According to Hypothesis 4, the Disadvantage scale variable should be negatively related 
to provision of a desk at home. The results, which are displayed in the second column of data for 
each nation in Table 4.3 demonstrate that, consistent with expectations, Disadvantage is 
negatively associated with provision of a desk in the U.S., Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, 
although the relationship is not statistically significant in Singapore. The size of the estimated 
log odds ratio for Disadvantage is greatest in the U.S. (-0.17, statistically significant at the p< 
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0.001 level) followed by Hong Kong (-0.11, p<0.05 level), Taiwan (-0.09, p<0.05 level) and 
Singapore (-0.04, not statistically significant). For example, native-born, English-speaking 
parents of average SES background whose son attends an elementary school in a medium-sized, 
disadvantaged community are 16 percent less likely than their counterparts whose son attends an 
elementary school with an average score on the Disadvantaged scale to provide a desk at home. 
In Japan, the relationship between disadvantage in the school community and provision of a desk 
at home is positive, but the estimated standard error for the effect is more than twice the size of 
the coefficient. The data do not provide a clear picture of the relationship between provision of a 
desk and the level of disadvantage in school communities in Japan.  
 Given that levels of violence tend to be greater in areas of concentrated disadvantage 
(Sampson et al. 1997), we might also expect to find a negative relationship between that measure 
and provision of a desk at home. The results in Table 4.3 are generally consistent with this claim. 
The Neighborhood Violence scale is negatively associated with provision of a desk at home in 
all nations except Singapore. The coefficient for Neighborhood Violence is largest in the U.S. (-
0.13, statistically significant at the p<0.001 level) followed by Taiwan (-0.10, p<0.01 level) and 
Hong Kong (-0.04, not statistically significant). The coefficient for Neighborhood Violence is 
also negative in Japan, but the standard error is large relative to the coefficient, which suggests 
that the data do not provide a clear picture of the relationship. The same is true for the 
Singaporean data; the coefficient for Neighborhood Violence is positive but small relative to the 
size of the standard error, indicating that the data do not capture well the relationship between 
safety and provision of a desk at home.  
 Lastly, the inclusion of school characteristics in Model 2 explains some but not all of the 
between-school variance in provision of a desk at home in the U.S., Hong Kong, Japan and 
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Singapore. In these nations, the estimated rho value for Model 2 are smaller than in Model 1, but 
still statistically significant. From Model 1 to Model 2, the proportion of the total variance that is 
explained by differences between schools decreases by 56 percent ((0.045-0.020)/0.045)x100) in 
the U.S., 43 percent in Hong Kong, 30 percent in Japan, 36 percent in Singapore and 57 percent 
in Taiwan. For the Taiwan data, the lack of statistical significance of the rho value for Model 2 
indicates that likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that ψ = 0 cannot be rejected, or that the 
school-level variables added to Model 2 mostly explain the differences between schools in their 
relationships to parental provision of a desk at home. These findings provide some empirical 
support for the alternative argument that features of the school community, specifically the 
quality of family-school relationships  and the degree of concentrated disadvantage, tend to 
influence parents’ decisions to become involved in their children’s education. 
  
Why is the proportion of involved parents higher in parts of East Asia than in the U.S.? 
Given both the demonstrated, negative relationship between concentrated disadvantage and 
mutual trust and respect (Sampson et al. 1997) and the importance of mutual trust and respect to 
parental involvement, it is possible that the proportion of parents who are involved in their 
children’s education is lower in the U.S. and Hong Kong because there are more school 
communities characterized by concentrated disadvantage in those nations than in Japan, 
Singapore and Taiwan. To assess this hypothesis (Hypothesis 5), I use the Disadvantage scale to 
classify schools into three categories: Affluent, Average and Disadvantaged. Schools in the 
Affluent category have scores on the Disadvantage scale that are one standard deviation or more 
below the mean. Schools with scores on the Disadvantage scale that are within one standard 
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deviation of the mean are categorized as Average, while schools with scores that are one 
standard deviation or more above the mean are categorized as Disadvantaged.  
 To compare the extent to which levels of disadvantage in school communities differ 
across nations, I calculate the mean scores using population weights for each category of schools 
on a number of features of the school community. For each feature of the school community, I 
test whether outcomes for Affluent and Disadvantaged schools differ from Average schools 
using two-tailed Wald tests. If hypothesis 5 is correct, then the results should indicate that in 
Hong Kong and the U.S., Disadvantaged schools typically have fewer resources and weaker 
relationships between parents and school staff than Average schools. Further, there should be 
less inequality in the socioeconomic conditions of Disadvantaged schools compared to Average 
and Affluent schools in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan compared to Hong Kong and the U.S.  
 Table 4.4 displays the results of these analyses. The table is divided into five panels, one 
for each nation. Each panel consists of three columns of data. The first column displays results 
for Affluent schools, the second column shows results for Average schools and the third column 
reports results for Disadvantaged schools. The first row of data in each panel provides the mean 
score on the Disadvantage scale for each category of schools. These results reveal cross-national 
variation in the difference between the proportion of economically disadvantaged and affluent 
students who attend Disadvantaged schools. Consistent with expectations, scores are higher in 
the U.S. (58.0) and Hong Kong (54.5) than in Japan (12.3), Singapore (37.8) and Taiwan (28.8). 
In fact, in Japan the mean for Disadvantaged schools on the Disadvantage scale is below the 
mean for Average schools in the U.S. (14.3) and roughly equal to the mean of Average schools 
in Hong Kong (11.7).  
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Table 4.4 Features of the School Community by Level of Concentrated Disadvantage  
  United States Hong Kong  
Variables Affluent
a
 Average 
Disad-
vantaged Affluent Average 
Disad-
vantaged 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
-
41.70*** 14.29 58.00*** 
-
47.71*** 11.71 54.47*** 
% Disadvantaged 15.12*** 29.76 63.00*** 9.04*** 25.48 63.00*** 
% Advantaged 56.82*** 15.47 5.00*** 56.75*** 13.77 8.53*** 
Neighborhood Violence 1.20*** 1.45 1.98*** 1.57 1.68 1.91** 
School Resources 1.63*** 1.97 1.90** 1.61* 1.79 2.12*** 
Parent-School Relationship 4.17*** 3.40 2.59*** 3.74*** 3.25 2.97*** 
% High quality Relations 77.39*** 33.92 2.57*** 70.47*** 22.22 13.60*** 
% Low quality Relations 0.00** 6.33 33.74*** 0.00* 4.64 13.62* 
% Non-native Language 9.42 12.38 25.58*** 7.26* 5.10 5.00* 
  Japan Singapore 
Variables Affluent Average 
Disad-
vantaged Affluent Average 
Disad-
vantaged 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
-
58.00*** -31.91 12.25*** 
-
55.65*** -8.45 37.76*** 
% Disadvantaged 5.00*** 8.63 21.65*** 7.35*** 10.31 45.80*** 
% Advantaged 63.00*** 40.54 9.40*** 63.00*** 18.76 8.04*** 
Neighborhood Violence 1.95 1.97 1.99 1.50 1.56 1.65* 
School Resources 1.73 1.76 1.83 1.35 1.36 1.32 
Parent-School Relationship 3.33 3.32 3.00** 3.68*** 3.27 2.62*** 
% High quality Relations 28.49 24.98 9.18* 46.36*** 19.22 0.00*** 
% Low quality Relations 2.44 2.95 11.07 0.00** 2.30 28.36*** 
% Non-native Language 5.00 5.53 5.24 2.46*** 3.41 3.65*** 
  Taiwan 
 
Variables Affluent Average 
Disad-
vantaged 
   
Concentrated Disadvantage 
-
44.26*** -3.21 28.84*** 
   % Disadvantaged 5.90*** 8.02 37.01*** 
   % Advantaged 50.16*** 11.23 8.17*** 
   Neighborhood Violence 1.92 1.86 1.82 
   School Resources 2.10 2.10 2.28 
   Parent-School Relationship 4.14*** 3.86 3.48*** 
   % High quality Relations 88.78** 70.77 50.70*** 
   % Low quality Relations 0.00 0.00 2.53 
   % Non-native Language 16.85*** 26.41 30.77** 
   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10; Significance levels indicate that outcomes differ statistically 
significantly from outcomes for Average schools.  
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 The second and third rows of data in each panel help to explain why mean scores on the 
Disadvantaged scale for Disadvantaged schools differ across nations. On average, 63 percent of 
the students enrolled in Disadvantaged schools in the U.S. and Hong Kong are from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, while only 5.0 percent and 9.0 percent of students in 
Disadvantaged schools in the U.S. and Hong Kong, respectively, come from economically 
affluent families. In Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, at most 7.4 percent of the student population 
of Disadvantaged schools come from economically affluent families. The difference between 
Hong Kong and the U.S., on the one hand, and Japan, Singapore and Taiwan on the other, is in 
the percentage of students who come from economically disadvantaged families and attend 
Disadvantaged schools. While over 50 percent of students attending Disadvantaged schools in 
the U.S. and Hong Kong are from disadvantaged families, only 21.7 percent, 37.0 percent and 
45.8 percent of students attending Disadvantaged schools in Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, 
respectively, are from economically disadvantaged families.  
 The next row of data in each panel of Table 4.4 reports the mean for each school category 
on the Neighborhood Violence scale. Here we see that within the U.S. and Hong Kong, 
outcomes for Disadvantaged schools differ statistically significantly from outcomes for Average 
schools. Disadvantaged schools in the U.S. average a score of 2.0 on the Neighborhood Violence 
scale, which is statistically significantly greater than the mean of 1.5 for Average schools and 1.2 
for Affluent schools. In Hong Kong, the mean score of 1.9 on the Neighborhood Violence scale 
for Disadvantaged schools is statistically significantly higher than the mean of 1.7 for Average 
schools. The mean score on the Neighborhood Violence scale for Disadvantaged schools in 
Singapore is also statistically significantly higher than the mean for Average schools (1.65 versus 
1.56). On the other hand, in Japan and Taiwan, differences across categories of schools in mean 
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scores on the Neighborhood Violence scale are not statistically significant. These findings 
suggest that Disadvantaged schools tend to be located in less safe neighborhoods in the U.S. and 
Hong Kong and Singapore, but not in Japan and Taiwan.  
 To assess differences across categories of schools within each nation in the quantity of 
resources available to aid instruction, I created a scale variable based on a series of survey items 
directed to school principals on the extent to which a shortage of 18 different resources affects 
their school’s capacity to provide instruction.39 Responses could range from 1 to 4 indicating 
responses of “None,” “A little,” “Some,” or “A lot.” Higher average scores on this scale indicate 
greater shortages of resources that aid instruction. Mean scores on this Resource Shortage scale 
for each category of schools are reported on the fifth row of data in each panel of Table 4.4. In 
Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, mean scores on the Resource Shortage scale do not differ 
statistically significantly across Affluent, Average and Disadvantaged schools. The same cannot 
be said for the U.S. and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the mean for Resource Shortage is 
statistically significantly higher for Disadvantaged schools than for Average schools. In the U.S., 
the mean score for Disadvantaged schools on the Resource Shortage scale is not statistically 
significantly different from the mean for Average schools. However, the mean for Affluent 
schools is statistically significantly smaller than the mean for Average schools, indicating that, 
compared to Affluent schools, both Average and Disadvantaged schools in the U.S. tend to lack 
resources that aid instruction.  
                                                     
39
 The list of resources is: 1) Instructional materials (e.g. textbook), 2) Budget for supplies (e.g. paper, pencils), 3) 
School buildings and grounds, 4) Heating/cooling and lighting systems, 5) Instructional spaces (e.g. classrooms), 6) 
Special equipment for handicapped students, 7) Computers for math instruction, 8) Computer software for math 
instruction, 9) Calculators for math instruction, 10) Library materials relevant to math instruction, 11) Audio-visual 
resources for math instruction, 12) Science laboratory equipment and materials, 13) Computers for science 
instruction, 14) Computer software for science instruction, 15) Calculators for science instruction, 16) Library 
materials relevant to science instruction, 17) Audio-visual resources for science instruction, and 18) Teachers.  
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 Hypothesis 5 rests on the assumption that concentrated disadvantage in the school 
community negatively impacts the likelihood that parents become involved in their children’s 
education because it stymies efforts to develop parent-school relationships based on mutual trust 
and respect. Evidence consistent with this assumption would show that school staffs’ 
characterization of parental involvement and support are lowest in Disadvantaged schools within 
each nation. The last three rows of data in each panel of Table 4.4 allow us to examine this 
assumption. Consistent with expectations, outcomes on the variable measuring staff reports of 
parental support are statistically significantly lower in Disadvantaged schools than in Average 
schools in every nation. Additionally, in every nation except Japan, mean scores on the Parent-
School Relations scale are statistically significantly higher in Affluent schools than in Average 
schools, suggesting that in these nations, school staffs’ characterizations of parental support and 
involvement increase with the socioeconomic status of the school community.  The fact that staff 
characterizations of parental involvement and support do not differ greatly by school SES in 
Japan suggests, perhaps, that the nation’s school-based outreach programs are also positively 
influencing staff perceptions of parental involvement, such that they are grounded less on 
parents’ socioeconomic status and more on what parents are doing to help their children succeed 
in school. 
 To gain a more complete picture of the range in the quality of parent-school relationships 
at Affluent, Average and Disadvantaged schools within each nation, the second-to-last row of 
data in each panel of Table 4.4 shows the percentage of schools in each category (e.g. Affluent, 
Average and Disadvantage) whose staff characterized parental support and involvement at their 
school as “high” or “very high,” while the last row of data in each panel indicate the percentage 
of schools in each category whose staff characterize parental support and involvement at their 
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schools as “low” or “very low.” In each nation, there is a statistically significant difference 
across categories of schools in the percentage with high quality parent-school relationships (as 
measured by staffs’ characterization of parental support and involvement at their schools). In all 
nations, the percentage of schools with high quality parent-school relationships is lowest in the 
Disadvantaged category. For example, in the U.S. 77.4 percent of Affluent schools characterized 
parental support and involvement as high compared to 33.9 percent of Average schools and only 
2.6 percent of Disadvantaged schools. In Singapore, not a single Disadvantaged school 
characterized parental support and involvement as high.  
 Interestingly, in every nation except Japan staff at Affluent schools did not characterize 
parental support or involvement as low. Zero Affluent schools in the U.S., Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan have low-quality family-school relationships (as measured by staff 
characterization of parental support and involvement)—and the outcomes are statistically 
significantly different from the outcomes for Average schools within these nations. In Japan, 2.4 
percent, or one, Affluent school received a characterization of low parental support and 
involvement, and that percentage does not differ statistically significantly from those of Average 
nor Disadvantaged schools. This finding sets Japan apart from the rest of the sample and 
suggests that school staff in Japan rarely characterize parental support and involvement at their 
schools as low. In contrast, parent-school relationships are characterized as low in 33.7 percent 
of Disadvantaged schools in the U.S. 
 In sum, the results presented in Table 4.4 indicate greater inequalities in the 
socioeconomic conditions of school communities in Hong Kong and the U.S. in contrast to 
Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. Disadvantaged schools in Hong Kong and the U.S. enroll a greater 
percentage of economically disadvantaged students compared to Disadvantaged schools in 
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Japan, Singapore and Taiwan; they are located in less safe neighborhoods than Affluent or 
Average schools, and have fewer resources that aid instruction than Average or Affluent schools. 
Additionally, consistent with the argument that concentrated disadvantage in the school 
community negatively impacts parents’ decisions to become involved in their children’s 
education because it stymies the development of social relationships based on mutual trust and 
respect, the results reported in Table 4.4 show a negative relationship between parent-school 
relationships (as measured by staff characterizations of parental support and involvement) and 
the level of disadvantage in school community in every nation under investigation.  In the next 
section I explore the extent to which staff characterizations of parental involvement and support 
(or the quality of parent-school relationships) depend on the proportion of parents who are 
involved in their children’s education at their school (as measured by provision of a desk at 
home) versus the degree of disadvantage in the school community.  
 
Predicting staff characterizations of parental support 
According to Hypothesis 6, the proportion of parents involved in their children’s education in the 
U.S. is lower than in Japan and Taiwan because educators in the U.S. perceive of parental 
involvement as determined by parents’ social-class background as opposed to their own actions 
and efforts to engage parents in the schooling process. Evidence consistent with Hypothesis 6 
would show that staff characterizations tend to be less positive of parental support and 
involvement, or the quality of family-school relationships tends to be lower, in Disadvantaged 
schools compared to Average schools holding other factors constant. Additionally, we should 
find a positive relationship between Affluent schools and staff characterizations of parental 
involvement and support, and a negative relationship between the level of violent and criminal 
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activity in the school neighborhood (as measured by teachers’ reports of feeling safe at school 
and in the surrounding locale). Further, indicators of the degree of disadvantage in the school 
community should explain more of the variation in staff characterizations of parental 
involvement and support, or family-school relationships, in the U.S. than in other East Asian 
nations.  
 To empirically assess this hypothesis, I use OLS regression to model staff 
characterizations of parental involvement and support, or the quality of parent-school 
relationships, using school-level data from each nation. The first model examines the relationship 
between the proportion of parents in the school who had provided their children with a desk at 
home and staff characterizations of parental involvement and support controlling for school size, 
the size of the school community and the TIMSS round. In Model 2 I include the Neighborhood 
Violence scale variable and dummy variables indicating that schools are either Affluent or 
Disadvantaged. I rely on the dummy variables as opposed to the Disadvantaged scale variable to 
allow the effect of disadvantage on staff characterizations of parental support and involvement to 
be nonlinear. Again, to ease interpretations of the relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables, I standardized the independent variables that are not dichotomous so that 
the national mean is equal to zero and it has a standard deviation of one. 
 
  
 
 
Table 4.5 OLS Regression of Staff Characterizations of Parental Support 
       United States Hong Kong  Japan Singapore Taiwan 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
2003 TIMSS 0.019 0.042 0.141 0.199** 0.174** 0.280*** -0.069 -0.066 -0.085 -0.087 
  (0.072) (0.059) (0.073) (0.071) (0.065) (0.068) (0.056) (0.052) (0.056) (0.053) 
School Size 0.067 0.003 0.127** 0.085* 0.034 0.043 0.126*** 0.078** 0.080* 0.076** 
  (0.036) (0.033) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) 
Large Community -0.074 0.119 -0.055 -0.036 -0.050 -0.063 
 
  0.091 0.067 
  (0.096) (0.079) (0.088) (0.084) (0.077) (0.075) 
 
  (0.068) (0.066) 
Small Community -0.096 -0.140* 0.084 0.003 -0.040 -0.123 
 
  -0.255 -0.194 
  (0.086) (0.071) (0.144) (0.092) (0.112) (0.108) 
 
  (0.166) (0.163) 
% Non-native Lang. 
-
0.162*** -0.026 0.006 -0.036 0.038* 0.034** -0.097** -0.067* -0.022 0.004 
  (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.017) (0.013) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
% w/ Desk at Home 0.461*** 0.170*** 0.186*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.097** 0.165*** 0.126*** 0.102*** 0.071* 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.028) 
Affluent School 
 
0.569*** 
 
0.340*** 
 
0.143 
 
0.306*** 
 
0.228*** 
  
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.066) 
Disadvantaged School 
 
-
0.359*** 
 
-0.079 
 
-0.304*** 
 
-0.423*** 
 
-0.275* 
  
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.108) 
Neighborhood Violence 
 
-
0.302*** 
 
-
0.132*** 
 
-0.081** 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.076* 
  
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.030) 
Constant 3.281*** 3.240*** 3.287*** 3.196*** 3.225*** 3.225*** 3.285*** 3.265*** 3.868*** 3.860*** 
  (0.070) (0.068) (0.091) (0.092) (0.071) (0.070) (0.036) (0.038) (0.063) (0.062) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.327 0.559 0.182 0.298 0.065 0.143 0.226 0.341 0.124 0.196 
Change in R-squared 0.232 0.116 0.078 0.115 0.072 
Observations 393 393 206 206 281 281 331 331 286 286 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
     
1
4
8
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 Table 4.5 presents the results from these analyses. Table 4.5 is divided into five panels, 
with the results for each nation displayed in a separate panel. For each nation, results of Model 1 
are located in the first column of data and results for Model 2 are in the second column. Huber-
White standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients for each variable. As 
expected, the results of Model 1 indicate a statistically significant, positive relationship at the 
school level between the proportion of parents at school who have provided their fourth grader 
with a desk at home and staff characterizations of parental support and involvement (or the 
quality of parent-school relationships). An increase of one standard deviation above the mean in 
the proportion of parents who provided their fourth grader with a desk at school is associated 
with an increase in staff characterizations of parental support and involvement of 0.50 in the 
U.S., 0.19 in Hong Kong, 0.12 in Japan, 0.19 in Singapore and 0.10 in Taiwan. 
 The adjusted R-squared for Model 1 indicates that the proportion of parents who provide 
a desk at home and the controls together explain at most 30 percent of the variation in staff 
characterizations of parental involvement (in the U.S.) and as little as 7 percent (in Japan). 
Together these findings suggest that staff characterizations of parental involvement and support, 
or the quality of parent-school relationships, is positively related at the school level to the 
proportion of involved parents.  
 The inclusion of indicators of concentrated disadvantage in the school community in 
Model 2 shed light on the relevance of Hypothesis 6 for addressing the East Asian-U.S. parental 
involvement gap. Consistent with Hypothesis 6, the results of Model 2, which are reported in the 
second column of data of each panel of Table 4.5, demonstrate a negative relationship between 
staff characterizations of parental involvement and Disadvantaged schools, net of other factors. 
The estimated negative effect of concentrated disadvantage on staff characterizations of parental 
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involvement is largest, on average, in Singapore (-0.45, statistically significant at the p<0.001 
level) followed by the U.S. (-0.36, p<0.001 level), Japan (-0.32, p<0.001 level), Taiwan (-0.28, 
p<0.05 level) and Hong Kong (-0.08, not statistically significant). Staff characterizations of 
parental involvement, or the quality of family-school relationships, also tend to be more positive 
at Affluent schools than at Average schools. The estimated effects of working at an Affluent 
school on staff characterizations of parental support and involvement, with all else held constant, 
is on average largest in the U.S. (0.58, statistically significant at the p< 0.001 level) followed by 
Hong Kong and Singapore (0.32 and statistically significant at the p< 0.001 level in both 
nations), Taiwan (0.23, p<0.001 level) and Japan (0.15, not statistically significant). This finding 
is consistent with Lareau’s (2000[1989]): school personnel in the U.S. tend to equate levels of 
parental involvement to parents’ beliefs about the importance of education and social-class 
background, as opposed to parents’ lack of knowledge or to a failure to communicate. 
 The last indicator of disadvantage in the school community, the degree of violent and 
criminal activity in the neighborhood (as measured by teachers’ reports of feeling safe at school 
and in the surrounding neighborhood), is also negatively related to staff characterizations of 
parental support and involvement, or the quality of family-school relationships. A one standard-
deviation increase on the Neighborhood Violence scale is associated with a decrease in staff 
characterizations of parental support and involvement, holding all else constant. Moreover, the 
estimated effect, which is on average largest in the U.S. (-0.31, statistically significant at the 
p<0.001 level), is statistically significant in all nations except Singapore. Taken together these 
findings provide some support for the argument that staff characterizations of parental 
involvement, or the quality of family-school relationships, are based to some extent on the 
degree of disadvantage in the school community in all nations. 
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 However, for Hypothesis 6 to be relevant to understanding the East Asian-U.S. parental 
involvement gap, the socioeconomic status of the school community must explain more of the 
variation in staff characterizations of parental involvement and support (or the quality of family-
school relationships) in the U.S. than in Japan, Singapore or Taiwan. The last row of data 
displayed in each nation’s panel in Table 4.5 report the change in the adjusted R-squared that is 
due to the inclusion of indicators of disadvantage in Model 1. These figures indicate the 
proportion of the total variance in staff characterizations of parental involvement and support, or 
the quality of family-school relationships, that can be attributed to the degree of disadvantage in 
school communities. Consistent with Hypothesis 6, concentrated disadvantage in school 
communities explains a much larger portion of the variance in staff characterizations of parental 
involvement and support in the U.S. (0.256) than in any East Asian nation. (In Singapore, the 
amount of variance explained by socioeconomic conditions is 0.139 followed by Hong Kong, 
0.112, Japan, 0.074, and Taiwan, 0.073.) To put this finding into perspective, the amount of 
variation in staff characterizations of parental involvement that is explained by disadvantage in 
school communities in the U.S. sample is nearly twice as great as in the Singapore sample, and 
three and one-third times the amount in the Taiwan sample.  
 Additional evidence that staff characterizations of parental involvement and support, or 
the quality of family-school relationships, are more strongly influenced by the degree of 
disadvantage in the school community in the U.S. than in East Asia comes from post-estimation 
significance tests on the difference in the coefficient for parental provision of a desk in Model 1 
and Model 2. As Table 4.5 reports, the estimated coefficient for the percentage of students with a 
desk at home at each school is smaller in every nation in Model 2 than in Model 1. If the 
difference is statistically significant, then this finding suggests that the relationship between the 
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proportion of parents in the school community who are involved in their children’s education (as 
measured by parental provision of a desk at home) and staff characterizations of parental 
involvement and support (or the quality of family-school relationships) is spurious. Disadvantage 
in the school community explains some of the positive association between parental provision of 
a desk at home and staff characterizations of parental involvement or support (or the quality of 
family-school relationships). Wald tests that the coefficients for the percentage of students with a 
desk at home are the same in Model 1 and Model 2 indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in any of the East Asian nations, but that it can be rejected in the U.S. (at the p < 0.001 
level). It appears as though staff characterizations of parental involvement in the U.S. are more 
influenced by the degree of disadvantage in the school community than in East Asian nations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using data from all high-achieving nations that participated in the 2003 or 2007 TIMSS fourth-
grade population, this chapter shows that while the proportion of parents who provide a desk at 
home is still higher in Japan and Taiwan than in the U.S. twenty years after Stevenson and 
Stigler (1992) publicized that finding, there is considerable variation within East Asia in the 
proportion of parents who are involved in their children’s education in this manner. The 
proportion of parents who provide their children with a desk at home is very high (although not 
uniquely so) in Japan, around the international mean in Taiwan and Singapore, and lower in 
Hong Kong than in the U.S.  
 This chapter presents empirical evidence consistent with the argument family-school 
relationships and the degree of concentrated disadvantage in the school community influence 
parents’ decisions to become involved in their children’s education. The findings show that, after 
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controlling for parent background factors and student characteristics, the likelihood that parents 
provide a desk at home varies across schools within each East Asian nation and the U.S. In all 
nations, staff characterizations of parental involvement and support, which were used to indicate 
the quality of family-school relationships in the school community, are positively related to 
provision of a desk at home. In all nations but Taiwan, the degree of concentrated disadvantage 
in the school community is negatively related to parental provision of a desk at home. Including 
these variables into the model of parental provision of a desk at home explains most, if not all (in 
the case of Taiwan) of the variation between schools in the likelihood that parents provide their 
children with a desk at home.  
 This chapter develops two hypotheses based on the alternative theory to explain the East 
Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap. The first, based on social organizational research, is that 
the degree of concentrated disadvantage in the school community negatively impacts the 
formation of high quality parent-school relationships. Consistent with this hypothesis, I show 
that the degree of concentrated disadvantage is greater in Hong Kong and the U.S. than in Japan, 
Singapore and Taiwan.  Schools with the least affluent student populations in Hong Kong and 
the U.S. enroll a greater percentage of economically disadvantaged students compared to similar 
schools in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. Unlike similar schools in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, 
where the differences between the least affluent schools and other schools in terms of resources 
and neighborhood safety are not significant, the least affluent schools in Hong Kong and the U.S. 
are located in less safe neighborhoods than other schools in those nations (according to teachers’ 
reports of feeling safe at school and in the surrounding area), and they have fewer resources that 
aid instruction than other schools. Taken together, these findings suggest that there is more 
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concentrated disadvantage in school communities in Hong Kong and the U.S. than in Singapore, 
Taiwan and Japan.  
 Further support for the hypothesis that concentrated disadvantage in the school 
community limits school staffs’ ability to foster strong bonds with parents, the analyses of this 
chapter reveal a negative association between parent-school relationships (as measured by staff 
characterizations of parental support and involvement) and socioeconomic disadvantage in 
school community in every nation under investigation. Perhaps future research could shed more 
light on the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and parental involvement by 
expanding the scope of the analysis to include a larger number of nations with high levels of 
socioeconomic inequality across schools. 
 The second hypothesis developed in this chapter to explain the East Asian-U.S. parental 
involvement gap is that educators in the U.S. attribute parents’ involvement to social-class 
background more so than educators in East Asian nations. Consistent with this argument, the 
analyses of this chapter demonstrate that in the U.S., staff characterizations of parental 
involvement and support are strongly influenced by the socioeconomic status of the school 
community. Whether or not schools enroll the most affluent or least affluent student populations 
and an indicator of neighborhood violence account for more than 25 percent of the variation in 
staff characterizations of parental involvement and support in the U.S., compared to 7.6 percent 
in Taiwan, 8.5 percent in Japan, 11.3 percent in Hong Kong and 12.8 percent in Singapore. 
Additionally, in contrast to any East Asian nation, in the U.S., some of the relationship between 
staff characterizations of parental involvement and the proportion of parents at school who 
provide their children with a desk is spurious.  
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 Although this chapter underscores the importance of school staffs’ perceptions for 
increasing parental involvement, the purpose of this chapter is not to exchange one cultural 
deprivation theory for another. Rather, I seek to highlight structural features in the U.S. 
educational system that currently reinforce staff perceptions of parental involvement. For 
example, I maintain that engaging parents in the schooling process is a skill that requires 
professional training. According to Epstein (1995), advanced degree programs for teachers in the 
U.S. do not typically emphasize parent-teacher partnerships in their curricula. State and local 
school districts could implement professional training and development programs for teachers to 
learn how to design and execute successful parental involvement programs, but this does not 
appear to be happening on a widespread basis. It is highly likely that staff attribute parental 
involvement to factors outside their control because it is difficult to increase parental 
involvement and because state and local school districts, as well as advanced degree programs 
for teachers, do not teach them how to do it.  
 To implement successful parental involvement programs, what parents do in their own 
homes with their own children needs to be considered to some degree by school staff as part of 
their professional responsibility. What U.S. scholars have failed to note is that the legal structure 
of the U.S. does not always encourage this kind of perspective, which could also be hindering 
school staffs’ ability to increase parental involvement here. Over the last six decades, U.S. 
Supreme court rulings have limited schools’ ability to act in loco parentis in part by augmenting 
students’ rights to free speech. Scholars trace this trend back to West Virginia State Board of 
Education v Barnette (1943), which ruled that schools cannot force students to recite the pledge 
of allegiance. In the decision, the court reversed the common understanding of public schools as 
institutions geared at inculcating a sense of national unity and shared values and instead 
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concluded that the U.S. public school system should cultivate rich cultural diversities. The 
decision clearly states that no government official, school teachers included, has the right to 
dictate the standards of appropriate behavior. While this legal structure does not preclude parent-
teacher partnerships, it adds another layer to an already difficult task. Future cross-national 
research might ask how variations in the legal structure regarding schools’ rights to act in loco 
parentis influence the mechanisms through which schools encourage parental involvement. 
 This chapter reveals the multiplex nature of the concept of parental involvement and 
emphasizes the importance of social resources adhering in the relationships between parents and 
school staff to increase the proportion of involved parents in school communities. However, 
appropriate measures of all of these important variables are lacking from internationally 
comparable datasets on early education, and TIMSS is no exception. More progress on 
understanding the mechanisms supporting higher proportions of involved parents in East Asian 
nations compared to the U.S. will be difficult until internationally-comparable datasets gather 
high quality data on these factors.  
 This chapter also demonstrates that to gain an accurate assessment of the number of 
parents who are involved in their children’s education or the effectiveness of their involvement, 
and to have the ability to persuasively compare this measure across nations, there are several 
important points that internationally comparative researchers should keep in mind. First, does the 
type of parental involvement being measured depend on individual schools or teachers to provide 
parents with the opportunity to engage in such an activity? The amount of time that parents 
spend helping their children with homework turns out to be a poor measure of involvement 
because it relies too heavily on the amount of homework that teachers assign to children. Other 
measures of parental involvement, such as volunteering at the school, could also pose a problem, 
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as this type of involvement depends on the frequency with which schools afford parents the 
opportunity to volunteer. Second, is the type of parental involvement under consideration heavily 
influenced by individual children’s needs and abilities? Third, is the type of parental involvement 
popular and age-appropriate in all societies under consideration? Lastly, does the measure rely 
on rated responses to survey questions? If so, national differences in responses biases need to be 
taken into account before the measure can be used to compare levels of parental involvement 
across nations. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
HE QUESTION OF WHY  East Asian nations continue to out-educate us in math is far from 
settled. Policymakers and academics tend to focus more on culture than on demonstrable 
differences in the math education and support for learning that East Asian systems provide 
compared to the U.S., and few have taken advantage of the high-quality, internationally 
comparable datasets available to empirically investigate East Asian education. This is what 
sociologists can bring to the table.  
 Analysis of data from the 2003 and 2007 TIMSS fourth-grade population has shown that 
variation in the quantity of math instruction fourth-grade students receive is smaller in all East 
Asian educational systems than in the U.S.; that the minimum percentage of math topics students 
might be taught is higher in East Asian educational systems than in the U.S., and that there tends 
to be more agreement regarding the curriculum among teachers in East Asian educational 
systems than in the U.S. These findings suggest that, compared to the U.S., the quantity of 
educational opportunities are more equitably distributed among fourth-grade students in East 
Asian educational systems. Further, it appears from these data that East Asian educational 
T 
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systems are doing a better job than the U.S. of ensuring that all fourth graders have access to 
basic math knowledge.  
 Additionally, the analysis has shown that educational systems like the U.S., which allow 
more variation in the quantity of math instruction provided across same-grade classrooms and 
also allow teachers to cover only a small fraction of the math topics that students are typically 
taught, tend to have lower average math achievement scores than those that ensure a higher 
baseline of instruction and less variation in the quantity of instruction that students receive. 
While not conclusive, this evidence is consistent with the argument that the institutional 
arrangements in the U.S. that allow for greater variability in the math instruction provided might 
be partially responsible for the poor performance of U.S. students on international assessments in 
math.  
 It is still unclear whether uniformity of instruction on its own would increase average 
achievement or whether curriculum preparation, teacher training in the curriculum or other 
factors regarding the curriculum that were not included in the analyses of this dissertation but 
might positively impact both the uniformity of instruction and average achievement, are to credit 
for the positive relationship between uniformity of instruction and achievement. The analysis of 
this dissertation cannot rule out the possibility that experimentation and variation in instructional 
content, coupled with a rigorously designed core curriculum or some such, could also promote 
achievement.  
 The analysis has also shown that East Asian teachers are considerably more effective at 
motivating student achievement in math than teachers in the U.S. Among students who have 
received the same quantity of instruction, average achievement is statistically significantly higher 
in East Asian nations than in the U.S. This work has shown that the most effective fourth-grade 
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math teachers in the U.S. are about as effective as the average teacher in Japan, and less effective 
than the average in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. These findings are consistent with the 
argument that the relative inability of U.S. teachers to encourage math achievement is a prime 
determinant of the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap. 
 The analysis has also indicated that increasing the amount of material that students are 
taught does not necessarily increase achievement. At the system level there does not appear to be 
a coherent relationship between quantity of instruction and achievement. Although average 
achievement varies little within East Asia, there is considerable variation within East Asia in the 
quantity of math topics on the TIMSS assessment that fourth-graders are taught. On average 
across rounds, students in Singapore are taught about 85 percent of the test topics, while students 
in Japan are taught around 58 percent. Students in Hong Kong and Taiwan receive instruction on 
roughly 75 percent of the TIMSS topics. In comparison, students in the U.S. are taught about as 
many TIMSS math topics as are students in Singapore. Further, there does not appear to be a 
relationship at the student level between quantity of instruction and achievement. Holding 
student and school characteristics constant, including the percentage of test topics that students 
have been taught into three-level hierarchical models of student achievement does not predict 
achievement in any nation under investigation. While the results of this analysis are not 
conclusive, they suggest that the relationship between quantity of instruction and achievement is 
more complicated than the idea that the more students are taught, the more they will know. 
 Multilevel models of student achievement have also shed light on the extent to which 
teacher effectiveness varies within each nation. These results demonstrate that teachers in Hong 
Kong and Singapore vary significantly in their effectiveness—even after the quantity of 
instruction they provide is taken into account. In fact, variation in teacher effectiveness is greater 
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in those two East Asian nations than it is in the U.S. Thus, while Hong Kong and Singapore 
compared to the U.S. appear to have attained more uniformity of math instruction across 
classrooms, they do not appear to have achieved significant uniformity in the quality of 
instruction they provide.  By contrast, teacher effectiveness varies little in Japan and Taiwan, 
where there is also significant uniformity of math instruction across same-grade classrooms. 
These findings suggest that Japan and Taiwan are closest to having realized one of the core goals 
of schooling, which is to provide equal educational opportunities to all students. 
 However, results from multilevel models are far from conclusive because the precision of 
the measures of teacher effectiveness that they provide depends on students and teachers being 
randomly assigned to schools and to classrooms within schools. Practices such as ability 
grouping and assigning more experienced teachers to higher ability classrooms can influence the 
amount of variation in teacher effectiveness these types of models measure. Although this 
dissertation attempts to control for the nonrandom assignment of students to classrooms by 
including a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not schools group fourth-grade students 
my ability in math, it cannot account for the nonrandom assignment of teachers to schools or to 
classrooms within schools. Further, there is no way with the present data to take into 
consideration parents’ choice of schools for their children. For this reason, results of multilevel 
models of teacher effectiveness should not be considered decisive. 
 It is widely believed that one reason for the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap is that a 
greater proportion of parents in East Asia than in the U.S. are involved in their children’s 
education, and that East Asian parents are more effectively involved.  The release of the best-
selling Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother (Chua 2011) fueled popular opinion that Chinese 
mothers are unforgiving in their quest to raise A+ students while Western parents by comparison 
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are lackadaisical about stimulating their children’s talents and abilities. Given the popularity of 
using cultural stereotypes to explain why East Asian parents are more involved in their children’s 
education than U.S. parents, it is time for an alternative theory and for a rigorous analysis of 
recent, nationally representative data to inform this debate.  
 Unfortunately, all internationally comparable datasets on early education, including 
TIMSS, lack multiple high-quality measures of parental involvement from the nations under 
investigation. Fortunately, there is one indicator of parental involvement available in the TIMSS 
dataset—parental provision of a study desk at home—that is useful for several reasons. First, it is 
the same measure that Stevenson and Stigler (1992) draw on, which allows me to verify their 
results using nationally representative data. Additionally, provision of a desk at home is a good 
measure of parental involvement for internationally comparative research. This is because the 
measure relies on a survey question that requires a “yes” or “no” response, so it should not be 
biased by differences in national response styles. Also, unlike time spent helping children with 
homework, which depends on children’s needs and the amount of homework that teachers 
assign, whether or not parents provide their children with a desk at home is a decision that is 
mainly up to parents. Further, unlike a measure such as the amount of time that parents spend 
talking with children about schoolwork, which appears to differ across racial/ethnic groups (Kao 
2004), provision of a desk at home is a common way that parents can demonstrate the 
importance of education to their children in both East Asia and the U.S. Despite the utility of this 
indicator, the lack of other measures of parental involvement and data on parent-school 
relationships means that the major contributions of Chapter 4 are theoretical.  
 I have shown that among all high-achieving nations, the proportion of parents who had 
provided their fourth-graders with a desk at home is high—although not uniquely so—in Japan, 
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around the international average in Taiwan and Singapore, and lower in Hong Kong than in the 
U.S. Specifically, the percentage of students with a study desk at home is 94 percent in Japan, 89 
percent in Singapore, 87 percent in Taiwan, 77 percent in the U.S. and 72 percent in Hong Kong. 
This finding does not reflect a greater household income disparity in Hong Kong and the U.S. 
than in Japan, Taiwan and Singapore: while the average Gini coefficient of income inequality 
over the latter half of the 20
th
 century as reported by Deininger and Squire (1996) is largest 
among all five nations in Hong Kong (41.6), it is significantly smaller in the U.S. (35.3) than in 
Singapore (40.1).
 40
  
 Prevailing theory on the East Asian-U.S. parental involvement gap, which attributes the 
higher levels of parental involvement in East Asia to Confucianism, cannot explain why the 
percentage of parents who provide their children with a desk at home is lower in Taiwan than in 
Japan (the two nations in this study that are arguably most influenced by Confucian philosophy). 
Meanwhile, the U.S.-based theory on parental involvement that has received the most attention 
in recent sociological journals claims that parents’ social-class background largely determines 
their involvement (Lareau 2000[1989], 2002, 2003). This theory cannot explain why 94 percent 
of parents in Japan provide their children with a desk at home. By drawing attention to the work 
of Coleman (1991, 1994) and Epstein (1986, 1995), who take into account the effect of the social 
organization of the school community on parents’ decisions to become involved in their 
children’s education, this dissertation has provided a theoretical way out of this morass.  
 Both Coleman (1991, 1994) and Epstein (1986, 1995) stress the role of social capital in 
the school community in influencing the proportion of parents who are involved in their 
children’s education. Both Coleman and Epstein contend that school staff can work to develop 
                                                     
40
 According to Deininger and Squire (1996), the average Gini coefficient over the latter half of the 20
th
 century in 
the U.S. (35.3) is just slightly larger than in Japan (34.8). It is smallest among all three nations in Taiwan (29.6). 
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the types of social capital that encourage parental involvement. Coleman would do this by 
creating information channels between parents and staff, while Epstein also emphasizes the 
importance of building relationships with parents that are based on mutual trust and respect. I 
build on these theories by taking into account the finding from social organizational research that 
concentrated disadvantage in a community tends to stymie the development of mutual trust and 
respect (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). In so doing, I highlight how features of the 
school community influence the amount of work that school staff must undertake to develop the 
social capital needed to involve parents in the schooling process: staff at schools in communities 
of concentrated disadvantage are going to face more obstacles than are staff at schools in affluent 
communities. This argument leads us to expect that the likelihood of involvement varies across 
schools, even after controlling for parent background; that concentrated disadvantage is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of involvement, and that effective parent-school 
relationships are positively associated with parental involvement.  
 While the results are not conclusive, this dissertation provides evidence that is consistent 
with the preceding hypotheses. Two-level logistic regression models have shown that, holding 
constant school and student-level indicators of socioeconomic status, some of the variation in the 
likelihood of parental provision of a desk is due to differences between schools. The models have 
also shown that the socioeconomic status of the school community as well as the quality of 
parent-school relationships, as measured by school staffs’ characterization of parental support, 
tend to be related to parental provision of a desk at home—even after taking parental 
characteristics into account. While these findings are correlations and thus do not necessarily 
indicate causation, they represent a step in the direction of gathering empirical evidence that is 
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consistent with the argument that features of the school that children attend can influence their 
parents’ decisions to become involved. 
 This dissertation has also developed two hypotheses to explain why the types of social 
capital necessary to promote parental involvement might be less plentiful in U.S. schools than in 
East Asian schools. First, I suggest that concentrated disadvantage in the school community 
limits the capacity of school staff to develop relationships with parents that are based on mutual 
trust and respect. This would explain why school staff in the U.S. are less able to encourage 
parental involvement if levels of concentrated disadvantage tend to be higher in the U.S. than in 
Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. Indeed, the analyses have demonstrated that the degree of 
concentrated disadvantage is higher among the lowest socioeconomic schools in Hong Kong and 
the U.S. than among those in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. Given that the degree of income 
inequality in the U.S. is only slightly higher than in Japan, this finding is not simply reflecting 
the greater income inequality in the U.S. than in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan (Deininger and 
Squire 1996). Schools with the least affluent student populations in Hong Kong and the U.S. 
enroll a greater percentage of economically disadvantaged students compared to similar schools 
in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. Unlike similar schools in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, where 
the differences between the least affluent schools and other schools in terms of resources and 
neighborhood safety are not significant, the least affluent schools in Hong Kong and the U.S. are 
located in less safe neighborhoods than other schools in those nations (according to teachers’ 
reports of feeling safe at school and in the surrounding area), and they have fewer resources that 
aid instruction than other schools.  The political and institutional arrangements that allow for 
economic segregation of students in schools and for resources that aid instruction to be unequally 
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distributed across economically segregated schools might be partially to blame for the lower 
proportion of involved parents in the U.S. compared to Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. 
 The other hypothesis to explain why the types of social capital conducive to fostering 
parental involvement might be less abundant in U.S. schools than in East Asian schools states 
that school staff in the U.S. are more apt to allow the socioeconomic status of the school 
community to influence their perceptions of parental involvement. I suggest that until school 
staff perceive of parental involvement as something that they can influence, as opposed to 
something that is determined by social class status, it is unlikely that they will invest their time 
and energy into encouraging parents to become involved in their children’s education. The 
analyses have shown that the socioeconomic status of the school community and the degree to 
which teachers feel safe working in the school together account for a sizeable proportion of the 
variation in staff characterizations of parental involvement and support in the U.S. Additional 
evidence that school staff in the U.S. base their characterizations of parental support on social-
class background comes from the fact that—in contrast to all East Asian nations—in the U.S., 
some of the relationship between staff characterizations of parental involvement and the 
proportion of parents at school who provide their children with a desk is spurious. These findings 
lend some support to the argument that teaching training and support programs in the U.S. have 
not done enough to prepare educators to involve parents in the schooling process. 
 
IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Putting research on the East Asian-U.S. achievement gap on sounder empirical and 
methodological footing has shone the spotlight on the strengths and weaknesses in the literature 
and opened up several pathways for future research. The analyses of Chapter 2 lend support to 
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Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) argument that the achievement gap might stem from the relative 
uniformity of instruction across same-grade classrooms in East Asia compared to the U.S. 
Stevenson and Stigler point to the national curriculum standards of Japan and Taiwan to explain 
the relative uniformity of instruction there, and recommend that the U.S. adopt national 
curriculum standards to decrease the variability of instruction. While this dissertation did not 
examine the mechanisms through which educational systems encourage uniformity of 
instruction, it seems highly unlikely that national curriculum standards on their own are 
responsible for the degree of uniformity of instruction that Stevenson and Stigler witnessed in 
Japan and Taiwan. This is because only 7 of the 42 nations that participated in the 2003 or 2007 
TIMSS did not have national curriculum standards. To understand how educational systems 
achieve significant uniformity of instruction across same-grade classrooms, future research 
might examine the relationship between uniformity of instruction and the various methods that 
nations use to monitor and enforce those standards. 
 The clarity and consistency of the standards themselves might also influence 
achievement—as well as the uniformity of instruction provided—regardless of the various 
methods used to hold schools and teachers accountable for the amount of instruction the provide 
If curriculum standards are easily accessible and transparent, then presumably a greater 
proportion of teachers will be aware of what they are supposed to teach and similarly, more 
parents will know what their children are supposed to be learning.  
 The analysis of Chapter 3 have shown that teachers in Japan and Taiwan do not vary 
much in their ability to promote math achievement, and that the amount of variation in teacher 
effectiveness within Hong Kong and Singapore is substantial. In so doing, this dissertation has 
opened up paths for future research on the structural features of educational systems that lead to 
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more or less uniformity in teacher effectiveness. To understand which structural features 
contribute to greater uniformity in teacher effectiveness, future research might examine 
similarities and differences between Japan and Taiwan compared to Hong Kong and Singapore 
in teacher recruitment, training programs, hiring practices and professional support and 
development (for work in this direction see: Wang et al. 2003).   
 The implemented curriculum, or what students are taught, is clearly important. Previous 
work by Westbury (1992) contends that the reason East Asian math teachers appear to be more 
effective than their U.S. counterparts is because East Asian teachers cover more material in class 
than U.S. teachers typically cover. The underlying argument is similar to Sørensen and Morgan’s 
(2000), which is that schools that teach more material produce more learning. Results from 
Chapter 3 do not support this position.  Instead, the analysis has shown that among students who 
were taught the same number of math topics, average achievement scores are higher in East 
Asian nations than in the U.S. Future research might move beyond differences in quantity of 
instruction to focus on differences in the quality of instruction. For example, future research 
might focus on curriculum sequencing; pedagogical styles (for work in this direction see Stigler 
and Hiebert 1999; Leung 2005); textbooks and workbooks and the emphasis placed on theory 
versus practice in teacher training programs. Given that teachers in the U.S. tend to teach roughly 
the same percentage of TIMSS math topics as teachers in Singapore, future research might focus 
specifically on exploring the similarities and differences in the curriculum and pedagogy of those 
two nations (for work in this direction see Ginsburg et al. 2005).  
 Research on the relative academic success of East Asian students compared to their U.S. 
counterparts tends to underscore the role of East Asian parents in the achievement process. 
Immigrant studies as well as internationally comparative research contends that a greater 
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proportion of East Asian parents are involved in their children’s education, and more effectively 
involved, than U.S. parents. This dissertation has highlighted several empirical and theoretical 
weaknesses in this part of the literature. While previous research supplies some empirical 
evidence that a greater proportion of parents in East Asian nations than in the U.S. are involved 
in their children’s education, there is little empirical support for the argument that East Asian 
parents are more effectively involved than U.S. parents because Confucianism places a high 
value on education. The only evidence that national cultural legacies lead to divergent parenting 
practices come from small-scale studies of immigrants to the U.S. (for example, Okagaki and 
Sternberg 1993). Future research might focus on collecting original data from comparable 
samples of parents in East Asian nations and the U.S. to better examine the relationship between 
beliefs in the importance of education and the nature of parental involvement (for similar 
research see: Yamamoto, Holloway and Suzuki 2006). Mickelson’s (1990) work might inform 
this research. Mickelson contends that beliefs about the value of education are multidimensional. 
There are abstract beliefs, which reflect the societal consensus about the importance of education 
for future life chances, and concrete beliefs, which reflect the returns from education that 
students can expect to receive. Mickelson shows that concrete beliefs vary more among students 
than abstract beliefs and have more predictive power over student achievement than abstract 
beliefs. Future research might benefit by trying to measure parents’ concrete beliefs about the 
value of education as opposed to their abstract beliefs.  
 Chapter 4 has emphasized the significance of the social resources that adhere in the 
relationships between parents and schools for increasing the proportion of involved parents in 
school communities. One of these is mutual trust and respect, which social organizational 
research has shown difficult to foster in communities of concentrated disadvantage (Sampson et 
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al. 1997). I have shown that there are more school communities characterized by concentrated 
disadvantage in Hong Kong and the U.S. than in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, which might 
explain why the proportion of involved parents is lower in the U.S. and Hong Kong than the 
other three nations. Future research might test this hypothesis by including more nations in the 
analysis.  
 Chapter 4 has shown that there is more concentrated disadvantage in school communities 
in Hong Kong and the U.S. than in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. However, staff 
characterizations of parental involvement are less influenced by the socioeconomic status of the 
school community in Hong Kong than in the U.S. This is important because, as I have argued, 
school staff are less likely to devote time and energy into engaging parents who are less involved 
in their children’s education if staff attribute parental involvement to social class as opposed to 
factors over which they have some control (e.g. parents’ knowledge of their children’s 
educational needs). U.S. education would thus benefit from understanding why staff at schools in 
communities of concentrated disadvantage in Hong Kong do not base their characterizations of 
parental support primarily on social class.  
 Although school staff can create and reinforce the social resources in the school 
community that encourage parental involvement, appropriate measures of these variables are 
lacking from internationally comparable datasets on early education. Future research on the 
mechanisms supporting higher proportions of involved parents in East Asian nations compared 
to the U.S. might gather high-quality data on the specific strategies school staff utilize to engage 
parents in the schooling process; the regularity with which they carry out these strategies, and the 
extent to which they attempt to reach out to less-involved parents. Documenting differences 
across educational systems in the extent to which teacher-training programs prepare teachers to 
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engage parents in the schooling process might also help us understand system-level differences 
in the proportion of involved parents.  
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN THE DATA 
In many ways, the quality of internationally comparable educational data circumscribe the 
research we are able to conduct. TIMSS has many strengths, which lead to greater insight into 
the impact of formal education on student achievement in math and science. This is for several 
reasons. First, TIMSS surveys 9-year-old students who are near the beginning of their formal 
education. This is beneficial because education is cumulative; for the majority of students 
surveyed, the elementary school they are attending is the only one they have ever attended. 
Therefore, the connections between the school inputs on the one hand, and student (or parent) 
outputs on the other are stronger than they are for students in their final year of secondary 
schooling. Additionally, unlike other “general use” tests that are used in international 
assessment, TIMSS strives to test the material that students learn in school. This practice allows 
us to examine more closely the relationship between the educational opportunities students 
receive and student achievement. Lastly, compared to most other international assessments, 
TIMSS provides tremendous insight into the curriculum of each educational system. The 
information gathered from the Teacher Questionnaire regarding the math topics on the TIMSS 
assessment that students have been taught makes TIMSS unique for allowing researchers to 
analyze the relationship between the quantity of instruction that students receive and the amount 
of knowledge students gained from that instruction. 
 There are some weaknesses in the TIMSS dataset, which limit the amount of insight 
research can gain into teacher effectiveness and the relationship between schools and parental 
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involvement. Insight into teacher effectiveness is limited in part by the sampling design, which 
calls for participating educational systems to survey just one classroom per school. To 
distinguish the amount of variance in student achievement that is due to teachers from the 
amount that is due to schools, the survey needs to collect data from more than one fourth-grade 
classroom in each school. Fortunately, most educational systems collect data from more than one 
classroom in a school, but the numbers are small and thus make for less reliable samples. It is 
also difficult for research to gain traction on the factors that make some fourth-grade teachers 
more effective than others because TIMSS does not collect information on teaching methods and 
beliefs from fourth-grade teachers.  
 Although parents are one of the primary influences on student achievement in early 
elementary education, TIMSS does not offer much insight into the efforts educational systems, 
schools and teachers make to engage parents in the schooling process. The questions on the 
Principal Questionnaire regarding the school’s expectations for parents do not do enough to 
differentiate schools by the importance they place on including parents. The survey instruments 
do not cover the strategies that school staff use to encourage parental involvement, nor do they 
ask teachers about the training or support they receive in inviting parents to play an active role in 
their children’s education. It seems as though great progress on the reasons for achievement gaps 
between nations will not be made until international assessments take parents—and what schools 
do to engage parents—into account. 
 
THE FUTURE OF DATA COLLECTION 
To improve the quality of data gathered, and thus the quality of the work that scholars might 
conduct on international comparative education, I offer the following suggestions: 
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 Change the default setting Require that each school survey at least two, fourth-grade 
classrooms. This will provide better data with which to gauge teacher effectiveness 
within each educational system. 
 Ask about teaching methods and beliefs Include on the fourth-grade Teacher 
Questionnaire sections concerning their teaching methods and beliefs about math. These 
are already included on the eighth-grade Teacher Questionnaire and could be easily 
adapted for the fourth-grade. The information garnered from these questions might bring 
us closer to understanding why some fourth-grade teachers are more effective than others 
at imparting math knowledge. 
 Make parents a priority The Principal Questionnaire currently includes a section of 
questions on parental involvement that do tell us about the strategies that schools use to 
engage parents in the schooling process. Rather than focus on the school’s expectations 
for parents, this section would ask about the communication that occurs between school 
staff and parents. For example, how frequently does the school communicate with 
parents? In what manner does the school typically communicate with parents? Does the 
school typically reach out to parents outside an official event only when a student is in 
trouble? Further, the Teacher Questionnaire would include at least one question about 
their training and/or preparation to include parents in the schooling process, or on the 
emphasis their school makes to communicate with parents. Ideally, the study would 
collect data from parents on their socioeconomic status and involvement methods, which 
the U.S. would make available for research.
41
 
                                                     
41
 The Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) already includes a Parent Questionnaire. However, 
there is no data from the U.S. on this portion of the study. 
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 Survey more teachers The greater the number of teachers surveyed about the school 
environment, the more accurate our understanding of the school environment becomes. 
Then, research might account for the bias and error in individual teacher’s responses by 
constructing multilevel structural equations that correct for these shortcomings 
(Raudenbush and Sampson 1999a; Raudenbush and Sampson 1999b). Assuming that 
there are not many more fourth-grade teachers than those already included in the study, 
teachers in the third and fifth grade might be targeted. The questionnaire for these 
teachers would include not only background questions and questions pertaining to the 
school environment, but would also ask teachers the grade level at which they believe 
students should be taught each of the math topics that appear on the TIMSS test. This last 
section of questions would provide insight into the level of agreement among teachers 
regarding the math curriculum.  
 State participation increases The U.S. participates in TIMSS and other international 
assessments as a single educational system. However, given that power over education 
rests with each state, it would make more sense if the individual states participated 
separately, like the Canadian provinces. The study could then create population weights 
such that data from each state might be combined to create a nationally representative 
sample. 
 Longitudinal studies  All current internationally comparative educational studies are 
cross-sectional, which means that scholars can examine relationships between variables 
but not cause. Conducting a longitudinal analysis would go a long way towards helping 
educators and policymakers understand the impact of educational inputs on student 
outputs. 
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 Despite the areas of TIMSS (and internationally comparative educational datasets in 
general) in need of improvement, the chief conclusion of this dissertation is that these data can 
be used to conduct rigorous analyses.  
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